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Introduction
This thesis contributes to the area of Microeconomic Theory, by addressing questions on in-
formational effects and information design in game-theoretic settings. In the first chapter, I
analyze the implications of rational inattention for monopoly pricing. Chapters 2 and 3 cover
topics on information acquisition and disclosure in auctions, contests, and matching markets.
The focus of Chapter 4 is on understanding how the composition of committees affects collective
decisions.
Even though, the applications and settings of the models that I study in this thesis may
seem diverse at first, they all address different aspects of the following question: How does the
information of agents influence the outcome in strategic situations, and what are the resulting
implications for information design?
Chapter 1 contributes to the relatively young research area of information design. The recent
interest in this topic can (to some extent) be attributed to the rapid advance of information
technologies, which has changed our access to information, and thus the nature of decision
making. One could argue that it is not the main challenge anymore to gather enough information
to make an informed decision. The bottleneck is rather the limited capacity of a decision maker
to pay attention to all of the available information. The literature on rational inattention,
initiated by Sims (1998, 2003, 2006), captures this idea. It assumes that information is fully
and freely available, but agents encounter costs or face a constraint to process this information.
This raises the question how a decision maker should optimally divide his limited attention,
in order to acquire information when facing a specific decision problem. Here, the decision
maker designs his own information environment. The complementary question, how to optimally
design the information environment of another agent in order to influence his actions in a way
that is profitable for the information designer (or sender), is studied in the Bayesian persuasion
literature (see Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011, and subsequent papers). Typically, the literature
studies settings in which agents face decision problems, i.e., non-strategic environments.
In Chapter 1, I study the implications of a rationally inattentive consumer on optimal
pricing. The analysis considers a strategic environment, in which the consumer chooses an
information structure and makes a purchasing decision, the seller chooses an optimal price.
The consumer may face a capacity constraint, which limits the amount of information that he
can process.
In this setting, the consumer’s information choice not only determines his value estimate or
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willingness to pay for the product. It also affects the effective, interim demand function that
the seller faces, and hence may influence the seller’s (optimal) pricing behavior. In the essay,
I show that by being inattentive (i.e. ignoring some information), the consumer can induce or
persuade the seller to offer better terms of trade, that is, to charge a lower price.
I provide a completely analytical solution to this problem.1 The first main result is, that
the equilibrium is determined by the consumer’s information structure, and has the following
three characterizing properties: (1) The consumer-optimal information structure is monotone
partitional. This means that the space of consumer’s valuations can be partitioned into subin-
tervals, and the consumer only learns in which range his true valuation falls. (2) In equilibrium,
all gains from trade are realized. (3) Every equilibrium satisfies a property that I refer to as
seller-indifference. This means, that the induced demand function that the seller faces is an
equal revenue curve. The seller is indifferent between charging prices equal to any of the value
estimates induced by the equilibrium information structure. By leveling the seller to a revenue
level, the consumer leaves her with just enough surplus in order to guarantee that she does not
want to deviate to a higher price level.
The second main result shows that even in the absence of information constraints and costs,
the consumer does not want to become perfectly informed. This means that even if the con-
sumer can learn his true valuation at no cost, he prefers to commit to ignoring information
about low values, whereas the information about high values is chosen to be more precise and
may be perfectly informative. By not paying attention to information that would separate low
valuations, the consumer commits to buy at an intermediate price, that is, at a price that
will sometimes be higher than his true valuation. Thus, the consumer offers the seller a higher
probability of trade. Given that the consumer can design his information environment, he has a
lot of power – he effectively designs the demand curve that the seller faces. By dividing his at-
tention optimally he can thus induce the seller to offer a lower price. In return for the increased
probability of trade, the seller offers better terms of trade, that is, a lower price. Hence, the
positive effect of additional gains from trade reverberates back to the consumer. The consumer
obtains a higher expected surplus.
Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis contribute to the literature studying informational effects in
markets, and endogenous information in Mechanism Design.
Mechanism or Market Design considers settings in which a number of players who hold
private information interact. The task of the mechanism or market designer is to create a game
that provides the players with the right incentives to reveal their private information, such that
the objective – for example the efficient allocation of resources or revenue maximization – is
best met. Typical examples are auctions, contests, and matching markets. In auctions, bidders
have private information about their valuation for the object for which they bid. In contests,
contestants are privately informed about their skills and exert effort to compete for prizes. In
1By contrast, the results in the rational inattention literature often focus on specific information environments
(e.g. normal experiments), or are based on numerical solutions.
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matching markets, agents signal their characteristics to compete for match partners.
In the traditional mechanism design setting, the private information of agents is exogenously
given. Recently, there are various papers that relax this assumption. This research analyzes
how the precision of private information held by players influences the equilibrium outcome in
a market, and identifies the optimal level of information for players. The next step is then to
include the information acquisition decision of players into the mechanism design problem, and
to design a mechanism that creates both, the right incentives to acquire information, and to
then reveal this private information truthfully.
Much of this research focuses on the auction setting and studies the informational effects
on the allocation and on the seller’s revenue.2 Extending this line of research, in Chapter 2, I
analyze how the level of information of participants in a two-sided matching market affects the
match outcome and welfare. The analysis is based on the matching model in Hoppe et al. (2009),
in which agents have to invest in non-productive signaling to compete for match partners. The
model incorporates as special cases auctions and contests, which can be considered as one-sided
matching markets. Auctions match objects to buyers, and bids serve as signals, whereas contests
match prizes to contestants, and efforts serve as signals.
The analysis shows that providing more precise information to market participants has two
main effects: First, increased information of market participants allows for a better allocation
and thus for a higher expected match output. Second, increased information of market partici-
pants may yield higher investments in (wasteful) signaling due to amplified competition among
agents. The effects depend on whether the additional or more precise information is provided
to the short or to the long side of the market. The second effect on signaling investments may
dominate. For matching markets, where signaling investments are assumed to be wasteful, it
may thus happen that increased precision of information reduces welfare. Specifically, the in-
creased competition within groups may eat up all of the additional match surplus made possible
by the higher information level of market participants.
An application of the results are promotion contests and feedback systems in companies.
The results of Chapter 2 suggest, that the effect of providing more precise information to con-
testants on aggregate effort depends on the ratio of contestants and prizes in the promotion
contest. Hence, different feedback systems are optimal, depending on the organizational struc-
ture of a company. In organizations with steeper hierarchies or an up-or-out system, strong
feedback systems should optimally be implemented, for example by a high frequency of peri-
odical performance reports. By contrast, for organizations with flat hierarchies or promotion
by seniority practices, the results suggest less sophisticated feedback structures. These predic-
tions of optimal feedback policies seem to be in line with common practices. For example, large
consulting firms with an up-or-out policy are known to have a very rigorous feedback structure.
The methodological contribution of Chapter 2 lies in suggesting single-crossing precision as a
new informativeness criterion. This concept establishes a link between the information orders in
2See e.g. Persico (2000), Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007), Ganuza and Penalva (2010), Shi (2012), and
the summary of Bergemann and Välimäki (2007).
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Ganuza and Penalva (2010) and the heterogeneity order in Hoppe et al. (2009). The connection
allows to use the powerful tools from majorization theory that Hoppe et al. (2009) adopt in
their analysis, to study informational effects in matching markets, contests and auctions.
The results and applications of Chapter 2 suggest information management as an addition
to the toolbox of a (mechanism) designer. It may sometimes be infeasible or complicated for the
designer to change certain structures or rules of a game. For example, in a promotion contest
the number and value of prizes (jobs on the next higher level) may be fixed. In these situations,
it can be easier to influence or design the information environment of agents, for example by
introducing more or less precise feedback systems in a company.
The analysis of Chapter 3 is a technical contribution to the literature on mechanism design
with endogenous information.
In traditional mechanism design settings with exogenously given private information, reg-
ularity conditions (such as increasing virtual valuations or a monotone hazard rate) are often
imposed in order to simplify the analysis, and to avoid technicalities, specifically ironing-out
procedures. Moreover, they guarantee that (optimal) mechanisms have a specific, regular form.
In a mechanism design setting with endogenous information, the distribution of posterior
types of agents emerges from the information acquisition or disclosure choices of the agents.
In such settings, conditions that guarantee regularity of the distribution of posterior types are
essential for tractability. Without these conditions a circular effect could arise: small changes in
the information level of agents could result in significant changes of the structure of the optimal
mechanism, which would change the incentives to acquire or disclose information. This effect
would render the model fragile, complicate the analysis tremendously, and make the model
untractable.
In Chapter 3, I identify sufficient conditions on the primitives of an information struc-
ture that guarantee that certain regularity properties of the prior distribution – an increasing
hazard rate, increasing virtual valuations or costs – translate to the distribution of posterior
estimates. These characterization results make it possible to study mechanism design problems
with endogenous information, without imposing regularity conditions on the interim stage or
restricting attention to specific information structures. Applications to information acquisition
and disclosure in optimal auctions, and to allocation problems without money are discussed.
Chapter 4 considers a committee voting situation. The novel aspect of this model is that, in
an interdependent values environment, it introduces a second dimension of private information,
about the preference type of agents. The goal of the analysis is to understand how private
preference types, preference uncertainty, and the composition of the committee affect collective
decisions.
In the essay, I study a situation in which a committee faces a binary decision: whether to
accept a proposal or to stay with the status quo. Proposals that are put to vote are complex
and committee members can only assess the quality of a particular dimension of it. Agents care
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about every aspect of the proposal, but are biased towards the factor that they can evaluate
best. One could think for example about a board committee, which has to decide on whether to
adopt a proposal for a product update or not. Committee members can best assess the quality
of the proposal in their dimension of expertise – for example technological or design aspects.
They will typically be biased towards this dimension but also be aware of the importance of
the other dimensions and hence care about all of them.
The extent of such partisanship is typically intrinsic in nature and can be regarded as
part of the personality of an individual. In the model, committee members hence hold two-
dimensional private information: about a quality criterion of the proposal, and about their
individual preference type.
In the essay, I first establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium in undominated strategies.
In equilibrium, agents adopt cutoff-strategies: An agent accepts an alternative whenever his
private quality signal is above a certain threshold. Moreover, it is shown that an agent’s private
preference type is reflected in the cutoff that he adopts. Strongly partisan agents base their
votes mostly on their own observed signal. More socially-oriented types adjust their acceptance
thresholds based on the information that they can derive from the event of being pivotal.
Hence, for less partisan preference types, acceptance standards move away from the sincere
voting threshold. For example, under unanimity voting, partisan agents adopt higher acceptance
standards than their more socially-oriented colleagues.
Based on the equilibrium characterization, I then address the questions how private prefer-
ence types and the composition of the committee affect collective decisions. It is shown that as
the partisanship level of the population of committee members increases, agents adjust their
acceptance standards more. Equilibrium cutoffs move away from the sincere voting threshold.
By contrast, agents who believe to find themselves in a committee with a more heterogeneous
distribution of preference types are more uncertain about the preference types of the other com-
mittee members. Hence, they will base their vote more on their own private signal. Equilibrium
cutoffs move towards the sincere voting threshold.
Applications of this work include decisions of corporate boards on how to invest, whom
to hire, and whether or not to adopt a new technology. Further examples are the allocation of
research grants or the approval of new drugs by the FDA. The results allow to make predictions,
regarding the acceptance standards and acceptance sets of such committees. For example, for
decisions that require unanimity, one should expect that committees whose members display a
high level of heterogeneity of preference types only accept alternatives that are of sufficiently
high quality in every dimension. Moreover, if committee members over-estimate the level of
partisanship of fellow committee members they will adopt too low acceptance standards.
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Chapter 1
Is Ignorance Bliss?
Rational Inattention and Optimal Pricing
A rationally inattentive consumer processes information about his valuation prior to
making his purchasing decision. In a monopoly pricing problem, I study the case in
which information processing constraints restrict the consumer to finite information
structures. The limiting, unconstrained case is analyzed as well.
Any finite equilibrium information structure satisfies three properties: It is partitional ,
guarantees seller-indifference, and induces efficient trade. The consumer strictly
benefits from having access to information structures with more signal realizations.
Every equilibrium information structure yields only a coarse perception about low
values, whereas the information about high values is more precise and may be
perfectly informative. In equilibrium, trade is efficient and the consumer is strictly
better off than under monopoly pricing for a fully attentive consumer. Surprisingly,
even in the absence of information processing constraints and costs, the consumer
does not want to become perfectly informed.
1 Introduction
The rapid advance of information technologies and access to large data has changed the nature
of decision making. As the gathering of information has become easier, the processing of infor-
mation has become increasingly challenging. A rational consumer, who may only have limited
cognitive capacity, can now choose which information to process and what to learn about his
valuation for a good. In this situation, how should a consumer optimally process information?
And what are the implications for optimal pricing?
In this essay, I study a rationally inattentive consumer who faces this information processing
problem in a monopoly pricing model. The consumer has to decide how much to learn about
his valuation for the good, prior to observing the price and making the purchasing decision.
The consumer faces the following trade-off: His information choice determines the estimate of
his valuation for the product, and the interim demand function that the seller faces. The seller
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might be induced to charge a higher price when facing a more informed consumer. Hence, the
consumer may be better off by knowing less.
The aim of this essay is to identify the economic effects that arise as a result of this new
feature of the model. The analysis provides answers to questions such as: What are the optimal
information processing and price setting choices for the consumer and the seller? What are
the implications for the market allocation, the price, and the consumer’s and seller’s expected
surplus? Can the seller exploit the consumer’s limited capacity to process information, or are
there benefits for the consumer from being selectively, but not perfectly informed? Is ignorance
bliss?
A broadly observed phenomenon is that, when faced with a complex product, consumers
use heuristics or rules of thumb to reach a decision (Gabaix and Laibson, 2003; Gabaix et al.,
2006; Shah and Oppenheimer, 2008). Such behavior is observed in a multitude of markets,
including the market for electronics and the used car market (see Yee et al., 2007; DellaVigna,
2009, and references therein). This may affect prices. Lacetera et al. (2012), Busse et al. (2013),
and Englmaier et al. (2013) all provide empirical evidence that links price discontinuities to
consumers being inattentive to features that influence the value of a used car. For instance,
consumers display a left-digit bias. This means that they only focus on the left-most digits, when
they evaluate the mileage or registration year of a car. Should such behavior be interpreted as
a mistake or limitation in the consumer’s information processing, or could it be rational for
the consumer to be partially inattentive? The analysis in this essay will provide insights into
how prices are influenced by the information processing structure of the consumer. As will be
shown, it can be rational for the consumer to not become perfectly informed and only have a
coarse perception of the world. Partial ignorance can be bliss.
The essay analyzes a monopoly pricing model with one seller (she) who wants to sell a good
to a consumer (he). The consumer chooses how to process information about his valuation prior
to observing the price charged by the seller and making his purchasing decision. The information
processing decision of the consumer corresponds to a selection of an information structure that
provides him with an (imperfect) signal about his valuation. Capacity constraints to process
information impose a restriction on the set of accessible information structures from which the
consumer can choose. Before setting a price, the seller observes the information structure but
not the private signal realization of the consumer.
I analyze two cases. In the first case, the consumer only has access to information structures
with a finite number of signal realizations. That is, he can only form a limited number of
categories of valuations, on which he can condition his purchasing decision. Hence, the consumer
has limited capacity to process information, which may be due to limited cognitive abilities.
In the second case, the consumer has no information processing constraints, and there are no
restrictions beyond standard feasibility and consistency requirements on the consumer’s choice
set of information structures.
Information structures within the accessible set are assumed to be free, while all other
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information structures are infinitely costly. By working with this simple cost structure, it is
possible to identify which information is the most valuable for the consumer. These insights can
be used to make predictions for the case with cost differentiation among accessible information
structures.
In the monopoly pricing model that I study, both agents have strategic influence. This
property has two important implications. (1) When obtaining more information, the consumer
faces a trade-off between being able to make a more informed decision and securing information
rents. The consumer’s choice of an information structure determines his interim valuations,
and thus the interim demand curve faced by the seller. Hence, information acquisition by the
consumer can have adverse effects on the informational rents that he can secure, because the
seller might be induced to set a higher price when facing a more informed consumer. (2) Even
if the consumer can process enough information to make an optimal purchasing decision for
a given price, his information processing constraint can be “strategically binding.” This means
that, the capacity of the consumer may not suffice to process enough information to take an
optimal purchasing decision for any price in the seller’s action set.
An essential contribution of this essay is to provide a completely analytical solution to this
problem. The equilibrium is determined by the consumer’s information structure, and has the
following three characterizing properties:
The equilibrium information structure is monotone partitional. This means that the space
of possible valuations is split into sub-intervals and the consumer learns which of these intervals
his true valuation falls into.
The equilibrium information processing structure induces efficient trade, that is, all possible
gains from trade are realized. Among these information structures, the consumer adopts the
one that grants him the largest possible share of the realized surplus.
Every equilibrium satisfies the seller-indifference property: The interim demand function
that is induced by the equilibrium information structure is an equal revenue curve. This means
that the seller is indifferent between charging a price equal to any of the value estimates that are
induced by the equilibrium information structure. In equilibrium, the seller charges the lowest of
these prices. By adopting an information structure with these properties, the consumer induces
the seller to charge a price that yields efficient trade while – at that price – leaving the seller
with just enough revenue in order to guarantee that she does not want to deviate and charge
a higher price.
The main features of the equilibrium information structure also persist in the unconstrained
case. In this case, there exists an equilibrium, in which the equilibrium information structure
is monotone partitional, the induced interim demand function is an equal revenue curve, and
all gains from trade are realized. There typically exist multiple equilibria in the unconstrained
case, but they are all outcome equivalent. Remarkably, even without information processing
constraints or costs, the consumer does not choose to become perfectly informed. Instead, it
is optimal for the consumer to ignore information that would separate low values, whereas his
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perception of higher values is finer and may be perfectly informative.
Finally, I discuss the implications of optimal information processing on the consumer’s
and the seller’s expected surplus. In the present model, the expected surplus of a rationally
inattentive consumer is always higher than in the case in which the consumer knows his true
valuation. Moreover, the consumer’s expected surplus strictly increases if he has access to infor-
mation structures with more signal realizations. If the consumer has no information processing
constraints, the seller’s expected revenue is bounded above by the monopoly revenue. I provide
examples for which the seller’s expected revenue is strictly lower than the monopoly revenue.
In the absence of information constraints, the present problem has similarities to the lit-
erature on Bayesian persuasion. In Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), the sender designs the
information environment of the receiver in order to persuade the receiver to take the sender’s
preferred action. By contrast, in this essay, the consumer designs his own information environ-
ment in order to induce the seller to charge his preferred price. Just as in the literature on
Bayesian persuasion, I make the assumption that the sender, here the consumer, can commit
to an information structure. A discussion of the specific modeling choices and the robustness
of the results is provided in Section 7.
A significant difference in the analyses is the following. In Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)
it is possible to identify each posterior belief with a value for the sender. By contrast, in the
monopoly model, the consumer’s value of a posterior belief depends on the price charged by
the seller, and hence the full information structure. Consequently, the concavification approach
from Aumann and Maschler (1995) that Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) use in order to obtain
their results is not applicable in the strategic environment that I study. The methods that are
used to establish the results in this essay are mostly constructive.
Related Literature This essay contributes to the recent research on information design.
This topic is addressed by various strands of literature, such as the literature on rational
inattention, bounded rationality, and Bayesian persuasion.
A closely related paper is Gul et al. (2015), who study a model of an exchange economy.
Consumers have limited cognitive abilities and can only choose coarse consumption plans. The
authors introduce the concept of a coarse competitive equilibrium and find that the limited
cognitive abilities of consumers lead to more price variation than in the standard competitive
equilibrium. This property is a result of the new function of the market mechanism, which now
also serves to allocate the agents’ scarce attention. The way in which the behavioral limitations
are modeled in this essay resembles the approach in Gul et al. (2015). In the competitive market
analyzed in Gul et al. (2015), none of the agents has strategic influence. This is precisely the
opposite of what is assumed in this essay; I consider a setting in which both agents have strategic
influence. Hence, the role of rational inattention and prices is reversed to the one identified in
Gul et al. (2015). In their paper, market prices serve to allocate attention, whereas in the
present model the allocation of attention determines the induced price.
This essay contributes to the literature on information acquisition. Previous literature has
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mostly focused on how much information agents should acquire (Kessler, 1998; Shi, 2012; Berge-
mann and Välimäki, 2002), whereas the model studied here can be considered as one of flexible
information acquisition:1 I not only discuss how much information a consumer should acquire,
but also identify which pieces of information are the most valuable to him. This interpretation
links the analysis to Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007). In an auction setting, they identify the
seller-optimal information structure and selling mechanism. The seller has full flexibility in his
choice of information structures and information is costless. The results in this essay identify the
consumer-optimal information structure, if the seller best-responds with a revenue-maximizing
mechanism.
This essay analyzes how the information environment of the consumer affects prices and
the market outcome. A related question is studied in Bergemann et al. (2015). In their model,
the consumers’ valuation is private information. They describe the set of market outcomes that
are achievable for different informational environments of the seller. Bergemann et al. (2015)
identify an outcome triangle and show that any pair of consumer and producer surplus within
this triangle is achievable. They find that the seller’s expected surplus is bounded below by the
monopoly profit. By contrast, I show that if the consumer can choose his information structure,
then the seller’s surplus may fall below the monopoly level.
This essay is also connected to the rational inattention literature. Starting with the seminal
papers by Sims (1998, 2003, 2006), this literature studies the question of how an agent should
optimally divide his attention if information is fully and freely available, but information pro-
cessing is costly. Several papers analyze pricing models with rationally inattentive consumers.
The most significant paper in this context is Matejka (2015). He studies a dynamic model with
a consumer who is rationally inattentive to prices. He finds that rational inattention leads to
rigid pricing, since such a pricing structure yields more prior knowledge and is easier to assess
for the consumer.
The cost structures that are used in the rational inattention literature and in this paper
differ strongly. Much of the rational inattention literature models information costs as a function
of entropy reduction,2 whereas I limit the number of categories that agents can distinguish and
assume that all of these information structures have zero costs. Similar approaches to model
cognitive limitations are taken by Wilson (2014) and de Clippel et al. (2014).
Outline The rest of the essay is organized as follows. The model is introduced in Section 2.
In Section 3, an illustrative example is discussed. The main results are presented in Section 4
and Section 5. Section 4 covers the case of a consumer with information processing constraints.
The unconstrained case is discussed in Section 5. The implications of optimal information
processing and capacity constraints for the consumer’s and the seller’s profits are addressed in
1Some recent papers, such as Yang (2015b,a), also study flexible information acquisition in other contexts,
for instance asset pricing and coordination problems.
2As discussed in Gentzkow and Kamenica (2014), it is more generally possible to define an information cost
function based on a given measure of uncertainty (Ely et al., 2014). Woodford (2012) suggests an alternative
cost function based on a different entropy-based measure.
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Section 6. Section 7 provides a discussion of the specific modeling choices of the timing, and
of the observability of the information processing structure. Section 8 and concludes. Unless
stated otherwise, all proofs are in the appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Payoffs and Information
A seller (she) wants to sell one object to a consumer (he). Both players are risk-neutral. The
consumer’s valuation for the object, v, is drawn from a distribution F with support on the unit
interval, [0, 1]. The distribution F is twice continuously differentiable, atomless, F (0) = 0, with
full support, f > 0 on (0, 1), and mean µ0. The seller’s marginal costs are zero. The consumer’s
true valuation is ex-ante unknown to both agents. The distribution F and the seller’s valuation
are common knowledge.
If a consumer with valuation v and the seller trade the object at price p, then the seller’s
payoff (revenue) is r = p, and the consumer’s net payoff (surplus) is u = v − p.
Information processing. Information processing of the consumer corresponds to him choos-
ing an information structure that determines how and what the consumer learns about his
valuation for the object. An information structure,
pi =
(
S, {G(·|v)}v∈[0, 1]
)
,
is given by a set of signal realizations S ⊆ R and a family of conditional distributions
{G(·|v)}v∈[0, 1], where G(s|v) is the probability that the consumer observes a signal realiza-
tion less or equal to s if his true valuation is v. The corresponding density or mass functions
are denoted by g (·|v).
The consumer updates his beliefs according to Bayes’ Rule. For a given information struc-
ture, each signal realization s induces a posterior belief F (·|s) ∈ ∆([0, 1]) of the consumer,
given by
F (v|s) =
∫ v
0
g(s|v)f(v) dv∫ 1
0
g(s|v)f(v) dv ,
as well as a value estimate
Vs := E [v|s] =
∫ 1
0
v dF (v|s).
Moreover, an information structure pi, induces a distribution Fpi ∈ ∆ ([0, 1]) over value estimates
of the consumer.
For an information structure, feasibility requires that for every v ∈ [0, 1], G(·|v) is well-
defined as a distribution function.
Bayesian updating implies that every information structure is Bayes consistent. That is, the
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induced posterior beliefs are consistent with the prior:
ES [F (v|s)] = F (v) ∀ v ∈ [0, 1] . (1.1)
A consumer, who has no capacity constraints to process information can choose every informa-
tion structure that satisfies feasibility.
Capacity constraints. In this essay, the consumer’s information processing constraint is
modeled as an upper bound n ∈ N on the number of signals or “categories” that he can distin-
guish. A capacity constrained consumer has only access to information structures with at most
n signal realizations. This set of information structures is called the accessible set. Informa-
tion structures within this set are not differentiated by information costs. For all information
structures in the accessible set, the information processing costs are zero, the costs for all other
information structures can be considered to be infinite.
This approach to model cognitive limitations is similar to those in Gul et al. (2015) and
Wilson (2014). Of course there are alternatives to model capacity constraints of agents, for
example, by introducing information processing cost proportional to the entropy reduction, or
some other measure of uncertainty.3
2.2 Strategies and Timing
Action sets. The consumer’s action sets are the set of information structures S, with typical
elements pi, that he can choose from, and the decision set A = {0, 1}, where a = 1 represents
the case in which the consumer buys the object, and a = 0 the case in which the consumer
makes no purchase. The action set of the seller is the set of prices R+0 .4
Timing. The consumer moves first. He chooses an information structure pi, subject to his
capacity constraint, and privately observes a signal realization s ∈ S. The seller observes the
information structure of the consumer, but not the private signal realization. She then sets a
price p, and the consumer decides whether to purchase the object at the price p or not. The
timing of the game is illustrated in Figure 1.1. The timing of the private signal and the price
setting decision can be interchanged, or be simultaneous.
Strategies and Solution Concept. Every information structure pi induces a distribution
over value estimates of the consumer.
For the consumer, a strategy is a tuple, (pi, φ(·, ·)) of an information structure pi and a
3For examples of alternative modeling choices see Gentzkow and Kamenica (2014), Ely et al. (2014), Sims
(1998, 2003) and Woodford (2012).
4One could more generally let the seller choose a selling mechanism. In the setting studied here, the result of
Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) applies and the posted price mechanism is an optimal selling mechanism. Hence,
for the sake of brevity of the exposition, I directly reduce the action set of the seller to prices. This is without
loss of generality.
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The consumer chooses
an information struc-
ture pi ∈ S.
(public)
The consumer observes
a signal realization s.
(private)
The seller sets
a price p.
(public)
The consumer makes
his purchasing decision.
Figure 1.1: Timing in the monopoly model with a rationally inattentive consumer.
mapping from value estimates and prices to a purchasing decision,
φ : [0, 1]× R+0 → [0, 1] .
That is, φ(V, p) is the probability that the consumer will buy the object if his value estimate
is V and the price is p.5
A strategy for the seller is a mapping from the set of information structures, S, that the
consumer may choose from to the set of price distributions,
σS : S → ∆([0, 1]).
Under strategy σS, if the seller observes that the consumer chooses information structure pi,
she chooses the price distribution σS(pi) ∈ ∆([0, 1]).
The solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
The information structure pi is said to induce the price p, if p is a best-response for the seller
to the information structure pi. Say that the information structure pi induces the expected sur-
plus from trade T (pi), the seller’s expected revenue R(pi), and the consumer’s expected surplus
U(pi), if these are the resulting values, if the seller plays a best-response to the information
structure pi, and the consumer best-responds to this.
3 Illustrative Example: The Uniform Prior Case
In order to fix ideas and to illustrate the fundamental effects in the monopoly pricing model
with a rationally inattentive consumer, I start with an example. Throughout this section, the
consumer’s valuations are assumed to be uniformly distributed on the unit interval, v ∼ U [0, 1].
Benchmarks: Uninformed and fully informed consumer. The two relevant benchmarks
are the case in which the consumer has no information about his valuation, and the case in
5In the linear setting with risk-neutral agents considered in this essay, the distribution over value estimates
captures all information about pi that is relevant for the consumer’s purchasing decision and the seller’s pricing
decisions. This observation is used in order to reduce the problem, and to simplify the strategy sets that have
to be considered. Similar reductions are used, for example, by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) and Caplin et al.
(2014). They reduce the problem to posterior beliefs. The model in this essay considers risk-neutral agents and
linear utilities. Hence, a reduction of the problem to value estimates is possible.
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which he privately knows his true valuation.
In the first case, both the consumer and the seller are uninformed. They only know the
distribution of the consumer’s valuation. In equilibrium the seller charges a price equal to the
expected value of the prior distribution p = µ0 = 12 , and the consumer always buys the good.
Trade is efficient, that is, the potential gains from trade are fully realized. The seller extracts
all surplus from trade. Her expected revenue is R(0) = 1
2
, the consumer obtains zero surplus.
The latter case, in which the consumer is fully informed and privately knows his true val-
uation, is the standard monopoly pricing problem. In equilibrium, the seller will charge the
monopoly price pM = 1
2
, and the consumer only buys the good if his true valuation is greater
(or equal) to the price.6 A consumer with a lower valuation is excluded from trade, and hence
trade is not efficient. The resulting expected surplus from trade is TM = 3
8
, the seller’s expected
revenue is RM = 1
4
, and the consumer’s expected surplus is UM = 1
8
.
The benchmark cases with an uninformed and a fully informed consumer are illustrated in
Figure 1.2.
Monotone partitional two-signal information structure. Suppose that information is
fully and freely available, and that the consumer has to decide how to process this information.
Consider the case in which the consumer can only distinguish two categories, one of which he
interprets as “good” and the other one as “bad”. If the consumer has full flexibility in designing
these two categories, then how should he define them?
If the consumer forms two categories, he can condition his purchasing decision only on these
categories and the realized price. Each category induces a willingness to pay of the consumer,
that is, a region of prices for which he would buy the good. The information processing choice of
the consumer can be modeled as the consumer observing a signal realization that informs him
in which of the two categories his true valuation falls. The high signal realization sh indicates
that the consumer’s true valuation is in the good category, and hence increases the consumer’s
willingness to pay. The induced value estimate Vh is larger than the prior mean. By contrast, a
realization of the low signal s` decreases the consumer’s willingness to pay, V` ≤ µ0.
The resulting interim demand function that the seller faces is a step function. For prices
smaller or equal to the willingness to pay of a consumer who observes a low signal, the proba-
bility of trade is one. Upon passing this value, the probability of trade drops to gh, which is the
probability that the high signal realizes. The probability of trade is zero for prices above the
value estimate of a consumer who observes a high signal. This is illustrated in Figure 1.2(c).
The seller’s objective is to maximize her expected revenue. It is straightforward, that the
seller never charges a price on the flat, inelastic region of the interim demand curve. Hence, the
seller’s problem is to decide whether to charge the inclusive price V` and to sell with probability
one, or to charge the exclusive price Vh and to only sell to a consumer who receives a high signal,
that is, with probability gh. An information structure, respectively choice of categories, thus
6It is irrelevant whether the consumer buys the good or not if he is indifferent, since the event that the
consumer’s valuation is equal to the price is a zero-probability event.
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0 pµ0
1− Fpi(p)
R(µ0)
(a) Uninformed consumer.
0 p
pM
1− Fpi(p)
RM UM
(b) Fully informed consumer.
0 pV` Vhvˆ
gh
1
1
1− Fpi(p)
(c) Two-signal information struc-
ture.
Figure 1.2: Demand function, expected seller’s revenue and consumer’s surplus for (a) an unin-
formed consumer, and (b) a fully informed consumer. Demand function induced by a two-signal
information structure (c).
determines both, the possible price realizations V` and Vh, as well as the corresponding demand
or probability of trade for the exclusive price, gh.
The consumer only obtains a positive surplus if the seller charges an inclusive price.7 Hence,
the only way in which the consumer can secure information rents is to choose an information
structure that induces the seller to charge an inclusive price. For a given information structure
pi, the seller charges the inclusive price, V`(pi), if it yields a weakly higher revenue than the
exclusive price, V`(pi) ≥ gh(pi)Vh(pi).
The consumer’s problem reduces to:
max
pi∈S(2)
{(Vh(pi)− p∗(pi)) · gh(pi) s.t. p∗(pi) = V`(pi)}, (1.2)
where S(2) is the set of all feasible, two-signal information structures, and p∗(pi) is the revenue-
maximizing price for the seller given information structure pi.
For simplicity, assume that the consumer chooses a monotone partitional information struc-
ture. That is, he splits the interval of true valuations into two subintervals, such that the high
signal realizes whenever the true valuation is in the upper subinterval, otherwise the low sig-
nal realizes. Such an information structure pivˆ is determined by the threshold vˆ, which is the
boundary of the two subintervals.
For example, a used car could fall in the category “good” if its mileage is below 25000,
or if it is less than three years old. Apartments could be categorized based on the number of
rooms, or certain aspects of the location. The criteria do not need to be one dimensional as
long as they reduce to two categories.8 The induced willingnesses to pay of the consumer for a
7Given an exclusive price, the consumer only buys the object if the high value estimate realizes. In this case,
the consumer obtains the object, but at a price that is equal to his expected valuation; his expected surplus is
zero.
8For example, the category "good" could consist of apartments in a preferred location with at least three
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high or low signal realization depend on the threshold that determines the categorization. For
instance, if at least five rooms are required to sort an apartment in the “good” category, then
the willingness to pay of a consumer is higher for both of the signal realizations, compared to
the case in which all apartments with at least three rooms are classified as “good”. Formally,
the high and the low value estimate, are both increasing in the threshold.
It is easy to see that the expected revenue of the seller from charging the inclusive price
is increasing in the threshold vˆ. The inclusive price is increasing in the threshold and the
probability of trade is constant and equal to one. The effect of a threshold shift on the expected
revenue from the exclusive price is less obvious. The exclusive price is increasing in the threshold,
whereas the probability that the high signal realizes and hence the probability of trade is
decreasing in the threshold.
If the seller charges an exclusive price, then the consumer’s expected surplus is zero, and
the seller can extract all gains from trade.9 Hence, the seller’s expected revenue from charging
the exclusive price is equal to the gains from trade in the region where the high signal realizes.
It follows that the expected revenue from charging the exclusive price is decreasing in the
threshold vˆ.
It follows that there exists a critical threshold at which the seller is indifferent between
charging the inclusive or the exclusive price, V`(pivˆ) = gh(pivˆ)Vh(pivˆ). For all thresholds above
the critical one, the seller charges the inclusive price, else he charges the exclusive price. For a
uniform prior, the critical threshold is 1
2
(√
5− 1).
The consumer’s expected surplus, if the seller charges an inclusive price, is
U (pivˆ) = µ0 − p∗ (pivˆ) , (1.3)
which is decreasing in the price. It follows that the equilibrium information structure is the
one that induces the lowest price among all information structures that induce the seller to
charge an inclusive price (cf. 1.2). The equilibrium threshold is equal to the critical threshold
v∗ = 1
2
(√
5− 1) . In equilibrium, the seller charges the inclusive price, but is indifferent between
charging the inclusive or the exclusive price. The equilibrium two-signal information structure
is illustrated in Figure 1.3.
The identification of the equilibrium information structure in the example was based on
the assumption that the set of accessible information structures consists of all monotone parti-
tional two-signal information structures. Certainly, the question arises whether this information
structure is optimal for the consumer among larger classes of accessible information structures.
Is a partitional information structure optimal, or can the consumer benefit from noise in the
rooms, and all apartments with at least five rooms.
9Indeed,
R(Vh) = (1− F (vˆ)) · E [v|v ≥ vˆ] =
∫ 1
vˆ
v dF (v).
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v∗
V` =
1
4
(√
5− 1) Vh = 14 (√5 + 1)
Figure 1.3: Equilibrium two-signal information structure, pi∗2, with threshold v∗ =
1
2
(√
5− 1).
The high signal, sh, realizes if the consumer’s valuation is in the good category, otherwise the
low signal, s`, realizes.
information? And are two signal realizations enough, or can the consumer strictly benefit from
having access to information structures with more signal realizations? These and further ques-
tion will be answered in the course of the general analysis in the following sections.
4 Finite Information Structures
After the illustrative example, this section returns to the analysis of the general model. Suppose
that there is a limit on the maximal number, n ∈ N, of signal realizations or categories that
the consumer can distinguish. This constraint may for example represent the limited cognitive
ability of the consumer to process the available information. In this section, the equilibrium
information structure is identified, which determines how a capacity constrained consumer
should optimally process or categorize information. First, some preliminary observations are
discussed, then properties are derived that any equilibrium information structure must satisfy, if
it exists. These properties are then used in order to reduce the problem of finding an equilibrium
information structure, and to prove existence.
For any information structure pi, with n signal realization s1, . . . , sn, these signals are indexed
such that the induced value estimates, Vi := E [V |si], are arranged in an ascending order,
V1 ≤ · · · ≤ Vn.
4.1 Preliminary Observations
To begin the analysis, some observations about optimal purchasing, price-setting and informa-
tion processing decisions are established.
Consumer’s purchasing decision. It is immediate that for any given information structure
pi, signal realization si, and price p, a best-response for the consumer is to buy the object if
and only if his value estimate Vi is greater or equal to the price,
φ∗(Vi, p) = 1 ⇔ Vi ≥ p, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. (1.4)
Price-setting by the seller. For a given information structure pi =
(
S, {G(·|v)}v∈[0, 1]
)
, the
situation for the seller is as if he faces a consumer whose valuation is drawn from distribution
Fpi with support
supp (Fpi) = {Vi = E [v|si] : si ∈ S}.
17
The seller charges the price p that maximize her expected revenue, R(p) = p · (1− Fpi(p)). As
discussed in the example in Section 3, the induced interim demand function is a step function,
and the seller charges a price equal to one of the value estimates of the consumer.
Lemma 1.1 (Selling Mechanism).
For an information structure pi that induces the distribution of value estimates Fpi, a best-
response of the seller is to sell the object by a posted-price mechanism with price
p∗(pi) = arg max
p∈[0, 1]
{p · (1− Fpi(p))}.
This price is equal to one of the induced value estimates of the consumer, p∗(pi) ∈ supp (Fpi).
The expected revenue that the seller can extract by charging the price Vi is denoted by
R(Vi). The seller sets a price equal to the value estimate that maximizes her expected revenue.
It is useful to classify prices and distinguish between exclusive and inclusive prices. For a
given information structure pi, say that price p is an exclusive price, if the consumer buys the
object only if the highest value estimate realizes. Price p is (partially) inclusive, if there are at
least two signal realizations that induce distinct value estimates, and for which the consumer
will buy the object at the price p. A price is called fully inclusive, if, under the given information
structure, the consumer always buys the good at that price, irrespective of the signal realization.
If the seller charges an exclusive price, only a consumer with the highest value estimate buys
the good, and demand is low. By contrast, for a fully inclusive price the probability of trade
is one. Given that marginal costs are zero, this implies that any fully inclusive price yields
efficient trade, that is, potential gains from trade are fully realized.
Information processing by the consumer. The consumer faces the following trade-off
in his choice of an information structure: His information processing decision does not only
determine the distribution over his value estimates, but also the interim demand function that
the seller faces, and hence the price.
For the problem of identifying the equilibrium information structure, the following compli-
cation arises. Any change in the information structure may induce the seller to switch from
charging an inclusive price to charging an exclusive price. Hence, a seemingly small effect on
the distribution and realizations of the value estimates, may have a large effect on the con-
sumer’s expected surplus. The strategic interaction among the consumer and the seller results
in discontinuities in the consumer’s problem.
As discussed in the example of Section 3, the consumer only obtains a positive surplus if the
seller charges an inclusive price. It follows that the consumer will always choose an information
structure pi that induces the seller to charge an inclusive price.
Lemma 1.2 (Inclusive Prices).
The consumer chooses an information structure that induces the seller to charge a (partially or
fully) inclusive price.
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4.2 Seller-Indifference
A central result in the characterization of the equilibrium information structure is a property
that I refer to as seller-indifference. This property requires that, if the equilibrium information
structure induces the seller to charge a price equal to the ith-lowest of the induced value esti-
mates, Vi, then the seller is indifferent between charging this price and charging a price equal
to any of the higher value estimates.10
Proposition 1.1 (Seller-Indifference).
Suppose that pi is an equilibrium information structure that induces the seller to charge the
price p = Vi. Then, the seller’s revenue R(Vi), is equal to the revenue that he could extract by
charging a price equal to any of the higher value estimates in the support of Fpi:
R(Vi) = R(Vj) ∀j ≥ i. (1.5)
The seller is indifferent between charging any of these prices.
For any finite information structure pi, the optimal price for the seller is equal to one of the
value estimates induced by pi (Lemma 1.1). Roughly put, the seller has to choose a price-level
for his product, where the set of possibly optimal price-levels is given by the support of Fpi.
Proposition 1.1 establishes that the distribution over value estimates induced by the equilibrium
information structure is an equal revenue curve above the equilibrium price charged by the seller.
This means that charging a price equal to any of the value estimates above the equilibrium price
yields the same expected revenue for the seller. By leveling the seller to a revenue level, the
consumer leaves her with just enough surplus to guarantee that she does not want to deviate
to a higher price-level.
Let me now sketch the idea of the proof. The result is proven by an indirect argument. For
any information structure pi that does not satisfy the seller-indifference property (1.5), a new
information structure, pi, is constructed that makes the consumer better off.
Suppose that pi is an information structure that does not satisfy (1.5). Let k > i be an index
such that the seller strictly prefers charging the price Vi over charging the price Vk, that is,
R(Vi) > R(Vk). The idea is to construct a new information structure as follows: Mass is taken
from the upper part of the support of F (·|si). This will reduce the value of Vi, and hence the
seller’s expected revenue if he charges the price induced by signal si, p = E [v|si]. Similarly,
mass is taken from the supports of posterior distributions induced by signals sj, for which the
seller is initially indifferent between charging the prices Vj and Vi. The distribution of mass
among signals sj with j ≥ i is re-adjusted such that the seller is still induced to charge a
price equal to the ith-lowest value estimate E [v|si]. In particular, mass will be added to signal
10This result is reminiscent of the indifference result of Proposition 5 in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). In
the interpretation of their leading example, this result states that under the sender-optimal signal the judge is
certain of the innocence of the defendant if he chooses the action “acquit”, and indifferent if he chooses “convict”.
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sk, which increases the seller’s expected revenue from charging a price equal to E [v|sk], the
posterior estimate induced by signal sk.
Such a construction has the following properties: (1) The probability of trade and the
expected surplus from trade remain the same, since mass is only re-distributed among types
that participate in trade. (2) The price charged by the seller decreases. The consumer’s expected
surplus is given by the difference of expected total surplus and expected revenue.
U =P(trade) · E [v|trade]− P(trade) · p.
Hence, under the new information structure, the consumer’s expected surplus will be higher
than before. The formal details about the existence and the construction of such an information
structure are relegated to the appendix.
4.3 Optimal Information Processing Induces Efficient Trade
A central property of the equilibrium information structure is that it induces efficient trade.11
Proposition 1.2 (Efficient Trade).
Any finite equilibrium information structure induces efficient trade. All gains from trade are
realized, and the exclusion region is empty
The intuition for this result is as follows. If the potential gain from trade are not fully
realized, then there are consumer types that are excluded from trade, but for whom it would
be profitable to trade. In the present model, the consumer has a lot of power. He can design
his information environment and thus the demand curve that the seller faces. Hence, he can
influence the seller’s pricing behavior. In particular, the consumer can switch to an information
structure that yields efficient trade and makes him better off. Under the equilibrium informa-
tion structure, the consumer does not pay attention to information that would separate low
valuations. This means that he effectively commits to buy at an intermediate price that may
be higher than his true valuation. He thus offers the seller a higher probability of trade at this
intermediate price. By dividing his attention optimally, the consumer can induce the seller to
offer better terms of trade in return for the increased probability of trade. The seller charges
a lower price and the consumer obtains a higher expected surplus. The positive effect of the
additionally realized gains from trade reverberates back to the consumer.
Let me sketch the proof of Proposition 1.2; the details are in the appendix. The proof
consists of two steps. First, the problem is reduced by showing that any equilibrium information
structure is outcome-equivalent to an information structure for which at most one value estimate
lies in the exclusion region. Here, two information structures pi and pi are said to be outcome
equivalent, if the realized price, the expected surplus from trade, the seller’s expected revenue,
and the consumer’s expected surplus induced by pi and pi coincide.
11Recall that, by assumption, the consumer’s valuation is always greater or equal to the seller’s cost. In this
case, efficient trade means that trade must occur with probability one.
20
Suppose that there is more than one value estimate in the exclusion region, which means
that there are various signal realizations that will result in the consumer not buying the good.
For a given price, it would not make a difference if the consumer had a coarser perception of
these values, and would obtain only one signal that informs him that he should not buy the
good. From the seller’s perspective, such an adjustment of the information structure reduces the
dispersion in the exclusion region part of the demand curve. It creates a single mass point on
the expected value of the types in the exclusion region. This change in the demand curve either
has no effect on the seller’s pricing decision, or incentivizes the seller to switch to charging a
price equal to the expected value of the types in the former exclusion region. In the latter case,
trade is efficient and the consumer is better off.
The second step is to prove that for any information structure that induces a partially
inclusive price, there exists an information structure that induces a fully inclusive price, and
yields a weakly higher expected surplus for the consumer.
4.4 Monotone Partitional Information Structures
The previous findings have established properties (seller-indifference and efficient trade) of
the outcome induced by the equilibrium information structure. But how should the consumer
optimally process information? As the next result shows, any finite equilibrium information
structure is monotone partitional. The consumer only learns in which range his true valuation
falls.12 He cannot profit from adding noise to the signal.
Proposition 1.3 (Equilibrium Structures are Monotone Partitional).
For every n ∈ N, any equilibrium information structure, pi∗n is monotone partitional.
4.5 Equilibrium Existence
Building on the necessary properties for an equilibrium information structure that were identi-
fied in the previous sections, equilibrium existence is established. First, the problem is reduced
by using that any equilibrium information structure must be monotone partitional, induce
seller-indifference, and efficient trade. Then, using this simplification of the problem, equilib-
rium existence is proven.
Theorem 1.1 (Equilibrium Existence).
For every n ∈ N there exists an essentially unique equilibrium. The equilibrium is determined
by the equilibrium information structure pi∗n, which is characterized by the following properties:
(i) pi∗n is monotone partitional,
(ii) induces efficient trade, and
(iii) guarantees seller-indifference.
12This result is reminiscent of the optimality of coarse information structures in the literature on communica-
tion or strategic information transmission based on the seminal paper by Crawford and Sobel (1982). As pointed
out in Sobel (2012) complexity in communication is an alternative explanation for limited communication.
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4.6 More Signals are Better
It is obvious that having access to more information structures increases the choice set of the
consumer, and hence he will be weakly better off. But will he strictly benefit from having access
to information structures with more signal realizations? Or is there a maximal number of signal
realizations such that the consumer cannot profit from additional signal realizations?
For a given price, the consumer faces a binary decision – whether to buy the good or not.13
For this decision, it suffices for the consumer to know whether his valuation is above or below
the price. He can obtain this information with a binary information structure.
The situation is different, if the consumer cannot condition his information processing choice
on an observed price, and has to take into account that this choice will influence the price
charged by the seller. In this case, having access to information structures with more signal
realizations allows the consumer to better react to different prices that the seller may charge.
Hence, the consumer can better influence the price setting strategy of the seller.
The following example illustrates how the consumer can use additional signal realizations
to secure a strictly higher profit.
Example 1.1 (Two signal realizations are not enough):
Reconsider the uniform prior example discussed in Section 3. The equilibrium monotone par-
titional two-signal information structure pi∗2 was identified (illustrated in Figure 1.3). By The-
orem 1.1, this is indeed the equilibrium two-signal information structure.
Suppose now that the consumer has access to one more signal realization and can distinguish
three categories, say “good”, “intermediate” and “bad”. Can the consumer strictly benefit from
the enlarged set of feasible information structures and improve upon the case with only two-
signal realizations?
The consumer can use the additional signal to identify an interval of intermediate values,
such that this interval covers true valuations that have previously resulted in a good signal,
as well as some that have resulted in a bad signal. Figure 1.4 illustrates such an information
structure, pi3.
s` sh
0pi∗2 :
pi3:
1
1
v∗
vˆ1 vˆ2
s˜hs˜is˜`
Figure 1.4: Illustration of the use of an additional signal.
13In Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) it is shown that one can restrict attention to signals with at most as many
signal realizations as available actions. This feature is an implication of the revelation principle as discussed in
Myerson (1997). In the present model, the consumer’s action set is binary. This would suggest that two signal
realizations are enough. However, the seller can set any real-valued price, which implies that the action set that
the consumer has to consider when choosing the information processing structure is large.
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Under this new information structure, good and bad signals both provide stronger evidence
that the true valuation is high, respectively low. Hence, the value estimate induced by the good
(bad) signal increases (decreases). For the price induced by the bad signal, the demand remains
the same whereas the price that the seller can charge decreases. Hence, the seller’s expected
revenue decreases. For the good signal, the price increases and the probability of trade decreases.
The expected revenue that the seller can extract by charging a price equal to the value estimate
induced by the good signal is equal to the realized surplus from trade for values in the good
category. Hence, if this category gets smaller, the corresponding expected revenue of the seller
decreases.
What can be said about the revenue that the seller can extract by charging a price equal
to the value estimate induced by the new, intermediate signal? Compare the seller’s revenue if
she adopts a price equal to the intermediate value estimate to the seller’s revenue under the
optimal two-signal information structure. Given the seller-indifference property for the latter,
one can consider the seller’s revenue if she charges the exclusive price, induced by the original
good signal. There is a demand effect and a price effect. From the perspective of the seller, the
demand effect is positive: the probability to sell if she charges a price equal to the intermediate
value estimate is higher than for the exclusive price, induced by the original good signal. By
contrast, the price effect is negative: the price is lower than the original exclusive price.
The demand effect only depends on the probability that the true valuation falls in the
intermediate or good category, but not on the realization of the good category. The price effect,
by contrast, depends on how the region that yields an intermediate or a good signal is split
between the intermediate and the good categories. All else equal, the larger the fraction of the
good category, the stronger is the price effect. If the good category is sufficiently large, then
the seller’s expected revenue from charging a price equal to the intermediate value estimate is
below the revenue level of the two-signal case. Hence, for appropriately chosen categories, under
the new information structure, trade is still efficient but the seller obtains a smaller share of
the total expected surplus. The consumer is strictly better off.
The feature that the consumer strictly benefits from having access to more signal realizations
is a general property. This result is formally established in Proposition 1.4. For n ∈ N, let p∗n
be the minimal price that can be induced as a fully inclusive price by an information structure
with at most n signal realizations. Any finite equilibrium information structure induces efficient
trade, and hence the equilibrium n-signal information structure induces the minimal price
p∗n. The question whether the consumer strictly benefits from having access to information
structures with more signal realizations is equivalent to the question whether the sequence p∗n
is strictly decreasing in n.
Proposition 1.4 (More Signals are Better).
The consumer strictly profits from having access to information structures with more signal
realizations. Equilibrium prices pn are strictly decreasing in n, and the consumer’s expected
surplus U∗n is strictly increasing in n.
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Figure 1.5: Thresholds and induced prices for the equilibrium n-signal information structures.
Evolution of optimal information structures and thresholds with n
How should a capacity constrained consumer optimally allocate his attention? As established
in Theorem 1.1, the consumer chooses a monotone partitional information structure. Still, the
question remains, which pieces of information are the most valuable for the consumer. Should
the consumer pay more attention to information about low or about high valuations?
For the uniform prior example, the evolution of optimal information structures and prices is
illustrated in Figure 1.5.14 As can be seen, if more signal realizations are available, the informa-
tion structure gets finer around valuations close to the lowest threshold. This is the threshold
that determines the value estimate that corresponds to the induced price. The consumer pays
more attention to values closer to the threshold that is relevant for the price.
5 The Unconstrained Case
In the absence of any information constraints or costs, the consumer can choose freely how to
process the available information. Which pieces of information should the consumer acquire in
this case? Should he learn his valuation perfectly, or are there benefits from remaining partially
uninformed?
The main result of this section shows that it is in the consumer’s best interest to remain
partially uninformed. Every equilibrium information structure pools all values below a certain
threshold. The consumer benefits from committing to ignore information that would separate
low valuations.
Theorem 1.2 (Unconstrained Equilibrium).
Without information constraints, there exists a threshold 0 < v < 1 such that every equilibrium
information structure is outcome-equivalent to the following information structure pi∗:
The information structure pi∗ pools all values below the threshold v, and the induced distri-
bution of value estimates, Fpi∗, is an equal revenue distribution.
Why is it optimal for the consumer not to get perfectly informed but to pool an interval of
low values into one signal? By obtaining only a coarse perception about low values, the consumer
can induce the seller to charge a lower price, which increases the consumer’s expected surplus.
14A more detailed and formal discussion is provided in Appendix B.
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To obtain intuition for this result, consider the benchmark, in which the consumer knows his
true valuation. In this case, the seller charges the monopoly price. Hence, the seller excludes low
values from trade in order to maximize her expected revenue. This means that potential gains
from trade are not fully realized. Moreover, the consumer cannot obtain information rents for
valuations that fall in the non-trade region. An information structure that pools low valuations
creates a mass point on an intermediate value estimate. For a sufficiently large pooling region,
the seller will be induced to charge a price equal to the value estimate of this pooling region.
This information structure induces efficient trade, and the induced price is below the monopoly
price in the case with a fully informed consumer. The consumer can secure more information
rents, and hence has a higher expected surplus.
In the unconstrained case, multiplicity of equilibrium information structures, respectively
equilibria, arises. The optimal information structure pi∗ identified in Theorem 1.2, is the limit
of the finite equilibrium information structures. In the absence of information processing con-
straints, the number of signal realizations is unconstrained. Consequently, the number of signal
realizations that are used to obtain information about some interval of the valuation space
does not affect the number of the signals that are available to acquire information about other
valuations. Hence, instead of pooling types within intervals in which the prior distribution has
positive virtual valuations, the consumer can also learn his true valuation perfectly. Such an ad-
justment of the information structure, which is only possible if the consumer has no information
constraints, does not affect the equilibrium outcome.
In order to illustrate the properties of the equilibrium information structures in more detail,
I discuss three examples. Each of these examples illustrates a typical equilibrium information
structure. The discussion shall provide some intuition how specific features of optimal informa-
tion structures depend on properties of the prior distribution.
Example 1.2: Consider the uniform prior case, v ∼ U [0, 1]. In the benchmark with a fully
informed consumer, the monopoly price is pM = 1
2
. As just discussed, in the absence of informa-
tion processing constraints or costs, there are multiple equilibria. Two examples of equilibrium
information structures are the following:
a) The information structure pi∗max pools all types in the interval
[
0, 1
2
)
, and is perfectly infor-
mative on the interval
[
1
2
, 1
]
. This information structure is illustrated in Figure 1.6.
b) The information structure pi∗∞ pools all types in the interval
[
0, 1
2
)
. On
[
1
2
, 1
]
, and the
induced distribution of value estimates is and equal revenue distribution. This information
structure is the limit of the finite equilibrium information structures,
pi∗∞ = lim
n→∞
pi∗n.
The information structure pi∗max is the finest equilibrium information structure whereas pi∗∞
is the coarsest equilibrium information structure. The distributions of value estimates induced
by these two information structures are illustrated in Figure 1.7.
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Figure 1.6: The equilibrium information structure pi∗max for the uniform prior case, v ∼ U [0, 1].
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Figure 1.7: Distributions over value estimates Fpi∗ that are induced by the equilibrium informa-
tion structures pi∗max and pi∗∞, for the uniform prior case, v ∼ U [0, 1].
In the uniform prior case, E
[
v|v ≤ pM] = 1
4
= pM
(
1− F (pM)) . Hence, pooling of the types
within the region
[
0, 1
2
)
, makes the seller indifferent between charging the fully inclusive price
p∗ = 1
4
and the monopoly price, which is the price that maximizes the seller’s revenue among
all prices in supp (Fpi∗) \{p∗}. In equilibrium, the seller will charge the fully inclusive price.
Example 1.3: Suppose now, that the valuation of the consumer is distributed on [0, 1] with
the linearly decreasing density f(v) = 1−2v. For this distribution, pooling all valuations smaller
than the monopoly price, induces the seller to charge the fully inclusive price. Moreover, she
strictly prefers this price over the monopoly price, E
[
v|v ≤ pM] > RM . It thus suffices to pool
a smaller interval [0, vˆ] of low valuations to make the seller indifferent between charging the
fully inclusive price and the monopoly price. Notice, that the seller prefers to charge these two
prices over any price in the region
(
vˆ, pM
)
. Hence, there is still some slack in this information
structure.
For the given prior distribution, any equilibrium information structure pi∗ pools all types
within an interval [0, v), with v ≤ vˆ < pM , and has a “sweeping up” region [v, v]. In this region
the information structure induces a distribution over value estimates with constant virtual
valuation equal to zero. The sweeping up function H on [v, v] is given by:
H(V ) =1− v
V
(1− F (v)) .
Above v, the information structure can be perfectly informative. This equilibrium information
structure pi∗max is illustrated in Figure 1.8. It induces efficient trade, T ∗ =
1
3
, and the induced
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expected revenue of the seller is below the monopoly revenue R∗ < RM .
0
v v
pM
1
Vs = vH(V )
s0
sweeping up
region
p∗
Figure 1.8: Equilibrium information structures pi∗max for a decreasing prior density.
Example 1.4:
Suppose that the consumer’s valuations are distributed according to the beta-distribution
v ∼ β (1, 1
2
)
. For this distribution, the monopoly price is pM = 2
3
. Moreover, it holds that
E
[
v|v ≤ pM] < RM . Under the information structure that pools the values in the interval[
0, pM
)
and is perfectly informative otherwise, the seller still charges the monopoly price. By
moving the threshold of the pooling region up, the value estimate of the values within this
region increases. This increases the revenue that the seller can extract by charging the fully
inclusive price. Moreover, some types for which the marginal revenue is positive are now in-
cluded in the pooling region. Hence, the revenue that the seller can extract by charging the
optimal price in the separating region decreases. The critical threshold v∗ at which the seller is
indifferent between charging the partially inclusive price and charging the fully inclusive price
determines the equilibrium information structure. The seller’s expected revenue induced by
this information structure is smaller than the monopoly revenue. This equilibrium information
structure is illustrated in Figure 1.9.
0 1
pM
v∗
Vs = v
s0
p∗
Figure 1.9: The equilibrium information structure pi∗max for, v ∼ β
(
1
2
, 1
)
.
6 Seller’s Revenue and Consumer’s Surplus
This section discusses the implications of a rationally inattentive consumer in a monopoly
pricing problem for welfare, the seller’s expected revenue and the consumer’s expected surplus.
In order to analyze these effects, the equilibrium outcomes that are induced by the equilibrium
information structures identified in Section 4 and Section 5 are compared to the outcome in
the monopoly pricing problem, in which the consumer is privately informed about his true
valuation. The latter situation corresponds to the benchmark with a fully informed consumer
(cf. Section 3).
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Given the discussion in the previous sections, the effect on aggregate welfare is straight-
forward. Every equilibrium information structure induces efficient trade. By contrast, under
monopoly pricing for a fully informed consumer, some types are excluded from trade, and
hence not all possible gains from trade are realized. Implementing the equilibrium information
structure for a rationally inattentive consumer thus improves welfare.
The implications of monopoly pricing for a rationally inattentive consumer for the seller’s
expected revenue and the consumer’s expected surplus are less obvious. Denote the expected
surplus of the consumer and expected revenue of the seller induced by the equilibrium informa-
tion structure by U∗n and R∗n for the finite case, and by U∗∞ and R∗∞ in the unconstrained case.
In Proposition 1.4 it was shown that the consumer strictly profits from having access to more
signal realizations. The following corollary generalizes this result.
Corollary 1.1. The expected surplus of the consumer U∗n is increasing in n, whereas the expected
revenue of the seller R∗n is decreasing in n. Both sequences approach the respective values of the
unconstrained case in the limit.
lim
n→∞
U∗n = U
∗
∞, and lim
n→∞
R∗n = R
∗
∞.
In the unconstrained case, a rationally inattentive consumer is always strictly better off than
a consumer who knows his true valuation a priori. The seller’s expected revenue is bounded
above by the monopoly revenue in the benchmark with a fully informed consumer. As illustrated
in Example 1.3 and Example 1.4 it may be strictly smaller.
In each of the above examples, it can be shown that the outcome induced by the equilibrium
two-signal information structure is a Pareto improvement compared to the benchmark case with
a fully informed consumer. Numerical values are provided in Table 1.1.
pM p∗2 = R
∗
2 p
∗
∞ = R
∗
∞ R
M UM U∗2 U
∗
∞
v ∼ U [0, 1] 1
2
1
4
(√
5− 1) 1
4
1
4
1
8
1
4
(
3−√5) 1
4
f(v) = 1− 2v 1
3
≈ 0.19808 ≈ 0.14782 4
27
8
81
≈ 0.13526 ≈ 0.18552
v ∼ β (1, 1
2
)
2
3
≈ 0.43593 ≈ 0.38349 2
3
1+
√
3
3+
√
3
2
9
1+
√
3
3+
√
3
≈ 0.28318 ≈ 0.23074
Table 1.1: Equilibrium prices, consumer’s expected surplus and seller’s revenue for the bench-
mark with a fully informed consumer, the optimal two-signal information structure, and the
unconstrained optimal information structure.
It is instructive to illustrate the results on the consumer’s expected surplus and the seller’s
expected revenue in a surplus triangle. By Proposition 1.2, all equilibrium outcomes lie on the
efficient frontier. The locations of the equilibrium outcomes in the surplus triangle are illustrated
in Figure 1.10.
The case, in which the consumer cannot process any information and the seller extracts
all surplus from trade, corresponds to the upper extreme point of the efficient frontier. As the
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Figure 1.10: Surplus Triangle
number of available signal realizations n increases, the points that mark the induced outcomes
move down on the efficient frontier. The limiting case either corresponds to the intersection
of the efficient frontier with the monopoly revenue level, or may lie on the efficient frontier
below this point. In the first case, trade is efficient, the seller obtains the monopoly revenue
and the consumer obtains the remaining surplus from trade. The latter case corresponds to the
situation illustrated in Example 1.3 and Example 1.4, in which the seller’s expected revenue is
strictly below the monopoly revenue.
7 Discussion: Timing and Observability
In strategic situations, the timing influences whether the information processing constraints of
the consumer are strategically binding or not. In the model studied in this essay, the timing
is such that the consumer commits to an information structure prior to observing the price.
The seller observes the information structure, but not the private signal realizations, before
he chooses which price to charge. Hence, the choice of an informational environment of the
consumer is a non-contingent choice. The analysis in this essay highlights the role of rational
inattentiveness of the consumer in such a setting. By committing to not pay attention (ig-
nore) certain information, the consumer can induce the seller to charge a lower price. This
increases the realized gains from trade, and benefits the consumer. It often even leads to a
Pareto improvement compared to the case in which the consumer knows his true valuation.
There are alternative modeling choices of timing and observability, and depending on the
application that one has in mind any of these modeling choices may be the most natural.
First, one could consider the case in which the consumer chooses his information structure
contingent on the price that he observes. Without information costs, this case is trivial, since
even with two signal realizations, the consumer can choose an information structure that lets
him take an optimal purchasing decision. By learning whether his valuation is above or below
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the price, the consumer obtains all information that is relevant for his purchasing decision.
In equilibrium, the seller charges the standard monopoly price. Hence, the result is outcome
equivalent to the benchmark with a fully informed consumer from Section 3.
The second alternative is to assume that the seller and the consumer choose the price and the
information structure simultaneously. The consumer then observes the private signal realization
and the price, and makes his purchasing decision. This case is equivalent to the model in which
the consumer first chooses an information structure, but this is not observed by the seller.
The idea that the consumer faces limitation to process information15 is central to the analysis
in this essay. The equilibrium characterizations for the case in which the seller cannot observe
the consumer’s information structure differs strongly from the one in the present model. In the
constrained case, if the seller cannot observe the information structure of the consumer, there
exists no equilibrium in pure strategies. However, the main effects of a rationally inattentive
consumer on monopoly pricing and the realized outcome are robust, and do not depend on the
assumption that the seller can observe the information structure of the consumer. The effects
established in this essay for the observable case also exists in the unobservable case, even though
they are weaker.
To briefly illustrate the features of a mixed-strategy equilibrium in the unobservable case,
reconsider the uniform prior example of Section 3. The consumer is restricted to monotone
partitional two-signal information structures. In this setting, the consumer will mix over two
information structures with thresholds v∗A =
1
3
and v∗B =
2
3
, respectively. These are also the
two prices over which the seller mixes. Both players mix with probability 1
2
. Notice that each
information structure of the buyer is a best-response to one of the seller’s prices and vice
versa. For instance, for the price pA = 13 , it is optimal for the consumer to learn whether his
valuation is above or below this threshold. If the consumer adopts the information structure
with threshold v∗A =
1
3
, then the best response of the seller would be to charge a price equal
to 2
3
. In this equilibrium, not all gains from trade are realized. However, an important insight
gained from the analysis in this essay, remains. There are again positive welfare effects of a
rationally inattentive consumer, even though they are weaker than in the observable case. In
the equilibrium with a two-signal information structure, the expected realized gains from trade,
as well as the expected surplus of the consumer and the expected revenue of the seller are higher
than in the benchmark with a fully informed consumer.
The equilibrium values of total surplus, consumer’s expected surplus and seller’s revenue for
the three modeling choices, the benchmark with a fully informed consumer, the observable and
the unobservable case, are summarized in Table 1.2. It can be seen that both, the consumer
and the seller are best off in the case in which the consumer chooses the information structure
first, and this is observed by the seller.
The relation between the results for the three modeling choices is different in the absence of
information constraints. In this case, if the seller cannot observe the information structure of the
15Those may be self-imposed, due to cognitive limitations or external regulation.
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price(s) U∗2 R∗2 T ∗
Full-information benchmark 1
2
1
12
1
4
1
3
Observable case 1
4
(
√
5− 1) 1
4
(3−√5) 1
4
(
√
5− 1) 1
2
Unobservable case (1
2
◦ 1
3
, 1
2
◦ 2
3
) 1
9
4
15
17
45
Table 1.2: Equilibrium prices, and consumer’s, seller’s, and total expected surplus, for each of
the three timings.
consumer, then in equilibrium the consumer learns his true valuation and the seller charges the
monopoly price. Hence, the outcome in the unobservable case is the same as in the benchmark
with a fully informed consumer.
This relation shows that in the absence of information constraints, the effect that rational
inattention can reduce prices and yield welfare improvements strongly depends on the assump-
tion that the seller can make his pricing decision contingent on the information choice of the
consumer. This observation suggests that it is desirable to either make the consumer’s choice
of an information structure observable for the seller or to have an intermediary or regulator
control the information structure of consumers and recommend pricing strategies for sellers.
8 Concluding Remarks
The objective of this essay was to understand the implications of a rationally inattentive con-
sumer in a monopoly pricing model. The consumer can freely decide which pieces of informa-
tion about his valuation to process, but may face information processing constraints. These
constraints can be due to limited cognitive abilities or other sources that restrict the flexibility
of information acquisition of the consumer.
A main contribution of this essay is to identify a “persuasion through rational inatten-
tiveness” effect. By choosing his information structure, the consumer designs the information
environment of the monopoly pricing problem. Any given information structure together with
a signal realization induces a belief of the consumer, which determines his reaction to realized
prices. Moreover, this information structure also affects the demand curve that the seller faces,
and hence her pricing strategy.
The analysis identified the effects of persuasion through rational inattention on the outcome
in a monopoly pricing model. It was shown that, by committing to ignore some information that
would separate low valuations, the consumer can induce the seller to charge a lower price. The
consumer unambiguously benefits from the lower realized price, whereas the seller’s expected
revenue may decrease. For every equilibrium information structure all possible gains from trade
are realized. Moreover, it is often the case that pricing for a rationally inattentive consumer
yields a Pareto improvement, compared to the case in which the consumer is privately informed
about his true valuation. A Pareto improvement is more likely, if the consumer faces information
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processing constraints.
Based on the insights gained from the analysis in this essay, there are various interesting
directions for future research. Examples include the analysis of optimal design and pricing of
product lines, and the effects of competition among sellers (inter- or cross-market competition)
or buyers (auction setting). Moreover, it would also be interesting to explore persuasion through
rational inattentiveness in other strategic environments such as contract theory or collective
decision making.
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Appendix
A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.1. Suppose that the consumer chooses the n-signal information structure pi,
that induces the value estimates V1 < V2 < · · · < Vn, and the corresponding probability masses
g1, . . . , gn. For the seller, the situation is as if he faces a consumer whose valuation is drawn
from distribution Fpi. If the seller charges a price p ∈ (Vk, Vk+1] then by (1.4) the consumer
will buy the object if and only if his value estimate is at least p. Hence, the probability of
trade is
∑n
i=k gi, and the expected revenue for the seller is R(p) = p ·
∑n
i=k gi. Among all prices
p ∈ (Vk, Vk+1], the revenue maximizing price for the seller is p = Vk, and it follows that the
seller’s best-response function is given by
p∗(pi) := arg max
p∈Supp (Fpi)
{p ·
n∑
i=1
gi · 1[p,1](Vi)}.
Proof of Lemma 1.2. If the seller charges the exclusive price, p = Vn, the consumer’s expected
surplus is 0. By choosing an informaiton structure that induces the seller to charge an inclusive
price p < pn, the consumer can guarantee himself a positive expected surplus U ≥ gn (Vn − p).
Notation: The sets of information structures with exactly n, respectively at most n, signal
realizations are denoted by
S(n) = {pi ∈ S : |S| = n} ⊂ S, and S [n] ∪nk=1 S(k).
For a given information structure that induces the distribution Fpi of value estimates, let
Vi ∼S Vj denote the case in which the seller is indifferent between charging any of the prices
Vi, Vj ∈ supp (Fpi). If the seller strictly prefers to charge price Vi over Vj, write Vi  Vj.
Let S(n)i ⊂ S(n) be the subset of information structures with n signal realizations that induce
the seller to charge a price equal to the ith-lowest value estimate, Vi = E [v|si].
Proof of Proposition 1.1 (Seller-Indifference). Suppose that the equilibrium information struc-
ture pi induces the seller to charge a price equal to the ith-lowest value estimate, that is, p = Vi
and pi ∈ S(n)i . Suppose moreover that there exists some k > i such that R(Vi) > R(Vk). That
is, the seller strictly prefers to charge the price p = Vi over charging a price pˆ = Vk. It will
be shown that in this case it is possible to construct an information structure that makes the
consumer better off.
Some technical preliminaries: For every j ∈ I, let Vj := supp (F (·|sj)) ⊆ V be the support of
the posterior distribution induced by the signal realization sj. Since Vj ⊆ [0, 1], it is bounded
above and below, and vj := supVj exists. Moreover, for every v ∈ [0, 1], {v} is a zero-probability
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event.16 Hence, w.l.o.g. we can assume that vj ∈ Vj, that is, vj = supVj = maxVj. It follows
that for every j ∈ I, there exists some δj > 0 such that [vj − δj, vj] ⊆ Vj, that is, f(v|sj) > 0
for all v ∈ [vj − δj, vj]. Finally, given that f(v), g(sj) > 0 it holds that f(v|sj) = 0 if and
only if g(sj|v) = 0, which implies that g(sj|v) > 0 if and only if v ∈ Vj. Using analogous
arguments establishes that every j ∈ I, vj := minVj exists, as well as some δj > 0 such that[
vj, vj + δj
) ⊆ Vj.
Formal construction of an information structure that yields a higher expected surplus for the
consumer than pi:
Construction 1.
Let k ∈ I be the largest index such that R(Vk) < R(Vi). For every
δ = (δi, . . . , δn) with δj > 0 ∀ j = 1, . . . , n, such that (1.6)[
vj, vj + δj
) ⊆ (Vj ∪ [vj+1, vj+1 + δj+1]) ∀ j > k, and
(vj − δj, vj] ⊆ (Vj ∪ (vj−1 − δj−1, vj−1]) ∀ i ≤ j < k,
it is possible to define a new information structure pi as follows. Set g(sn+1|v) := 0 and define
the family of conditional distributions that characterize pi by:
For every j > k : (1.7)
g˜(sj|v) =

g(sj|v) + g(sj+1|v) for v ∈
[
vj+1, vj+1 + δj+1
)
0 for v ∈ [vj, vj + δj)
g(sj|v) otherwise,
For every j, s.t. i ≤ j < k :
g˜(sj|v) =

0 for v ∈ (vj − δj, vj]
g(sj|v) + g(sj−1|v) for v ∈ (vj−1 − δj−1, vj−1]
g(sj|v) otherwise,
g˜(sk|v) =

g(sk|v) + g(sk+1|v) for v ∈
[
vk+1, vk+1 + δk+1
]
g(sk|v) + g(sk−1|v) for v ∈ (vk−1 − δk−1, vk−1]
g(sk|v) otherwise,
and
g˜(sj|v) = g(sj|v) ∀ j < i.
For every v ∈ [0, 1], this construction satisfies g˜(sj|v) ≥ 0 for all sj ∈ S, and
∑n
j=1 g˜(sj|v) = 1.
Hence, pi is well-defined as an information structure. This construction is illustrated in Fig-
ure 1.11.
Construction 1 takes some mass off the support Vn of F (·|sn). This reduces the revenue that
16By assumption F is continuous and has no atoms.
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p = Vi
si+1 sk−1 sk sk+1 sn 1
Figure 1.11: Illustration of Construction 1.
the seller could extract by charging a price equal to E [v|sn]. Indeed,
R(V˜n) =V˜n · g˜(sn)
=
(∫ 1
0
vf(v|sn) dv
)
· g˜(sn)
=
∫ 1
0
vg˜(sn|v)f(v) dv
=R(Vn)−
∫ vn+δn
vn
vg(sn|v)f(v) dv < R(Vn).
The construction then adds the mass taken from the support of of F (·|sn) to the support
of F (·|sn−1), which increases the revenue that the seller could extract by charging the price
E [v|sn−1]. The probability to sell remains the same whereas the seller can charge a higher
price. However, Construction 1 also takes mass off the lower part of the support of F (·|sn−1),
which reduces the revenue that the seller can extract by charging price E [v|sn−1].
For signal sk−1, mass is taken off some high values v ∈ (vk−1 − δk−1, vk−1] in the support
Vk−1. This reduces the revenue that the seller can extract by charging the price E [v|sk−1], since
this price reduces whereas the probability to sell remains the same. Construction 1 then adds
mass to the support of F (·|sk−1), which increases the revenue that the seller can extract by
charging the price E [v|sk−1].
Moveover, for any δ that satisfies (1.10), the revenue that the seller can extract by charging
the price E [v|sk] increases.
For a continuous prior distribution, there exists a δ that satisfies (1.10), such that Con-
struction 1 yields R(V˜j) < R(Vj) for all j ≥ i, j 6= k, and R(V˜k) = R(V˜j) for all j ≥ i. For the
resulting information structure pi there are two cases to be considered:
Case (1): Given information structure pi, the seller still charges a price equal to the ith-lowest
value estimate E [v|si]. In this case, for every v ∈ [0, 1] the probability of trade is not affected
by Construction 1. Hence, the probability of trade remains the same,
∑n
j=i g˜(sj) =
∑n
j=1 g(sj).
The same is true for the expected value of types that participate in trade, and hence for the
expected total surplus from trade, T (pi) = T (pi). Moreover, by Construction 1 V˜i < Vi, and
hence R(V˜i) < R(Vi). It follows that the expected surplus of the consumer is higher than
before, U(pi) = T (pi)−R(pi) < U(pi).
Case (2): Under the information structure pi, the seller wants to charge a price other than
E [v|si]. If this is the case, the seller must have an incentive to switch to a lower price Vj < V˜i.
Again, the consumer is better off than under information structure pi.
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This contradicts the assumption that there exists a finite equilibrium information structure
pi that does not satisfy the seller-indifference property.
Proof of Proposition 1.2: First, two lemmas are established, which are then combined in
order to prove Proposition 1.2.
Lemma 1.3 (Small Exclusion Region).
Any equilibrium information structure pi∗ is outcome-equivalent to an information structure
with at most one value estimate in the exclusion region. That is, there exists at most one value
estimate V ∈ supp (Fpi∗) such that V < p.
Proof of Lemma 1.3. Suppose that pi∗ is an optimal information structure. Let V := supp (Fpi∗)
be the support of value estimates that are induced by this information structure. By Lemma 1.1,
the seller will charge a price p∗ ∈ V , say p∗ = Vp. Let VE ⊆ V be the subset of value estimates
that will be excluded from trade in equilibrium. That is, V ∈ VE if and only if V < Vp = p∗.
Claim 1.1. The set VE is either empty, or is a singleton VE = {V1}.
Suppose not, that is, suppose that |VE| > 1, say V, V ′ ∈ VE. That is, V, V ′ < Vp, and
w.l.o.g. assume that V < V ′. The seller charges price p∗ = Vp, and hence it must hold that
R(Vp) ≥ V, V ′. Let s, s′ be the signal realizations that yield V , respectively V ′. The following
construction defines a new information structure pi that is obtained from pi by merging the
signal realizations s and s′ into one signal realization s.
Construction 2. Let pi :=
(
S˜, {g˜(·|v)}v∈[0, 1]
)
with
S˜ := (S ∪ {s}) \{s, s′},
g˜(s|v) :=g(s|v) + g(s′|v) ∀ v ∈ [0, 1] , and
g˜(sj|v) :=g(sj|v) ∀ v ∈ [0, 1] , sj 6= s, s′.
Construction 2 implies
V := Epi [v|s] = g(s)V + g(s
′)V ′
g(s) + g(s′)
∈ (V, V ′) .
There are two cases to be considered. (1) Under pi, the seller still wants to set a price equal to
Vp, and (2) pi induces the seller to charge a price equal to p = V .
Case (1): Switching from pi to pi has no effect on the outcome, pi and pi are outcome-equivalent.
Case (2): Under the new information structure pi, the seller is induced to charge a price
p˜ = V < V ′ < Vp. Notice that Construction 2 does not affect the value estimates that are larger
than Vp – neither their value V , nor the probability that they arise, gV . However, by Con-
struction 2 the price charged by the seller reduces. Hence, it is easy to see that the consumer’s
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surplus increases. Indeed,
U(pi) =
∑
{V ∈V:V≥Vp}
(V − p∗) · gV <
∑
{V ∈V:V≥Vp}
(V − p˜) · gV = U(pi).
The consumer is strictly better off under information structure pi than under pi – a contradiction
to the assumption that pi is a equilibrium information structure.
Lemma 1.4 (Implementability by Fully Inclusive Prices).
Suppose that the price p0 is inducible by the n-signal information structure pi, and Upi is the
resulting expected surplus of the consumer. Then the price p := µ0 − Upi is inducible as a fully
inclusive price by an n-signal information structure, which yields the expected surplus Upi for
the consumer.
Proof of Lemma 1.4. If the exclusion region is empty, VE = ∅, then the result follows triv-
ially. In this case, p0 = V1 and trade is efficient. The realized total expected surplus from
trade is T = µ0, the seller’s expected revenue is R = p0, and the consumer’s expected surplus
is Upi = T−R = µ0−p0. In this case p = p0, which is implemented as a fully inclusive price by pi.
Suppose now that the exclusion region is non-empty VE 6= ∅. By Lemma 1.3, one can assume
w.l.o.g. that there is only one value estimate in the exclusion region, VE = {V1}. It follows that
p0 = V2 > V1. The mass of the exclusion region is g1, and the mass on the price charged by the
seller, p0 = V2, is g2. In order for p0 to be a best-response of the seller, it must hold that
R(V2) ≥ R(V1), and R(V2) ≥ R(Vj) ∀ j > 2.
Case (1): Suppose that the first relation holds with equality, R(V2) = R(V1), then by merging
signal realizations s1 and s2 into one joint signal, say s, one obtains a merged value estimate
V ∈ (V1, V2). For the resulting information structure, charging the price V yields an expected
revenue of R(V ) = V > R(V1), and hence the seller would strictly prefer to charge a price equal
to V over any other price. This contradicts the assumption that pi is an equilibrium information
structure.
Case (2): Suppose that R(V2) > R(V1). For p0 = V2, expected total surplus from trade is17
T (p0) = µ0 − g1V1.
The expected revenue of the seller is:
R(p0) = (1− g1) · p0,
17Here the following property is used: For every non-zero probability event s, it holds that
F (s) · E [v|s] + (1− F (s)) · E [v|¬s] = µ0,
where ¬s is the complementary event to s.
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and the expected surplus of the consumer is:
Upi(p0) = (1− g1) · (E [v|¬s1]− p0) .
It follows that
p =µ0 − [(1− g1)E [v|s¬s1]− (1− g1)p0]
=g1V1 + (1− g1)p0. (1.8)
Claim 1.2. The price p, given by (1.8), can be implemented by an n-signal information structure
as a fully inclusive price.
Construct a new information structure pi from pi as follows: Add all of g2 and a fraction
α = g2
1−g1 to the signal realization s˜1, the resulting value estimate is V˜1 = p. This is well-defined,
given that Bayesian consistency requires that 1− g1 > g2. Hence, unless gs = 1− g1, there will
be some mass left on type VE. Add all of the remaining mass on VE to the signal realization
s˜, and add mass from higher value estimates, Vj, j > 2 until V˜1 = p. Taking mass from higher
value estimates will only reduce the expected revenue that the seller can extract from setting a
price equal to any of these types, that is, reduce the seller’s incentives to do so. It follows that
R(V˜1) =p = g1V1 + (1− g1)p0 > R(V2 = p0) ≥ R(V˜j) ∀j > 2,
which shows that the price p is implementable as a fully inclusive price by an n-signal informa-
tion structure.18
Under the new information structure the expected surplus of the consumer is the same as
before. However, under the new information structure there is at least one j > 1 such that
the seller strictly prefers to charge price p = V˜1 over charging a price equal V˜j. Hence, by
Proposition 1.1, there exists another information structure that makes the consumer better
off.
Proof of Proposition 1.2 (Efficient Trade).
Suppose not, that is, suppose that for some n ∈ N, there exists an equilibrium information
structure pi ∈ S(n) such that VE 6= ∅. W.l.o.g. assume that VE is a singleton (Lemma 1.3), that
is VE = {V1}. Consequently, it must hold that the seller charges the price p = V2 = min V\{V1}.
By Lemma 1.4 there exists an information structure pi that induces the seller to charge a fully
inclusive price, induces efficient trade, and yields the same surplus for the consumer as the
initial information structure pi. Recall that the construction in Lemma 1.4 of the information
structure pi, leads to R(V˜1) > R(V˜j) for all j ≥ 2. That is, for the newly constructed information
structure pi, the seller has a strict preference to charge the fully inclusive price, V˜1. But in this
case, Proposition 1.1 implies that there exist an n-signal information structure that yields a
18To be precise, it is only possible to reach prices p ≤ µ0 with this construction. However, this is without loss
of generality, since it is never an optimal action for the consumer to induce a price greater than µ0.
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strictly higher surplus for the consumer than the surplus induced by pi, which is also higher
than the surplus induced by pi. A contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 1.3 (Equilibrium Structures are Monotone Partitional).
The result is established by an indirect proof. It proceeds as follows: Suppose that there exists
some n ∈ N and an equilibrium information structure pi∗n that is not partitional. Provide a
construction of an n-signal information structure that induces a strictly higher surplus for the
consumer. This contradicts the assumption that the initial non-partitional information structure
is part of an equilibrium.
Suppose that pi is a non-partitional equilibrium information structure, and let sk be the
highest signal realization for which the partitional property fails. That is, suppose that there
exists an index k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that g(sk|v) ∈ (0, 1) for a set V̂k ⊆ [0, 1], with non-empty
interior int(V̂k) 6= ∅. As before, let Vk denote the support of F (·|sk).
Construction 3.
Step 1: (Adding the “missing mass” to the values in V̂k.)
Let sj < sk be a signal realization such that int (suppF (·|sj) ∩ suppF (·|sk)) 6= ∅. Define a new
information structure pi by
gˆ(sk|v) =
g(sk|v) + g(sj|v) for v ∈ Vk0 otherwise, (1.9)
gˆ(sj|v) =
0 for v ∈ Vkg(sj|v) otherwise, and
gˆ(s`|v) = g(s`|v) ∀ ` 6= j, k.
This construction adds “missing mass” to the values v ∈ V̂k. 19 The information structure pi
is obtained from pi by shifting masses across signal realizations. Hence, by construction, pi is
well-defined as an information structure.
For the construction in (1.9), gˆ(sk|v) ≥ g(sk|v) for all v ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, the probability
that signal sk realizes increases, gˆ(sk) =
∫
[0, 1]
gˆ(sk|v)f(v) dv > g(sk), and the revenue that the
seller can extract by charging a price equal to the value estimate induced by signal sk increases,
R(V̂k) > R(Vk).
Step 2: (Re-leveling the seller’s expected revenue.)
The second step of the construction induces a “re-leveling” of the seller’s revenue. That is,
mass is taken off the lower part of the support Vk of F̂ (·|sk). For every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let
vi := minVi, the minimum of the support of F (·|si). Again one can assume that vi exists,
given that Vi ⊂ [0, 1] is bounded below and, moreover, {v} is a zero-probability event for all
v ∈ [0, 1].
19Notice that it may happen that the construction yields gˆ(sk|v) = 1 for all v ∈ [0, 1], which would imply
that signal realization sk occurs with probability 1.
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The probability mass that was added to signal realization sk in Step 1 was taken from signal
realization sj. Now, for every
δ = (δj+1, . . . , δk, 0) with δ` > 0 such that (1.10)
[v`, v` + δ`] ⊆
(V` ∪ [v`+1, v`+1 + δ`+1]) ∀ ` ∈ {j + 1, . . . , k},
it is possible to define a new information structure pi by:
g˜(sk|v) =
0 for v ∈ [vk, vk + δk)gˆ(sk|v) otherwise, (1.11)
g˜(s`|v) =

gˆ(s`|v) + gˆ(s`+1|v) for v ∈
[
v`+1, v`+1 + δ`+1
)
0 for v ∈ [v`, v` + δ`)
gˆ(s`|v) otherwise,
∀ ` ∈ {j + 1, . . . , k − 1}, and
g˜(sj|v) =
gˆ(sj|v) + gˆ(sj+1|v) for v ∈
[
vj+1 + δj+1, vj+1
)
gˆ(sj|v) otherwise,
g˜(si|v) = gˆ(si|v) ∀i /∈ {j, . . . , k}.
This construction in illustrated in Figure 1.12.
0 1vk vk + δk
1
g(sk|v)
B
A
Vk
(a) Conditional probability of signal realization sk
0
vk−1 vk vk
1pi :
sk−1 sk
0 1pi :
vk−1 + δk−1 vk + δk vk
sk−1 sk
(b) Supports of signal realizations under pi and pi.
Figure 1.12: Illustration of Construction 3. In (a), area A is the mass that is added to signal
realization sk in Step 1, area B is the probability mass that is taken off the lower part of the
support of F (·|sk).
For every s` with ` ∈ {sj+1, . . . , sk}, Construction 3 increases the probability that signal
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s` realizes for some high values, which increases the revenue that the seller could extract by
charging the price E [v|s`]. Construction 3 then takes probability mass off values in the lower
part of the support V`, which again reduces the revenue that the seller could extract by charging
the price E [v|s`].
For a continuous distribution function, it is possible to find a δ that satisfies (1.10) such
that:
R(V˜`) = R (V`) ∀` ∈ {j + 1, . . . , k}. (1.12)
Claim 1.3. For any ` ∈ {j+1, . . . , k} such that g˜` ≤ g`, the distribution of values in the support
of F˜ (·|s`) first-order stochastically dominates those in F (·|s`).
Indeed,
f˜(v|s`) =

f(v|s`) = 0 ∀ v ∈ [0, v`)
0 < f(v|s`) ∀ v ∈ [v`, v` + δ`)
g˜(s`|v)f(v)
g˜(s`)
≥ g(s`|v)f(v)
g(s`)
= f(v|s`) ∀ v ∈ [v` + δ`, 1] .
Since F˜ (·|s`) and F (·|s`) are both distribution functions, thus monotone increasing, and satisfy
F˜ (1|s`) = F (1|s`) = 1, it must be that F˜ (v|s`) ≤ F (v|s`) for all v ∈ [0, 1]. This is exactly the
defining property for first-order stochastic dominance and it follows that F˜ (·|s`) ≥FOSD F (·|s`).
Claim 1.4. Construction 3 with δ such that (1.12) is satisfied yields:
(i)
∑n
m=` g˜m <
∑n
m=` gm,
(ii) V˜` > V`, and
(iii)
∑n
m=` g˜mV˜m ≥
∑n
m=` gmVm,
for all ` ∈ {j + 1, . . . , k}.
For g˜k this is easy to see. Suppose that g˜k = gk. Then, by Claim 1.3, F˜ (·|sk) ≥FOSD F (·|sk),
which would imply:
V˜k = Epi [v|sk] =
∫ 1
0
v · dF˜ (v|sk) >
∫ 1
0
v · dF (v|sk) = Vk,
and
R(V˜k) = V˜k
(
n∑
m=k
g˜m
)
> Vk
(
n∑
m=k
gk
)
= R(Vk).
R(V˜k) is decreasing in the lower threshold, vk + δk. That is, in order to obtain R(V˜k) = R(Vk),
one has to increase δk. It follows that g˜k < gk and (1.12) implies V˜k > Vk.
The statements of (i) and (ii) of Claim 1.4 for ` ∈ {j + 1, . . . , k − 1} follow by induction.
They are verified by applying the same arguments as for g˜k and V˜k to
∑n
m=` g˜m and V˜` using
that by (1.12) (
n∑
m=`
g˜m
)
V˜` =
(
n∑
m=`
gm
)
V`.
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Part (iii) of Claim 1.4 is still left to show. Notice that the value of
n∑
m=`
gmVm is just the
expected value of the values in the supports of F (·|sm) for signals s`, . . . , sn (cf. Figure 1.12).
Hence, the result of (iii) follows directly from Construction 3.
The last step of the proof is to analyze the effect of Construction 3 for the signal realization
sj. The probability that signal sj realizes increases to one, for all values v ∈
[
vj+1, vj+1 + δj+1
)
,
and decreases to zero, for all values v ∈ V̂k. Whether this re-allocation of probability mass results
in an increase or decrease of the expected revenue that the seller can extract by charging a price
equal to the value estimate induced by the signal realization sj is in general not obvious. The
next claim establishes that it is decreasing for the construction that satisfies (1.12).
Claim 1.5. Construction 3 with δ such that (1.12) is satisfied implies R(V˜j) < R(Vj).
The construction only re-distributes mass among signals s` with ` ≥ j. This implies that
n∑
m=j
g˜m =
n∑
m=j
gm.
That is, the probability of trade if the seller charges the price equal to the value estimate
induced by sj remains the same under the construction. Combined with the result of Claim 1.4,
it follows that g˜j > gj.
The information structure pi satisfies Bayes consistency by construction. Construction 3 only
re-allocates mass among signals s` with ` ≥ j. Hence, it must hold that:
g˜jV˜j +
(
n∑
k=j+1
g˜kV˜k
)
= gjVj +
(
n∑
k=j+1
gkVk
)
⇒ V˜j = gj
g˜j︸︷︷︸
<1
Vj +
1
g˜j
((
n∑
k=j+1
gkVk
)
−
(
n∑
k=j+1
g˜kV˜k
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
< Vj.
It follows that
R(V˜j) = V˜j
(
n∑
`=j
g˜`
)
< Vj
(
n∑
`=j
g`
)
= R(Vj),
which verifies Claim 1.5.
The case j > 1:
Under information structure pi, R(V˜j) < R(Vj) and R(V˜`) = R(V`) for all ` 6= j. The initial
information structure was assumed to be an equilibrium structures. Hence, by Proposition 1.2
must induce the price p = V1. It follows directly that under information structure pi, the seller
charges price V˜1 = V1. However, under information structure pi, the seller strictly prefers to
charge price V˜1 over charging the price V˜j. It follows that, pi does not satisfy seller-indifference
and hence, by Proposition 1.1, there exists another information structure that yields a strictly
higher expected surplus for the consumer. A contradiction to the assumption that pi is a non-
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partitional equilibrium information structure.
The case j = 1:
Suppose that j = 1. Then, under the constructed information structure pi, the seller does not
charge the fully inclusive price V˜1 anymore but prefers to charge a higher price, which yields a
higher expected revenue for him R(V˜`) > R(V˜1) for all ` > 1.
In this case, one can simply add mass from signal realization s2 to s1. This re-distribution
of mass increases the revenue that the seller can extract by charging a price equal to E [v|s1]
and decreases the revenue from charging the price E [v|s2]. Adding mass to s1 until reaching
the revenue level R(Vˇ1) = R(V˜`), ` > 2, results in R(Vˇ2) < R(Vˇ1). Hence, the seller strictly
prefers to charge the price Vˇ1 over price Vˇ2. By Proposition 1.1 there exists an information
structure that yields a strictly higher expected surplus for the consumer, which contradicts the
assumption that pi is consumer optimal.
Proof of Theorem 1.1 (Equilibrium Existence).
Consider any n ∈ N. From Proposition 1.2 it follows that if an equilibrium information structure
exists, then it must induce efficient trade, that is, must be an element of S(n)1 . For any pi ∈ S(n)1 ,
the consumer’s expected surplus is:
U(pi) = µ0 − p∗(pi).
Consequently, within the set S(n)1 , the information structure that induces the minimal price is
optimal. Define P ∗n := {p∗(pi) : pi ∈ S(n)1 }, the set of prices that are inducible as fully inclusive
prices by an n-signal information structure. Given that P ∗n ⊆ [0, 1], it is bounded below, and
hence inf P ∗n exists.
Existence of minP ∗n follows from Proposition 1.1 and Proposition 1.3. The equilibrium price
is p∗ = minP ∗n . It is now possible to construct the (equilibrium) information structure that
induces this price:
Consider any p ∈ [0, 1]. If p is inducible as a fully inclusive price, it must hold that V1 = p
and R(V1) = p. Every equilibrium information structure must be partitional (Proposition 1.3).
Hence, the lowest threshold vˆ1 is determined by:
E [v|v ≤ vˆ1] = p,
which implies g1 := F (vˆ1).
By Proposition 1.1, it must hold that R(V2) = (1 − g1)V2 = R(V1) = p, which determines
the value of V2. Using Proposition 1.3, the threshold vˆ2 is determined by
E [v|vˆ1 ≤ v ≤ vˆ2] = V2,
and the realization probability by g2 = F (vˆ2). This procedure can be used to iteratively deter-
mine the thresholds vˆ1, . . . , vˆn−1. In order to establish Bayes consistence, set Vn := E [v|v ≥ vˆn−1],
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and gn := 1− F (vˆn−1).
The above construction is well-defined for every p ∈ [0, 1], as long as one stops the con-
struction if at some point vˆk > 1. In this case, the price is certainly not the minimal price that
is implementable as a fully inclusive price. Notice that, since F is twice continuously differen-
tiable, for every i = 1, . . . , n, Vi(p) is continuous, and moreover strictly increasing in p. Now for
every p ∈ [0, 1] such that Vn(p) ≤ 1 there are three possibilities:
a) R(Vn(p)) > R(V1(p)). In this case, p is not inducible as a fully inclusive price.
b) R(Vn(p)) < R(V1(p)). In this case, p is not the minimal price that is inducible as a fully
inclusive price.
c) R(Vn(p)) = R(V1(p)). This is the minimal price that is inducible as a fully inclusive
price, p∗ = minP ∗n . The partitional information structure that is obtained from the above
construction is the optimal n-signal information structure pi∗n.
Proof of Proposition 1.4 (More Signals are Better).
The proof is by induction. For n ∈ N, let pi∗n be the equilibrium information structure if the
consumer is restricted to information structures with at most n signals.
Base case: It has already been established that for n = 2 the equilibrium information struc-
ture makes use of both signal realizations.
Induction hypotheses: Suppose that the result was already proven for all m ≤ n. That
is, suppose that for m ≤ n, the equilibrium information structure uses all signal realizations,
the consumer strictly profits from having access to information structures with more signal
realizations, U
(
pi∗m−1
)
< U (pi∗m), and the equilibrium price is strictly decreasing in the number
of signal realizations, p∗m−1 > p∗m.
Induction step: (n→ n+ 1)
Consider the equilibrium n-signal information structure pi∗n, and let V
(n)
1 , . . . V
(n)
n be the value
estimates induced by this structure. By the induction hypothesis, the probability mass of each
of these value estimates is strictly positive.
To show: If the consumer has access to information structures with at most n + 1 signal
realizations, then pi∗n+1 ∈ S(n+1), and U
(
pi∗n+1
)
> U (pi∗n).
Let pi be an information structure with n+ 1 signal realizations {s1, . . . , sn−1, sˆn, sˆn+1} that
is constructed from pi∗n by splitting the mass of the value estimate Vn, respectively of the signal
realization sn, between two signal realizations sˆn and sˆn+1. That is, g(sˆn|v)+g(sˆn+1|v) = g(sn|v),
for all v ∈ [0, 1]. The construction can be chosen, such that20
Vn−1 < V̂n < Vn < V̂n+1, (1.13)
20Notice that pi∗n is an equilibrium information structure and thus partitional. Hence, the desired construction
can be obtained by choosing vˆn+1 slightly above the highest threshold vn and let the additional signal realize
whenever v ∈ [vn, vˆn+1]. This construction implies R(Vn) > R(V̂n+1), since the revenue that the seller can
extract by charging a price equal to the hightest value estimate is decreasing in the highest threshold.
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and R(Vn) > R(V̂n+1). If mass from Vn is split such that (1.13) is satisfied, it is always the
case that R(Vn) > R(V̂n), since the probability to sell g(sn) = g(sˆn) + g(sˆn+1) is the same and
V̂n < Vn. Under this construction, the revenue that the seller can extract by charging a price
equal to Vj remains the same for all j < n. That is, R(Vj) = R(V̂j), ∀ j < n.
It follows that the information structure pi does not satisfy the seller-indifference property.
Hence, by Proposition 1.1 there exists an information structure with at most (n + 1)-signals
that yields a strictly higher surplus for the consumer. Consequently, the equilibrium informa-
tion structure pi∗n+1 yields a strictly higher surplus than the expected surplus that the consumer
would obtain under pi∗n. Hence, the surplus U(pi∗n+1) is not achievable with an n-signal informa-
tion structure, which implies that pi∗n+1 has to make use of all n+1 available signal realizations.
The result on equilibrium prices follows directly from the observation that the expected
surplus of the consumer is strictly greater under pi∗n+1 than under pi∗n, and the result that any
equilibrium information structure induces efficient trade (Proposition 1.2): U∗n = µ0 − p∗n, and
it follows that p∗n+1 < p∗n.
The following concept will be used in the proof of the next theorem.
Definition 1.1: Say that the sequence of finite information structures {pin}n∈N converges to the
information structure pi, if the sequence of distributions over value estimates {Fn}n∈N induced
by pin weakly converges to the distribution F˜ induced by pi. Weak convergence of distribution
functions, respectively convergence of information structures is denoted by:
Fn ⇒ F˜ , and pin ⇒ pi.
Proof of Theorem 1.2 (Unconstrained Equilibrium).
Claim 1.6. The sequence of finite equilibrium information structures pi∗(n) converges.
The support of true valuations is I = [0, 1] ⊆ R, which is a compact metric space. Let
B(I) be the Borel algebra on I. Then, the space P(I) of probability measures on (I, B(I))
is metrizable by the Levy-Prokhorov metric. That is, since I is separable, weak convergence
of measures is equivalent to convergence of measures in the Levy-Prokhorov metric. P(I) is
compact in the weak topology, and hence sequentially compact. It follows that for the sequence
{F ∗n}n∈N induced by {pi∗n}n∈N, there exists a convergent subsequence F ∗nk ⇒ F∞.
Every finite equilibrium information structure pi∗n induces the seller to charge a fully inclusive
price. The sequence {pi∗n}n∈N induces a sequence of prices {p∗n}n∈N, which is strictly decreasing
in n (cf. Proposition 1.4). Moreover, every finite equilibrium information structure is partitional
and satisfies the seller-indifference property (Proposition 1.3 and Proposition 1.1). The thresh-
olds of the interval partition that characterizes a finite equilibrium information structure are
already determined by the lowest threshold through the seller-indifference condition. It follows
that the weak convergence of distributions of values estimates is not only satisfied for a sub-
sequence but that the sequence {F ∗n}n∈N converges, F ∗n ⇒ F∞. This establishes convergence of
the sequence of information structures, {pi∗n}n∈N. Define pi∗∞ := lim
n→∞
pi∗n.
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Convergence in the Levy-Prokhorov metric implies convergence of prices, that is,
p∗n
n→∞−→ p∗∞. Every finite equilibrium information structures satisfies the seller-indifference con-
dition (Proposition 1.1), which implies
p∗n = E [v|v ≤ vˆ1, n] = E [v|vˆ1, n ≤ v ≤ vˆ2, n] (1− F (vˆ1, n)) , (1.14)
where vˆ1, n, and vˆ2, n are the lowest and next to lowest threshold of the interval-partition that
characterizes the information structure pi∗n. The left-hand side of (1.14) is increasing in vˆ1, n.
Moreover, for a given vˆ1, n, the right-hand side of (1.14) is increasing in vˆ2, n, and bounded below
by vˆ1, n · (1− F (vˆ1, n)). It follows that, for the information structure pi∗∞, the lowest threshold v
is given by
v := min{vˆ ∈ (0, 1] : (1− F (vˆ)) vˆ = E [v|v ≤ vˆ]}. (1.15)
The property that Fpi∗∞ is an equal revenue curve, directly follows from the feature that all
finite equilibrium information structures satisfy seller-indifference (Proposition 1.1), and that
this property is preserved in the limit.
It is still left to verify that pi∗∞ is indeed an equilibrium information structure. Suppose
not, that is, suppose that there exists an information structure pi∗ that makes the consumer
strictly better off U(pi∗) > U(pi∗∞). Let {pin}n∈N be a sequence of finite information structures
that converges to pi∗. This also implies that U(pin)
n→∞−→ U(pi∗). It follows that there exists some
 > 0 such that for every n ∈ N, there exists some n > n such that U(pin) − U(pi∗n) > . A
contradiction to the assumption that pi∗n is an equilibrium information structure.
Proof of Corollary 1.1. As shown in Proposition 1.4, the consumer’s expected equilibrium sur-
plus U∗n is strictly increasing in the number of signal realizations n. Given that every equilibrium
information structure induces efficient trade (Proposition 1.2), the induced expected total sur-
plus from trade T ∗n is constant in n. The total surplus is split between the consumer and seller.
It follows that the seller’s expected revenue R∗n = T ∗n − U∗n is strictly decreasing in n. In Theo-
rem 1.2, weak convergence of the sequence of finite equilibrium information structures has been
established, which implies
lim
n→∞
U(pi∗n) = U(pi
∗
∞) and lim
n→∞
R(pi∗n) = R(pi
∗
∞).
B Capacity, Equilibrium Information Structures and Thresholds
Reconsider the uniform prior example. The aim of this section is to show how to determine the
thresholds of the finite equilibrium information structures, and to illustrate how they evolve
with the number of signals.
Any finite equilibrium information structure is partitional (Proposition 1.3). A partitional in-
formation structure with n signal realizations is determined by a vector of thresholds
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a = (a0, a1, . . . , an) ∈ Rn+1, with 0 = a0 < a1 < · · · < an = 1. In the uniform prior case,
the value estimates and realization probabilities are given by:
Vi =
ai + ai−1
2
, and gi := ai − ai−1, ∀ i = 1, . . . , n.
Bayes consistency and feasibility are satisfied by construction.
The equilibrium information structure satisfies two more properties. It induces efficient
trade and yields seller-indifference. These two properties are satisfied, if and only if
V1 =
(
n∑
i=k
gi
)
Vk ∀ k = 2, . . . , n.
It follows that the threshold vector a ∈ Rn+1 defines the equilibrium n-signal information
structure pi∗n, if the thresholds satisfy the following system of equations:
ak =
a1
(1− ak−1) − ak−1, for k = 1, . . . , n (1.16)
a0 =0 and an = 1.
The thresholds of the equilibrium information structure for n ∈ {2, 5, 10} are illustrated in
Figure 1.5.
Observe that highest threshold an increases in n. This threshold is determined by
R∗n =
1− a2n
2
.
In the limit, the lowest threshold approaches 1
2
, yielding a value estimate and induced price
of 1
4
. The seller’s revenue also approaches this value from above, lim
n→∞
R∗n =
1
4
. For the highest
threshold an, it follows that it is bounded above by 12
√
2 and approaches this value from below,
lim
n→∞
an =
1
2
√
2.
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Chapter 2
Information Disclosure in Markets:
Auctions, Contests, and Matching Markets
We study the impact of information disclosure on equilibrium properties in a model
of a two-sided matching market that incorporates a large class of market design
environments. In this model, each agent first privately observes an informative, but
potentially noisy, signal about his private type. The agents then enter a matching
stage in which they choose signaling investments to compete for match partners.
In order to study the impact of information disclosure, we introduce a novel crite-
rion that orders signals in terms of their informativeness. We show that information
disclosure increases the expected total match output, but may also increase waste-
ful signaling investments due to amplified competition within groups. The second
effect may dominate, leading to a decrease in expected welfare. Disclosure effects
on equilibrium properties depend on whether information is disclosed to agents on
the short or on the long side of the market. Applications to auctions, contests, and
matching markets are discussed.
1 Introduction
In most market environments the information available to market participants significantly
influences agents’ behavior and the market outcome. Examples include auctions, contests, and
various matching markets, among them school choice, college admission and labor markets. In
auctions, bidding behavior as well as the revenue of an auctioneer depend on the information
available to bidders about the object being sold. Feedback provided by a company to their
workers affects workers’ effort in promotion tournaments, and the precision of grading systems
in high-schools influences the outcome of college admission.
In the recent auction literature, the effects of the precision level of information available to
bidders on bidding behavior, efficiency, and expected revenue in an auction have been studied
extensively. The resulting implications for auction design have been discussed.1 It is therefore
1 Examples include Persico (2000) and Shi (2012) who study information acquisition, whereas the focus
in Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007), Esö and Szentes (2007), Ganuza and Penalva (2010) and Ganuza and
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surprising that this important topic has been little studied and is still not well understood in
other market design environments.
In this essay we address this problem and analyze the effects of information disclosure on
agents’ behavior, the resulting assignment, and welfare implications in a two-sided matching
market model. We explain how our results map to various of the aforementioned market design
environments, and discuss the implications for auctions, contests and matching markets.
We consider a model of a two-sided, one-to-one matching market with a finite number
of agents on each side of the market. We refer to the two groups of agents as workers and
firms. These terms are only used to distinguish the two groups of agents. They can represent
for example workers and firms, students and schools, competitors and prizes, or bidders and
objects in auctions.
Our model is a modification of the marriage market formulated in Becker (1973), with
two-sided incomplete information. Firms have private information about their types, whereas
workers are a priori uncertain about their own types. The model has two stages: an information
stage followed by a matching stage. In the information stage, workers obtain an informative, but
typically noisy, private signal about their individual type and update their beliefs accordingly.
The signal realizations in the information stage determine the private information of workers.
Information disclosure means that workers obtain more informative signals, which results in a
higher information level of workers. In order to study the effects of information disclosure on
equilibrium properties in the second-stage matching game, we introduce a criterion, which we
call single-crossing precision, that orders signals in terms of their informativeness. This precision
criterion is similar to those introduced in Ganuza and Penalva (2010). It also uses the insight
that a more informative signal yields a more dispersed distribution of posterior estimates.
In the matching stage, agents take part in a matching game, in which they choose invest-
ments to compete for match partners. Investments are non-productive and serve as observable
signals about the private types of agents. This matching game was introduced and studied by
Hoppe et al. (2009) who refer to it as a matching tournament.2 They prove the existence of a
separating equilibrium in which agents are matched positively assortatively according to their
investments. In our analysis, we focus on this equilibrium.
We find that increasing the level of information available to workers increases the expected
total match output as well as the expected investments of firms, whereas the expected invest-
ments of workers may decrease. Workers always profit from information disclosed to them,
whereas this disclosure may negatively affect the welfare of firms. We show that the second
effect may be so strong that expected aggregate welfare is decreased, but also identify condi-
tions that guarantee that the expected aggregate welfare is increased by a higher information
Penalva (2014) is on information disclosure.
2Such a tournament is a generalization of a contest in which prizes are replaced by matching opportunities.
A similar model with a continuum of agents is discussed in Hopkins (2012).
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level available to workers. For the case in which disclosing more precise information is costly,
we characterize the worker-optimal and the socially optimal levels of information. The socially
optimal level of information maximizes expected aggregate welfare, whereas the worker-optimal
level only takes into account the utilities of workers and maximizes the welfare of this group.
The results are driven by two, possibly opposing, effects of information. On the one hand, a
higher information level of market participants allows for a better assignment in the matching
game, which increases expected total match output. On the other hand, disclosing information
to agents also amplifies competition within groups, which may result in increased (wasteful)
investments in the matching game. Our results indicate that the second effect may dominate,
resulting in decreased welfare.
These two effects are based on the following feature of two-sided markets in which agents
have private information: Agents impose externalities not only on agents within their group,
but also on agents on the other side of the market. In particular, a worker imposes a positive
externality on firms by providing a match opportunity. However, he also imposes a negative
externality on them, since more or better match opportunities lead to increased competition
among firms, which results in higher expected investments.
We apply the results that we establish in our general framework, to discuss the implications
of information disclosure in various market design settings, focusing on auctions, contests,
and matching markets. Depending on the application, agents’ investments are interpreted as
wasteful signaling costs or as (monetary or non-monetary) transfers to a third party. In each
of the applications we highlight certain features of our results.
The most straightforward application of our model are two-sided matching markets, and the
implications of our results yield new insights for these settings. Even though there seems to be
a broad agreement that the level of information of agents in two-sided matching markets is an
important factor which influences agents’ behavior and the market outcome, these informational
effects are poorly understood theoretically.3 Interpreting our results as they apply to two-sided
matching markets yields one of our main contributions: To our knowledge, we provide the first
study of the impact of information disclosure, and the level of information available to market
participants, on the outcome in a two-sided matching market. The main observations are that
disclosing information may decrease expected aggregate welfare, and that the effects depend on
whether information is disclosed to the agents on the short or on the long side of the market.
Our results can also be applied to illustrate the impact of information disclosure in contests
or rank-order tournaments, for example through feedback systems in organizations. The flex-
ibility of our framework provides two distinct ways to project our general model to contests,
3A reason for this may be that most of the theoretical analysis of matching markets studies complete
information models, in which agents know their preferences over potential match alternatives. The two aspects,
that agents have private information about their characteristics and may moreover be uncertain about their own
characteristics, are hardly captured by the theoretical models in the literature. Our model incorporates both of
these aspects and therefore takes a first step towards a theoretical analysis of the effects of private information
and the information level of market participants on the equilibrium outcome in matching markets.
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each yielding different insights and predictions. This feature allows us to obtain some of the
existing results in the contest literature as special cases of our results. More importantly, our
analysis provides new insights for the role of feedback systems in contest. We show that the
effects of information disclosure in contests depend on the ratio of competitors to prizes, and on
the prize-structure. For example, in promotion tournaments with a large pool of workers and
only a few available positions, providing information to workers increases overall effort, whereas
this is not necessarily the case if the ratio of workers and promotions is relatively balanced. Our
results moreover suggest that information management through feedback systems may serve as
an powerful element of contest design. We derive predictions about which feedback systems are
to be expected in different organizational structures.
Our methodological contribution is highlighted in the application of our results to auctions.
We discuss how the statistical methods that we use in this essay provide an alternative way
to prove the results of Ganuza and Penalva (2010) on information disclosure in auctions. To
further illustrate the potential of these statistical methods, we show how they can be used to
strengthen and generalize the results of Ganuza and Penalva (2010).
Outline The rest of the essay is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model. In
Section 3 we characterize equilibrium properties for an exogenously given level of information. In
Section 4, we introduce single-crossing precision, a novel criterion to measure the informational
content of signals. The effects of information disclosure and the resulting higher information level
of market participants are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 contains our results on the worker-
optimal and socially optimal levels of information. The implications of our results for auctions,
contests, and matching markets are presented in Section 7. Related literature is discussed in
Section 8, and Section 9 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the appendix. In Appendix C,
we also briefly discuss different precision criteria.
2 The Model
Consider a two-sided matching market with a finite number of agents. We refer to the two
groups of agents, constituting the two sides of the market, as workers, I = {1, . . . , n}, and
firms, J = {1, . . . , k}. These terms are only used to distinguish the two groups. Depending on
the application they may represent for example, workers and firms, men and women, students
and colleges, or competitors and prizes.
The types of workers, xi, and firms, yi, are determined by iid draws from the interval [0, x],
respectively [0, y].4 Agents’ types are independently distributed with prior distribution FX for
workers and FY for firms. We assume throughout the essay that FX(0) = FY (0) = 0 and FX
and FY are continuously differentiable with positive densities, fX > 0 and fY > 0, on the
support.
There is incomplete information on both sides of the market: Firms’ types yj, are private
information to the firms, whereas workers’ do not know their types ex-ante. The distributions
4If x or y equal infinity, types are drawn from [0,∞).
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FX and FY are common knowledge.5
If worker i is matched with firm j, each agent obtains match payoff xiyj, unmatched agents
produce zero output. In other words, the match value function is v(x, y) = 2xy and match
output is split equally among match partners.
In this model, under complete information, all workers agree on the ranking of firms and
vice versa. Our match value function is supermodular, which implies that positive assortative
matching is the allocation that maximizes expected match output and, moreover, is the only
stable matching.
We consider a two-period model which consists of an information stage followed by a match-
ing stage. In the first period, workers obtain an informative, private signal about their individual
types and update their beliefs accordingly. Agents then enter the matching stage, in which they
compete for match partners.
2.1 Information Stage
In the first period, the information stage, every worker observes a private signal realization
from an information technology S.
An information technology is a signal S, with typical realizations s ∈ [0, s], which is char-
acterized by a family of conditional distributions {G(·|x)}x∈X of signal realization.
G(s|x) := Pr(S ≤ s|X = x)
is the probability that a worker with type x receives a signal realization s′ ≤ s. We assume that
for every x ∈ X, G(·|x) is absolutely continuous, that is, admits a density function g(·|x) almost
everywhere. Together with the prior distribution FX , an information technology induces a joint
distribution on (X,S), a so-called information structure. Agents update their beliefs according
to Bayes’ rule. With a slight abuse of notation, the posterior distribution of X conditional on
S = s is G(·|s), and the resulting conditional expectation is
X̂(s) = E [X|s] =
∫
X
x dG(x|s).
We denote the marginal distribution of S by G.
We assume that high signals are more favorable than low signals in the sense of Milgrom
(1981). This condition implies that workers with high types are more likely to observe a high
signal realization than workers with low types. A high signal thus indicates a higher underlying
type of the agent than a low signal.
5We consider this model in order to simplify notation. It is straightforward to extend the analysis to the case
in which agents on both sides of the market are uncertain about their types.
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Assumption 2.1 (Monotone Signals): For all signal realizations s, s′ ∈ S with s′ > s, signal
realization s′ is more favorable than s. That is, for every non-degenerate prior distribution F
on X, if s′ > s, then the posterior distribution G(·|s′) dominates G(·|s) in terms of first-order
stochastic dominance, G(·|s′) ≥FOSD G(·|s).
This assumption implies that posterior estimates are strictly increasing in signal realizations:
E [X|s′] > E [X|s] , for every s′ > s.
If signal S is characterized by conditional densities {g(·|x)}x∈X , then Assumption 2.1 is equiv-
alent to the strict monotone likelihood ratio property.6
For a given prior distribution F , every information technology S results in a distribution of
posterior estimates, represented by a random variable X̂ := E [X|S]. Given Assumption 2.1,
the function X̂ : S → R+, with X̂(s) = E [X|s] is strictly increasing in s, which implies that
there exists an inverse function, X̂−1. The distribution function of the posterior estimates is
H(xˆ) = G
(
X̂−1(xˆ)
)
=
∫
X
G
(
X̂−1(xˆ)|x
)
dF (x),
with quantile function H−1(u) = inf{xˆ|H(xˆ) ≥ u} for u ∈ [0, 1].
We provide two examples of information technologies that are commonly used in the liter-
ature.
Example 2.1 (Truth-or-noise technology):
Suppose that X is the set of states with prior distribution FX . A truth-or-noise technology
provides with some probability α ∈ [0, 1] a perfectly informative signal s = x and with proba-
bility (1−α) pure noise, independently drawn from prior distribution FX . The receiver cannot
distinguish which kind of signal he observes. For signal realization s, the conditional expected
value is E [X|s] = αs+ (1− α)E [X] . 4
Example 2.2 (Normal Experiments):
Suppose that workers’ types are normally distributed, X ∼ N (µX , σ2X), and that signal S is
given by S = X+, with a normally distributed noise term,  ∼ N (0, σ2 ). It follows that signals
are normally distributed, S ∼ N (µX , σ2X + σ2 ). The posterior estimates are given by
X̂(s) =
σ2
σ2X + σ
2

µ+
σ2X
σ2X + σ
2

s,
thus linear in S, and again normally distributed. 4
In our setting, workers do not know their types a priori. Thus, in the matching stage, work-
ers can only condition their decisions on the information obtained in the information stage. For
a given prior distribution, FX , the information technology S determines the distribution of con-
6The collection {g(·|x)}x∈X has the strict monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) if for every x > x′,
g(s|x)
g(s|x′) is strictly increasing in s.
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ditional expected types of workers in the matching stage, HS(xˆ), which is common knowledge.
The individual expected types conditional on the private signal realizations are xˆi = E [X|si].
With a slight abuse of terminology, we refer to them as workers’ posterior types. They are
private information of the workers. Similarly, for firms, type yj is private information to firm j.
Given the linearity of our model, if a worker with posterior type xˆi is matched to a firm with
type yj, the expected match output for each of the match partners is xˆiyj.
2.2 Matching Stage
In the second period, the matching stage, all agents simultaneously choose an individual in-
vestment that serves as a costly signal of their type. Agents on each side of the market are
ranked based on their investments to then be matched positively assortatively. In case of equal
investments, we assume random tie-breaking. Under this assignment rule the worker with the
highest investment will be matched to the firm with the highest investment, the agents with
the second highest investments in each of the groups will be matched, and so on.7 If worker i
invests b and is matched with firm j, his payoff is
ui ((xi, b), yj) := xiyj − b.
A (pure) strategy for a firm is a measurable function from the set of types Y to non-negative
investments R+0 . For workers it is a mapping from signal realizations S to investments. The
solution concept is Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Remark. The discussion at the end of Section 2.1 illustrates that after the information stage
the situation is as if agents on both sides of the market have private information about their
types. We explicitly model the information stage because we are interested in the comparative
statics effects that correspond to changes in the informativeness of the information technology
of workers. One contribution of the essay is to identify the effect of a more precise information
technology on the distribution of posterior types of workers (Section 4), to then study the com-
parative static effects that result from these changes (Section 5), and discuss the implications
for various applications (Section 7).
2.3 Market Design Settings Captured by the Model
We now briefly discuss how the model captures various important market design settings.
Table 2.1 provides a summary.
Matching Markets The model represents a two-sided, one-to-one matching market, in which
agents on each side have homogeneous preferences about match partners. There is two-sided
incomplete information and agents invest in non-productive signaling à la Spence (1973) to
7A matching mechanism which would yield this outcome is, for example, the worker-, or firm-proposing
deferred acceptance algorithm, assuming that agents rank their potential match-partners according to the
observed investments. The assignment rule is also the natural extension to auctions, in which the highest
bidder obtains the object.
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compete for match partners.8 Investments are wasteful. They solely serve as an observable
signal of the agent’s unobservable type but do not have an effect on the match output. Agents
of each group are ranked according to their observable signaling investments to then be matched
positively assortatively.
Auctions The standard private values auction setting can be mapped into a special case
of our model. There is only one firm, with type Y ≡ 1, interpreted as the auction platform
which sells an object of commonly known quality 1. The workers represent the bidders in
the auction, with their types corresponding to their valuations of the object, and investments
corresponding to their bids. The seller is represented by a third party, which collects the bids.
This interpretation yields an all-pay auction. By the revenue equivalence theorem, the results
which we present in Section 5 and Section 6 apply to all standard auctions that implement the
efficient allocation.
Contests The model also captures a rank-order tournament or contest setting in the following
sense: Consider the firms as passive agents, who are the prizes in a contest, with commonly
known values η1:k ≥ · · · ≥ ηk:k. Workers represent the competitors who participate in the
contest, workers’ types correspond to their abilities, and investments capture the exerted effort.
workers firms types investments
auctions bidders –passive–9 valuations bids
contests/
tournaments
workers,
competitors
promotions,
prizes
productivity,
abilities
effort
matching
markets
students,
workers
schools,
jobs
characteristics signaling
investments
Table 2.1: Examples of environments captured by the model.
3 Equilibrium Characterization
In this section we characterize the equilibrium in the second-period matching game on which
we will focus in our analysis. It is easy to see that there exist multiple equilibria, among
them a pooling equilibrium in which all agents choose zero investments and the assignment
is random. We say that an equilibrium is symmetric if all workers adopt the same strategy
and so do all firms. Strategies are monotone if they are given by continuously differentiable,
strictly increasing functions. Under monotone strategies, firms’ with higher types choose higher
investments and workers’ investments are increasing in signal realizations. The existence of a
8In contrast to Spence (1973), here agents do not have different cost-types but high-type agents receive a
higher payoff from a particular match than low-type agents.
9The passive firm could for example represent an auction platform. The seller is a third party who collects
the investments.
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symmetric separating equilibrium in monotone strategies follows directly by adapting the results
of Hoppe et al. (2009) to our setting. Given Assumption 2.1 there exists a unique equilibrium
of this type.
Theorem 2.1 (Hoppe et al. 2009). Given the assumptions in Section 2, in the second-period
matching game, there exists a unique symmetric separating equilibrium in monotone strategies.
In our analysis, we will focus on this separating equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the positive
assortative matching with respect to the (posterior) types of agents is implemented, all agents
of a group adopt the same strategies, and high-type agents choose higher investments than
low-type agents.
Remark. There are various reasons why it is natural to focus on the equilibrium of The-
orem 2.1. This separating equilibrium is the unique equilibrium that is monotone in signal
realizations. Moreover, it implements the unique stable (and core) matching, given the infor-
mation available in the market after the information stage. It is also the natural extension to
the efficient allocation in auctions and contests.
Before we can provide some intuition for the equilibrium and the formulas for expected total
output, investments and welfare in equilibrium, we need to introduce some more notation.
For a sample X1, . . . , Xn let
X1:n ≥FOSD · · · ≥FOSD Xn:n
be the corresponding order statistics, where ≥FOSD indicates first-order stochastic dominance.
The random variable Xi:n represents the distribution of the ith highest among n iid draws. In
particular, X1:n = max{X1, . . . , Xn}.10
For given market sizes n, k, priors FX , FY and information technology S set
µSi:n := E
[
X̂i:n
]
and ηi:k := E [Yi:k] .
That is, µSi:n denotes the expected value of the ith order statistics of the posterior types, given
information technology S.
To obtain some intuition for this equilibrium it is instructive to analyze the reduced game
faced by agents on either side of the market separately, and relate equilibrium investments to
Vickrey-payments.11 This interpretation also more precisely demonstrates how the model is a
natural extension of a standard auction setting.
Suppose firms adopt separating strategies, and consider the situation for workers after the
information stage. In this case, the problem faced by workers in the second-period matching
10Hereby, we adopt the notation which is used in most of the economics literature. It should be noted that,
by contrast, the standard convention in statistics is to denote the highest order statistic by Xn:n.
11This was also pointed out by Hoppe et al. (2009). Adapting their results to our model yields the equilibrium
properties summarized in Table 2.2.
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game is as if they are in a contest competing for k heterogeneous prizes, where the values of
the prizes are determined by an agent’s posterior type and the expected values of the highest,
second-highest, third-highest,... types of firms. To be precise, for a worker with posterior type
xˆ, the values of the prizes are xˆ · η1:k, . . . , xˆ · ηk:k. The assignment in the matching stage is
positive assortative with respect to investments. In the corresponding contest faced by workers,
this allocation rule thus prescribes that prizes be allocated to the agents in order of their
investments, where the agent with the highest investment receives the highest price. Our model
is linear, and it is well-known that in such an environment expected payoffs of agents are fully
specified by the allocation rule, and the expected payoff of the lowest type.12 By the revenue
equivalence theorem, it follows that expected investments must be the same as in a VCG-
mechanism.13 In the VCG-mechanism, each worker must pay the amount equal to the negative
externality he imposes on the other workers. For a profile of signal realizations s1, . . . , sn, after
appropriate relabeling, let the corresponding posterior types be xˆ1 ≥ · · · ≥ xˆn. We refer to the
worker receiving the ith-highest signal, as (posterior) type i. The presence of type i does not
affect workers who receive a higher signal than himself, but he imposes a negative externality
on all workers receiving a lower signal realization. Each of those workers would be assigned to
a higher match-partner if type i were not present. It follows that the expected investment, ti,
of the ith type is:
ti =
min{k, n}∑
j=i
µj+1:n · (ηj:k − ηj+1:k). (2.1)
Summing up over all i we obtain the formula for expected total investments of workers,
Tw =
min{k, n}∑
i=1
i
(
ηi:k − ηi+1:k
)
µSi+1:n.
In the separating equilibrium of Theorem 2.1 the assignment in the matching stage is positive
assortative with respect to agents (posterior) types. It is easy to see that the resulting expected
total match output is O = 2
min{k, n}∑
i=1
µSi:n ·ηi:k. Expected total welfare of workers isWw = 12O−Tw
and the formulas for equilibrium expected total investments and welfare of firms are derived in
a similar fashion. Table 2.2 provides a summary of the formulas.
4 Precision of Information Technologies
We now introduce a novel criterion, which we call single-crossing precision, to compare signals
in terms of their informational content. In Section 5, we apply this concept to discuss the effects
of a higher level of information of workers on total match output, total investments, and welfare.
Given our assumption that signals are monotone, the natural informativeness criterion to
12A worker who receives signal realization 0 does not invest and is matched to the lowest firm with certainty.
His expected payoff is E [X|0] · ηn:k (which is 0 if n > k).
13The well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms due to Vickrey (1961), Clarke (1971) and Groves
(1973)
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workers firms
expected total
output
O = 2
min∑
i=1
µSi:n · ηi:k
expected total
investments
Tw =
min∑
i=1
i
(
ηi:k − ηi+1:k
)
µSi+1:n Tf =
min∑
i=1
i
(
µSi:n − µSi+1:n
)
ηi+1:k
expected welfare of
workers/firms
Ww =
min∑
i=1
i · (µSi:n − µSi+1:n)ηi:k Wf = min∑
i=1
i · (ηi:k − ηi+1:k)µSi:n
expected aggregate
welfare
W =
min∑
i=1
i · (2µSi:nηi:k − µSi+1:nηi:k − µSi:nηi+1:k)
Table 2.2: Formulas for expected total output, expected total investments and welfare for work-
ers and firms, respectively, and expected aggregate welfare, for given prior distributions, infor-
mation technology S, and market sizes, n, k. Here, min := min{k, n}.
use is the concept of effectiveness introduced by Lehmann (1988) – Persico (2000) calls this
concept accuracy. The basic idea behind this concept is that, for a more accurate signal the
conditional distributions that characterize the signal are more dependent on the state than
for a less accurate signal.14 Mizuno (2006) shows that for a more accurate signal the resulting
distribution of posterior estimates is more dispersed.
As Ganuza and Penalva (2010), we use this observation to define a novel precision criterion
in terms of properties of the resulting distribution of posterior estimates.15 It is based on the
following insight: for a completely random signal nothing can be inferred from the signal real-
ization and the resulting posterior estimate is always the ex-ante mean. For a more informative
signal, the resulting distribution of posterior estimates will be more responsive to the signal
realization and thus result in a more variable distribution of posterior estimates.
The information criterion that we use requires that a more precise signal leads to a more
dispersed distribution of posterior estimates in terms of a mean-preserving spread. Moreover,
for signals ordered in terms of single-crossing precision, we require single-crossing of the quantile
functions.
Definition 2.1: For a given prior FX and signals S1, S2, let H−11 and H
−1
2 be the quantile
functions of E [X|S1] and E [X|S2]. Say that signal S2 is more single-crossing precise than S1,
denoted S2%∗ S1, if
H−12 (u)
H−11 (u)
is increasing in u ∈ (0, 1) .
14Signal S1 is more effective than signal S2 if GS1
(
G−1S2 (s|x)|x
)
is increasing in x. Effectiveness applies to
monotone decision problems and requires less restrictive conditions than sufficiency (Blackwell, 1951) to compare
signals in terms of their informativeness.
15Our concept is slightly stronger than the concept of integral precision in Ganuza and Penalva (2010).
Their concept of supermodular precision and our concept of single-crossing precision are not nested – a formal
discussion is provided in Appendix C.
58
more informative
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
x
`
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
H
-1 Hx`L
(a) Quantile functions.
more informative
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
x
`
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
HHx`L
(b) Distribution functions.
Figure 2.1: Relation of the quantile and distribution functions of posterior estimates for signals
ordered in terms of single-crossing precision.
We say that agents have a higher information level if the private signal realizations that
agents receive in the information stage originate from a more (single-crossing) precise signal.
Single-crossing precision implies that the distribution of posterior estimates resulting from
the more precise signal crosses the one resulting from the less precise signal only once and
from above. Our criterion is therefore slightly more restrictive than the ordering induced by
accuracy.16 However, many commonly used information structures are ordered in terms of
single-crossing precision, among them those in Example 2.1 and Example 2.2. For truth-or-noise
technologies, signal Sα is more precise than Sβ if and only if α ≥ β. For normal experiments a
signal with less noise is more precise.
Increasing the precision of a signal in terms of single-crossing precision has two main im-
plications. First, it results in a more dispersed distribution of posterior estimates in terms of
a mean-preserving spread. Second, if the distributions of posterior estimates exhibit different
levels of skewness, then the more precise signal results in a more left-skewed distribution of
posterior estimates.17 Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 illustrate properties of the distribution, den-
sity and quantile functions of the posterior estimates from signals that are ordered in terms of
single-crossing precision.
In order to establish our results, we use the quantile function representation for order statis-
tics, which establishes a close link between the properties of the quantile functions and the vector
of expected order-statistics.18 For signals ordered in terms of single-crossing precision the vec-
16A more accurate signal results in a mean-preserving spread of the distribution of posterior estimates, a
property that does not exclude multiple crossings. Signals which are characterized by more or less fine partitions
of the state space are typically not ordered in terms of single-crossing precision, since the distributions of
posterior estimates may cross multiple times.
17This feature of our information order is in line with the well-documented observation in the empirical
finance literature that many asset return distributions exhibit negative skewness (e.g. Beedles, 1979; Alles and
Kling, 1994, and subsequent papers). This property is often attributed to standard practices adopted to release
information. Companies tend to release good news immediately (more frequently), whereas bad news are released
in clumps. This was first pointed out in Damodaran (1985) and recently discussed in Acharya et al. (2011).
18See Arnold et al. (1992).
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Figure 2.2: Density functions of posterior estimates for signals ordered in terms of single-crossing
precision. (a) illustrates the case for symmetric functions, (b) the case with different skewness.
tors of the expected order statistics of the posterior types satisfy a “single-crossing condition”.
Switching to a more precise information technology results in an increase of the expected value
of the highest order statistics of posterior types, whereas the expected values of lower order
statistics will decrease. The following lemma formally states this property.
Lemma 2.1. If information technology S2 is more single-crossing precise than S1, then for all
n ∈ N
µS1i:n
µS2i:n
is increasing in i.
5 The Comparative Statics Effects of Higher Precision
How does a change in the information level of workers affect equilibrium behavior of agents
and the resulting match outcome? In this section, we address this question and characterize
the effects on expected total output, investments and welfare.
In our model workers are a priori uncertain about their own types, and the outcome depends
on the private signals that they receive in the information stage. Thus, from the ex-ante perspec-
tive, the matching mechanism yields a lottery over all possible matchings of workers to firms.
In the two extreme cases, workers either receive no information about their own types, which
results in random matching, or they observe a perfectly informative signal and are matched
positive assortatively in equilibrium. Since signals are monotone (Assumption 2.1), workers
with high types are more likely to receive a high signal in the information stage than low-type
workers. Consequently, if the information level of workers increases, then the probability that
workers with high types are matched with firms of a similar ranking increases. This results in
a higher expected match output for pairs of high-ranking agents, but may result in a decrease
of expected match output for lower-ranked pairs.19
19This result holds if E [X|S2] is a mean-preserving spread of E [X|S1]. That is, is suffices to require that
signals are ordered in terms of integral precision (Ganuza and Penalva, 2010).
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Proposition 2.1. Let signal S2 be more precise than signal S1. Then, expected total match
output is increasing in signal precision.
The result establishes that, at the aggregate level, a higher information level of workers
always results in an increase in total match output. This is intuitive. A higher information level
of workers allows on average for a better matching.
The effect on expected investments and welfare of workers is harder to characterize. If
workers obtain more precise information, the resulting distribution of posterior types is more
dispersed. The expected value of the low posterior-type workers decreases. Consequently, for
these workers the (marginal) benefit in match output from being matched with a firm of higher
ranking reduces and thus also the expected externalities imposed on them by other workers.20
For high-type workers the effect is reversed and externalities imposed on them are increasing.
At the aggregate level, it is not clear a priori, which of these effects dominates, and some of
the following results will depend on the sizes of the two sides of the market, or distributional
properties of firms’ types.21
Theorem 2.2 (Workers’ expected total investments and welfare). Let signals be ordered in
terms of single-crossing precision. Then:
(i) Expected total investments:
a) There exists some nˆ ≥ k such that for all n ≥ nˆ, expected total investments of
workers are increasing in information precision.
b) If n ≤ k, and the distribution of firms’ types, FY , has an increasing hazard rate, then
expected total investments of workers are decreasing in information precision.
(ii) Workers’ expected welfare is increasing in information precision.
The result shows that, if workers are on the long side of the market and the number of workers
is sufficiently large, then a more single-crossing precise signal always results in an increase of
workers’ expected total investments. In this case, only the high-ranked workers are matched in
equilibrium. The expected types of these workers are increasing in the level of information and
so are the externalities imposed on them. If the ratio of workers to firms is large enough only the
effect on high-type workers matter. Consequently, the expected total investments, which capture
the externalities workers impose on each other, will increase. Competition among workers may
even be so strong that the expected investment of each individual worker is nondecreasing in
information.22
20To be precise, the expected externality imposed on the low posterior-type workers is non-increasing, since
these workers may not be matched in equilibrium. Workers with zero investments do not adjust their investments.
21The results of Theorem 2.2 incorporate as special cases both, the comparative statics results on hetero-
geneity of Hoppe et al. (2009) and the results of Ganuza and Penalva (2010) on the expected valuation and the
informational rent of the winning bidder, and the seller’s expected revenue. More details on this are provided
in Section 7.
22This result is easily established by combining Lemma 2.4 with (2.1).
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By contrast, if there are more firms than workers, all workers are matched in equilibrium.
We know that if the information level of workers increases, then the externalities imposed on
the low-type workers decrease. If this effect drives the effect on expected total investments of
workers, then they decrease as the information level of workers increases. This is the case if the
distribution of firms’ types has an increasing hazard rate, which implies that the externalities
imposed on low-type workers have a higher impact on aggregate expected investments than
those imposed on high-type workers (cf. Lemma 2.2 and Table 2.2).23
If workers hold private information, workers’ expected welfareWw captures the informational
rents of workers. In the model that we consider, the matching mechanism is fixed. Hence, as
expected, for a higher information level of workers, more information rent is left to the workers
and the expected welfare of workers is increasing.
The next result establishes the effects of a higher information level of workers for the other
side of the market, that is, on firms’ expected total investments and welfare.
Theorem 2.3 (Firms’ expected total investments and welfare). Let signal S2 be more single-
crossing precise than signal S1.
(i) Expected total investments of firms are increasing in information precision.
(ii) Firms’ expected welfare:
a) There exists some nˆ > k such that firms’ expected welfare is increasing in information
precision for all n ≥ nˆ.
b) If n ≤ k and FY has an increasing hazard rate, then firms’ expected welfare is
decreasing in information precision.
c) If FY has a decreasing hazard rate, firms’ expected welfare is always increasing in
information precision.
If workers have a higher information level, firms face a sample of potential match partners
with a more heterogeneous distribution of posterior types. Consequently, the expected difference
of the match outputs from being paired with one of two workers whose ranking differs only
by one increases. Competition among firms increases, which results in firms increasing their
expected investments. This is also true at the individual level – every firm will increase its
expected investment.
Among the firms that are matched in equilibrium, the match output of high ranked firms
is increasing in the information level of workers. For lower ranked firms it will typically be
decreasing, unless there is a much larger number of workers than firms. Thus, lower ranked
firms will be worse off if workers’ hold more precise information whereas high ranked firms may
profit. The effect on expected welfare of firms depends on which of these effects is dominant,
and hinges on the distribution of firms’ types and the sizes of the two sides of the market. If
firms constitute the long side of the market and their distribution of types has an increasing
23FY has an increasing hazard rate if
fY (y)
1−FY (y) is increasing in y. This property is a common assumption in
mechanism design and satisfied by a large class of distribution functions, including the uniform, normal, and
exponential distribution. For a detailed discussion see Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) and Ewerhart (2013).
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failure rate, firms’ expected welfare decreases the information level of workers increases. In this
case, the increased competition among firms will eat up all of the additional match surplus
made possible by the higher information level of workers.
Is it always welfare improving to provide workers with additional and hence more precise
information? The answer is not obvious. For a higher information level of workers, there is a
trade-off between a higher expected total match output and a possibly increase in (wasteful)
investments. From the previous analysis we know that providing more information to workers
always increases workers’ expected welfare whereas firms’ expected welfare may be decreasing.
A higher information level of workers has a more direct effect on expected welfare of workers
than on that of firms. This property may suggest that the first effect is stronger, which would
imply that expected aggregate welfare is always increasing in the information level of workers.
However, this intuition is not correct. The following example shows that increasing the
information level of workers may result in a decrease of aggregate welfare.
Example 2.3 (Expected aggregate welfare):
Consider a matching market with three workers and three firms, n = k = 3. Workers’ types
are standard uniformly distributed, Xi
iid∼ U [0, 1], and the information technology is a truth-
or-noise technology Sα with precision level α. In this setting, the posterior types of workers
are uniformly distributed on
[
1
2
(1− α), 1
2
(1 + α)
]
, and the corresponding vector of posterior
mean-order statistics is (µα1:3, µα2:3, µα3:3) =
(
1
2
+ 1
4
α, 1
2
, 1
2
− 1
4
α
)
. From an ex-ante perspective, the
expected posterior type of the highest worker is 1
2
+ 1
4
α. Suppose firms’ types are represented
by the vector (η1:3, η2:3, η3:3) =
(
2
3
, 1
2
, 1
3
)
. Table 2.3 illustrates expected output, expected total
investments and welfare of workers and firms for the given specifications.
O = 3
2
+ 1
12
α
Tw =
1
4
− 1
12
α Tf =
7
24
α
Ww =
1
2
+ 1
6
α Wf =
3
4
− 5
24
α
W = 5
4
− 1
24
α
Table 2.3: Expected total output, investments and welfare for workers and firms, for n = k = 3,
Xi
iid∼ U [0, 1], firms’ types (η1:3, η2:3, η3:3) =
(
2
3
, 1
2
, 1
3
)
, and a truth-or-noise technology of preci-
sion level α.
In this setting, as the information level α increases, the externalities imposed on the lowest-
ranked worker, 2 · (1
2
− 1
4
α
) · 1
6
, decrease whereas those imposed on the middle-ranked worker
are constant. Consequently, workers’ expected total investments, Tw = 14 − 112α, is decreasing
in the information level α. Moreover, as the information level of workers increases, welfare of
firms, Wf = 34 − 524α, decreases. In total, we obtain that the negative effect on firms is stronger
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than the positive effect on workers:
∂W
∂α
=
∂o
∂α
+
∂Wf
∂α
− ∂Tw
∂α
=
1
12
− 5
24
+
1
12
= − 1
24
< 0.
A notable feature of this example is, that even though workers’ expected total investments are
decreasing in the level of information, the negative effect on firms’ welfare is so strong that
expected aggregate welfare is decreasing. 4
Remark This observation that increasing the information level of agents may not be welfare
enhancing complements and strengthens existing results, which show that random matching
may be welfare superior to assortative matching because it allows to avoid wasteful signaling
or screening costs.24 Random matching requires that neither side adopts separating strategies.
In many settings this is unlikely to be true, be it because there is some information about
a ranking of agents available in the market, or because it is simply infeasible.25 In this case,
our example shows that for a higher information level of workers, the increased competition
among firms may be so strong that the increased investments of firms may eat up all gains from
increased match output and decreased wasteful investments of workers. As a result, overall ex-
pected welfare may be decreasing in the information level of workers.
To better understand the informational effects on aggregate welfare, it helps to decompose
aggregate welfare as W = o + (Wf − Tw); the sum of total match output of workers, o = 12O,
and aggregate externalities imposed by workers on other agents, Wf − Tw. Here, Tw captures
the aggregate externalities workers impose on each other, whereas Wf captures the aggregate
externalities imposed on firms, i.e., agents on the other side of the market. Thus, the effect
of a higher level of information of workers on total welfare consists of the effect on workers’
match output and the change in the aggregate externalities workers impose on all agents. By
Proposition 2.1 we know that total match output is increasing in workers’ information level
whereas Wf − Tw may be decreasing. In this case the effect on aggregate welfare depends on
which of the two effects is dominant.
We conclude this section by identifying conditions, which each individually guarantee that
aggregate welfare is increasing in workers’ information level.
Theorem 2.4. Aggregate welfare is increasing in information precision if one of the following
conditions is satisfied:
(i) FY has a decreasing hazard rate, or
(ii) n < k and fY is monotone decreasing.26
24See for example Hoppe et al. (2009), Condorelli (2012), and Chakravarty and Kaplan (2013).
25Of course, a way to implement the random matching is to ignore any investments of agents. However, if
agents have some private information this is not a stable matching.
26Every absolute continuous random variable with a decreasing hazard rate has a decreasing density function.
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6 Optimal Level of Precision
We now take the analysis one step further and assume that, in the information stage, the
precision of the information technologies is not exogenously given, but can be chosen before the
information stage. We call this game the precision and matching game.
In a precision and matching game, first, workers’ information technology Sα is chosen from
a set S of feasible information technologies, either collectively by one group of agents, or by a
social planner. The information technology Sα is then implemented and the rest of the game
proceeds as described in Section 2. In the information stage, every worker obtains a private
signal from Sα, agents then update their beliefs according to Bayes’ rule before they enter the
matching stage. The timing in the precision and matching game is illustrated in Figure 2.3.
Information technology
for workers, Sα ∈ S, is
chosen.
Information Stage
Each worker receives
an independent, private
signal realization from
Sα.
Matching Stage
Agents choose (wasteful)
investments to compete
for match partners.
Figure 2.3: Timing in the precision and matching game.
We characterize the socially optimal information level, αso, which maximizes aggregate wel-
fare of all agents in the market, and compare it to the worker-optimal information level, αao,
which maximizes workers’ welfare. This is the optimal information level in a one-sided market
in which only workers are active agents. It is also the information level that a designer who
only cares about the well-being of workers would want to implement in a two-sided market.27
Focusing on these two information levels allows to isolate the effects which originate from the
two-sidedness of the matching market and are not prevalent in one-sided markets.
If information is costless it is easy to see from our previous discussion that the worker-
optimal information level is to be perfectly informed (cf. Theorem 2.2). However, this is not
necessarily the socially optimal information level since aggregate welfare may be decreasing
in information precision (cf. Example 2.3). The same is true for the firm-optimal information
level, i.e., the precision of workers’ information which maximizes firms’ welfare. In any case,
if information is costless, the firm-optimal and the socially optimal level of information will
always be extreme, that is, either full information or no information.
But there exist also distributions with an increasing hazard rate and monotone decreasing density functions (cf.
Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 2005).
27This applies to setting in which there is a lobby group representing agents on one side of the market.
Examples include the parent empowerment movement or labor unions. It should be noted that workers would also
choose αao if they could coordinate on a common information level. e.g. by collectively choosing an information
technology.
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Costly Precision
We now consider the case when information is costly. To formally analyze this case, let S be a set
of feasible information technologies which is totally ordered in terms of strict precision. That is,
there exists some A ⊆ [0,∞) such that S = {Sα}α∈A and Sα is more precise than Sα′ if and only
if α > α′. Information technology Sα is characterized by {Gα(·|x)}x∈X . For ease of presentation,
we restrict attention to linear information models, with E [X|S] = αS+(1−α)E [X], α ∈ [0, 1].
The natural indexation in this case is to denote by Sα the information technology that results
in E [X|S] = αS + (1− α)E [X].
The following condition on the distribution of signals guarantees that for all precision levels
α ∈ (0, 1), the distribution and density functions of the posterior estimates, Hα and hα, are
continuously differentiable in the precision level α:
Assumption 2.2 (Differentiable Signals):
The marginal distribution of signal realizations G is twice continuously differentiable in s.
We assume that information costs have a ‘pay per signal’ structure. For information tech-
nology Sα ∈ S of precision α ∈ [0, 1] every worker who receives a signal from Sα has to pay
c(α) ∈ R+. Precision costs are increasing in α and capture for example investments in time
or resources to generate or collect information. The precision-cost-function c : [0, 1] → [0,∞)
is increasing and continuously differentiable with c(0) = 0 and c′(0) = 0. Since every worker
obtains exactly one signal, total costs for information technology Sα are C(α) := nc(α).
Given Assumption 2.2 expected welfare of workers and expected aggregate welfare are con-
tinuously differentiable in the level of information of workers (cf. Lemma 2.6). In order to
identify and compare the worker-optimal and socially optimal information levels, we impose
the following single-crossing conditions.
Assumption 2.3 (Single-crossing):
(i) ∂c/∂α
∂Ww/∂α
is strictly increasing in α ∈ (0, 1) .
(ii) ∂c/∂α
∂W/∂α
is strictly increasing in α ∈ (0, 1) whenever ∂W
∂α
> 0.
For S being the set of truth-or-noise technologies and Xi iid∼ U [0, 1], Assumption 2.3 is
satisfied for convex precision costs.
We now characterize the relation between the worker-optimal and the socially optimal in-
formation level if information is costly.
Theorem 2.5. In a precision and matching game, suppose Assumption 1–3 are satisfied.
(i) The socially optimal information level of workers is higher than the worker-optimal level,
αwo ≤ αso, if
a) workers constitute the long side of the market and n is sufficiently large, or
b) the distribution of firms’ types FY has a decreasing hazard rate.
(ii) The socially optimal information level of workers is lower than the worker-optimal level,
αso ≤ αwo, if workers constitute the short side of the market and the distribution of firms’
types has an increasing hazard rate.
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It is not surprising that in a precision and matching game the worker-optimal and socially
optimal levels of precision do not coincide. Information of workers imposes an externality on
firms. For a higher information level a better allocation can be achieved which increases total
match output. However, more information also leads to more differentiation among workers,
which increases competition among firms. This results in higher expected investments of firms.
The relation between the worker-optimal and the socially optimal level of information depends
on whether the overall effect of a higher information level of workers on firms is positive or
negative.
Theorem 2.5 illustrates that in a relatively balanced market, with groups of similar sizes on
each side of the market, the relation between the worker-optimal and socially optimal infor-
mation level depends on the distribution of the informed agents’ types. However, the socially
optimal information level is always higher than the worker optimal information level, if the
group of uniformed agents constitutes the long side of the market and is sufficiently large.
7 Applications
In this section we discuss implications of the results established in Section 5 and Section 6 for
various market design settings, in particular auctions, contests and matching markets. In each
of the applications we highlight certain features of our results and contributions.
7.1 Auctions
The standard private values auction setting is captured as a special case by our model. It
corresponds to the case in which workers represent the bidders of the auction, and there is
only one firm of a given, commonly known type, representing for example the auction platform
or the object to be sold. The seller is a third party who collects the bids. As summarized in
Table 2.4, the expected valuation of the winning bidder is 1
2
·O, his expected information rent
is Ww, and Tw represents the seller’s expected revenue.
auctions exp. valuation of
the winning bidder
exp. revenue of the
seller
exp. information rent
of the winning bidder
general model 1
2
O = µS1:n Tw = µ
S
2:n Ww = µ
S
1:n − µS2:n
Table 2.4: Translation of our results to the standard auction setting with n bidders.
Reminder: µSi:n denotes the ith mean order statistics of the posterior distribution of bidders’
types.
Translating our results of Section 5 to the auction setting yields the following insights: Dis-
closing information to bidders increases the expected valuation of the winning bidder (Propo-
sition 2.1) as well as his expected information rent (Theorem 2.2).28 Moreover, the seller’s
28For the result on expected information rents of the winning bidder a version of strong precision is needed.
The result follows for both criteria of strong precision, the one used in this essay as well as the concept of
supermodular precision adopted by Ganuza and Penalva (2010).
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expected revenue increases, if there are sufficiently many bidders (Theorem 2.2). If information
disclosure is costly, the revenue maximizing level is below the efficient level (Theorem 2.5).
These observations correspond to the results established in Ganuza and Penalva (2010) on
information disclosure in auctions. Our results therefore include their results on information
disclosure in auctions as a special case.
The methods from statistics that we adopt in this essay, provide an alternative and shorter
way to prove these results. Using these statistical methods allows furthermore to strengthen
the results of Ganuza and Penalva (2010). For example, the result on the expected informa-
tional rent of the winning bidder can be strengthened to the statement that providing more
information to bidders increases the expected informational rent of the winning bidder in terms
of first-order stochastic dominance and not only in expectation.29
The statistical methods used in this essay are powerful and should be explored further
because they hold the promise to yield interesting results and insights in mechanism design
settings with endogenous information. Let us support this point by providing a small, new
result that we can establish by exploring these methods further.
Let S = {Sα}α∈A be a ordered set of information technologies such that Sα′ is more precise
than Sα, if α′ > α. Say that the information level of bidder i is αi, if he receives a signal from
information technology Sαi in the information stage. Bidders may receive signals from different
information technologies, that is, of different precision, resulting in a profile of information
levels of bidders (α1, . . . , αn). We say that the information level of bidders weakly increases if
the information level of at least one bidder strictly increases, and the information levels of all
other bidders are non-decreasing.
Proposition 2.2. In a private values auctions setting consider any auction format that imple-
ments the efficient allocation. For any weak increase in the information levels of bidders, the
expected value of the winning bidder increases.
To our knowledge, this generalization of the results on information disclosure in auctions is
new to the literature. It establishes that any weak increase in the information level of bidders will
increase the expected efficiency of the allocation of the auction. For this result, the additional
information provided to, or processed by, the individual bidders may be heterogeneous, which
is natural feature in many situations.
Consider for example a seller who publicly discloses information that is relevant for bidders
to learn about their valuation for the object for sale. Typically, the level of information that
individual bidders extract from the publicly available data differs across bidders. Proposition 2.2
establishes that the effect on the expected valuation of the winning bidder does not depend
on this detail. Providing more information will always increase the expected valuation of the
winning bidder.
29The result is a simple corollary to theorem 3.B.31 in Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007). This was pointed
out in a footnote in Ganuza and Penalva (2010) but the fact that this alternative proof yields a stronger result
was mentioned only recently in Shaked et al. (2012).
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7.2 Two-sided Matching Markets
When applied to matching markets, our results provide a first theoretical study of the effects of
private information and the information level of market participants on the equilibrium outcome
in matching markets.
As we have discussed in Section 4, a higher information level of workers leads to more
differentiation among workers in the matching game. This effect allows for a better allocation:
high-abilitiy workers are more likely to be matched to a firm of similar ranking, which results
in an increase of total match output (Proposition 2.1).30
Moreover, a higher information level and the resulting higher differentiation among workers,
also raises the stakes for the firms of being matched to a better or worse partner. This results
in an increase of firms’ expected signaling investments (Theorem 2.3).
The effect on workers’ expected signaling investments is less clear-cut and depends on certain
features of the market (Theorem 2.2). For a higher information level of workers, the (marginal)
benefit from obtaining a better match increases for high-ranked workers, whereas it is decreasing
for low-ranked workers. This results in high-ranked workers increasing their investments in
signaling whereas lower ranked workers may invest less. If workers constitute the long side of
the market, only high-ranked workers are matched in equilibrium and workers’ expected total
investments are increasing. If there are more firms than workers, the effect may be reveres.
These results illustrate, that in finite matching markets, some of the effects of a higher
information level of market participants depend on whether information is disclosed to agents
on the short or the long side of the market. This new insight is made possible because our
comparative statics result in Section 5 apply for arbitrary finite group sizes on the two sides of
the market.31 This observation highlights that it is important to study matching market models
with a finite number of agents and not restrict attention solely on the case with a continuum
of agents on both sides of the market.32
An important insight from our analysis is the following: In a two-sided matching market in
which both sides of the market invest in wasteful signaling to compete for match partners, the
trade-off between a better allocation and a potential increase in wasteful signaling investments
may result in a decrease of expected aggregate welfare when the information level of market
participants increases (Example 2.3). This feature is specific to two-sided markets. Welfare of
30 This effect is observed in empirical studies. For example, in their study Hoxby and Turner (2013) provide a
subgroup of high-school seniors with additional information about their college opportunities and find that, for
students who received information, the probability to enroll in a college that matches their abilities increases
significantly.
31This also allows us to consider information disclosure in auctions as a special case of our results. Moreover,
the projection of our results to the model of Hoppe et al. (2009) generalizes their results on comparative statics
effects of group heterogeneity (they only consider the case n = k).
32Most models which discuss comparative static settings study models with a continuum of agents on each
side of the market. Considering a continuum of agents is often a reasonable and very useful assumption, since
it avoids the technicalities of having to deal with order statistics. However, the point we want to make here is
that it is also important to study the model with finite sets of agents.
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agents on the side of the market receiving more information is always increasing in expecta-
tion (Theorem 2.2). Consequently, in settings in which only one side of the market are active
agents, providing these agents with additional information would unambiguously increase ex-
pected welfare. By contrast, in a two-sided matching market, for an increase in the information
level of agents, the amplified competition among agents within their groups and the resulting
increase in signaling investments may eat up all additional match surplus.
What can we learn from this? Our results indicate that in a two-sided matching market more
information is not necessarily better if the objective is to maximize overall expected welfare.
However, there are often different or additional objectives like equalizing the information level
across agents, fairness considerations or incentivizing schools or colleges to invest in their quality.
Our results yield insights into the last aspect. If parents are provided with more information
about school choices, the highest-ranked schools profit most from informed choices of parents,
whereas low-ranked schools may be worse off (Theorem 2.3).33 This may serve as a formal
rationale for the claim often raised by the parent empowerment movement, that providing
parents with more information results in them making more informed choices, which – in the
long run – will increase school quality. From this perspective, it may even be good to let a
lobby for one side of the market, determine the level of information of market participants,
even though they do not fully interalize the costs and benefits from additional information
and thus will not choose the socially optimal information level.34 Theorem 2.5 suggest that,
if the uninformed agents – the workers – constitute the long side of the market, the worker-
optimal level of information for this side of the market is higher than the socially optimal level.
Given that only high-quality firms profit from the informed choices by workers, this incentivizes
firms to compete for the highest-rank among their peers which may induce them to invest in
quality-enhancing policies.
7.3 Contests
Our model can also includes a rank-order tournament or contest setting as a special case. To
see this, interpret agents on one side of the market, say the firms, as representing the prizes
in a promotion tournament, with commonly known values η1:k ≥ · · · ≥ ηk:k. This side of the
market is passive. Workers represent the participants of the contest. Workers’ types reflect
their abilities, and their investments correspond to the effort, which they exert. With this
interpretation, workers’ investments are not wasteful but they are collected by a third party –
the company or organization running the promotion tournament.
In promotion tournaments there are two natural objectives: To promote the best workers
and to maximize workers’ efforts. Translating our results from Section 5 and Section 6 to
33This claim still remains true if schools are not considered to be active agents and therefore do not invest in
signaling about their types.
34Distributing information among parents, providing more or less detailed information on websites, or de-
termining the precision level of standardized test like the SAT are examples of technologies that can serve to
influence the level of information of market participants.
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the promotion contest, we obtain the following predictions. More information of competitors
increases the probability to promote the best workers (Proposition 2.1). If the ratio of workers to
prizes is sufficiently large, then workers’ expected overall effort is increasing in their information
level. However, if this ratio is too small, providing information to the workers may not be effort
enhancing – not even on an aggregate level (Theorem 2.2).
There is a second option to project our model to a contest, interpreting firms as contestants
and the mean-order statistics of posterior types of workers, µS1:n ≥ · · · ≥ µSn:n, as prizes. In
this case, the translation of Theorem 2.3 yields the well-known observation that increasing the
prize-spread in contests results in an increase in workers’ effort.35
A typical question in the contest literature is how to design an optimal contest in order to
maximize workers’ effort. Our results indicate that information management through feedback
systems may serve as an useful element of contest design. Let us provide some details for
this insight. The standard design element that is usually considered in the contest literature
are prizes. The number and distribution of prizes in a contest affect workers’ effort, and can
therefore be used to design an optimal prize-structure that maximizes workers’ efforts. However,
in some organizations it may not be feasible to implement the optimal prize-structure suggested
by theoretical models, because there are certain constraints on the number or distribution of
prizes. For example, in promotion tournaments the prize-structure is determined by the wage
schedule and the number of positions on each level of the organization. In situations in which
the optimal prize-structure cannot be implemented, a designer could influence workers’ effort
by implementing a feedback systems to manipulate the information level available to workers.
We refer to this design element as information management.
Our results shed light on properties of optimal feedback systems in contests. They suggest
that we should observe different feedback systems depending on the ratio of workers and prizes
in a contest. In organizations with steeper hierarchies or an up-or-out system, we should expect
stronger feedback systems to be in action, for example a high frequency of periodical perfor-
mance reports. By contrast, for organizations with flat hierarchies or promotion by seniority
practices, our results predict less sophisticated feedback structures. These predictions seem to
be in line with common practices. For example, large consulting firms with an up-or-out policy
are known to have a very rigorous feedback structure.
8 Related literature
This essay is related to various strands of literature. It is connected to the vast matching
literature that emerged from the seminal papers by Gale and Shapley (1962), Shapley and
Shubik (1971) and Becker (1973). Most of the theoretical analysis of matching markets focuses
on complete information models in which agents’ preferences, types, and match values are
35See for example Lazear and Rosen (1981), Moldovanu et al. (2007), Connelly et al. (2014) and references
therein – also of empirical studies supporting these theoretical predictions.
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common knowledge. There is an emerging literature studying incomplete information matching
models and issues of screening and signaling which arise therein. See for example Hoppe et al.
(2009), Hopkins (2012), and Bilancini and Boncinelli (2013). Our second-stage game is based on
the models analyzed in Hoppe et al. (2009) and Hopkins (2012). They study two-sided matching
markets, in which agents on one or both sides of the market have private information about
their characteristics. Agents invest in costly signaling à la Spence (1973) to compete for match
partners. As Hoppe et al. (2009) we consider a small market with a finite number of agents,
whereas Hopkins (2012) studies a model with a continuum of agents. In a related paper by
Bilancini and Boncinelli (2013), agents on both sides of the market have private information
about their skills and can choose whether or not to disclose this information. For one side of the
market information is not verifiable and disclosing information yields certification costs. All of
the aforementioned papers consider matching markets in which agents have private information
about their characteristics, and analyze the costs and benefits from disclosing this information.
By contrast, our focus is on disclosing information to agents about their types. We study how
different information levels of participants in (matching) markets affect the resulting equilibrium
properties and welfare.
Related questions are addressed in the literature on information disclosure in auctions.
Ganuza and Penalva (2010) discuss the effects of different information levels of buyers in a
second-price auction, whereas Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007), Esö and Szentes (2007),
and Ganuza and Penalva (2014) adopt a mechanism design perspective. In a private values
environment, these papers discuss the revenue maximizing information structure and selling
mechanism for the seller. Similar to Ganuza and Penalva (2010) we focus on a given mechanism
and study how different information levels affect the equilibrium.
Our analysis extends the discussion of information disclosure in auctions to two-sided match-
ing markets and can also be applied to contests and rank-order tournaments. A recent survey of
the contest literature is provided by Connelly et al. (2014). The focus of most of these papers,
for example Moldovanu and Sela (2001, 2006) is on optimal contest design, that is, on the
optimal portfolio of prizes or how to split the contestants in subgroups to achieve the designer’s
objective. There is a growing literature studying the role of feedback and optimal feedback
systems in contests. Examples include Aoyagi (2010), Goltsman and Mukherjee (2011), Hansen
(2013), and Ederer (2010). All of these models restrict attention to the two-agent case and most
of them only consider full or no disclosure policies. By contrast, we allow for arbitrary finite
numbers of prizes and workers. A new insight that can be gained from our results is that the
optimal feedback policy depends on the ratio of workers to prizes (see discussion in Section 7.3).
This essay also ties to the literature that identifies and explores connections between auctions
and matching markets in order to establish new results. See for example Demange and Gale
(1985) and Hatfield and Milgrom (2005). The matching market that we study, can be considered
as the combination of two multi-object auctions with two sides of active agents (cf. discussion
in Section 3). To establish our results we use this connection between matching markets and
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auctions and identify a relation between the statistical methods used by Hoppe et al. (2009)
and the type of precision criterion introduced by Ganuza and Penalva (2010).36
Our essay also relates to the growing literature on pre-match investments in matching
tournaments. Examples include Cole et al. (2001), Peters and Siow (2002), and Mailath et al.
(2013) and Dizdar (2015). Pre-match investments generate first-order effects on agents’ types.
Similarly, Hopkins (2012) studies such first-order effects, interpreting shifts in agents’ type
distribution in terms of first-order stochastic dominance as a more competitive environment.
By contrast, in our analysis, investments in information yield second-order effects. A higher
level of information leads to a more dispersed distribution of workers’ posterior types in the
second-stage matching game.
9 Conclusion
In this essay we studied the impact of the level of information available to market participants
in a two-sided matching market. We illustrated that for a higher information level of workers
there is a trade-off between the increased match surplus from the better allocation, and the
welfare reducing effects of increased competition among agents. It was shown that the increased
competition among agents may be so strong that it eats up all additional match surplus. In
this case, a higher information level of market participant reduces welfare. Our results not only
provide a first study of information disclosure in matching markets, but can also be applied
beyond the matching setting. We discussed implications of our results for auctions and contests.
A notable distinction between the effects of information disclosure in auctions and matching
markets is the following: In an auction, a seller faces a trade-off between efficiency and having
to leave information rents to the buyers. In a matching market information disclosure yields a
trade-off between allocative efficiency and the welfare-reducing effects of increased competition
among agents on both sides of the market.
The setup of the model and the discussion of applications to different market design settings
illustrated how these settings are connected. We used these insights in this essay to identify a
relation between the discussions in Hoppe et al. (2009) and Ganuza and Penalva (2010). Estab-
lishing a link between the methods adopted in these papers provided us with a new approach
to study the impact of information disclosure in two-sided matching markets and related appli-
cations. We believe that the connections that we have identified between the different models
and concepts will prove to be useful in future research, in particular to study mechanism design
problems with endogenous information of agents.
36Methodologically, a related paper is Chi (2014), who uses statistical methods to study informational effects
in Bayesian decision problems.
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Appendix
A Technical Prerequisites
In this section we present the main techniques used to prove our results. The methods stem
from statistics and reliability theory. Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007) provide a comprehensive
treatment of order statistics whereas Marshall et al. (2011) is a good reference for the theory
of majorization. If not indicated otherwise, all definitions and theorems stated in this section
can be found in these two books.
The single-crossing property of quantile functions that we use in Definition 2.1 is equivalent
to the distribution of posterior estimates being ordered in terms of the star order (see Shaked
and Shanthikumar (2007), Section 4.B).
Fact 2.1. If S2 is more single-crossing precise than S1, then E [X|S2] is greater than E [X|S1]
in the star-order, E [X|S2] ≥∗ E [X|S1].
Notation. X ≤MPS Y , then Y is a mean-preserving spread of X.
X ≤∗ Y , then Y is greater in the star order than X.
Definition 2.2: Consider two ordered n-dimensional real-valued vectors a = (a1, . . . , an), and
b = (b1, . . . , bn) ∈ Rn, with a1 ≥ · · · ≥ an and b1 ≥ . . . bn. We say that a submajorizes b,
(a sub b), if
m∑
i=1
ai ≥
m∑
i=1
bi for all m = 1, . . . , n. (2.2)
If in addition (2.2) holds with equality for m = n we say that a majorizes b, (a  b).
A function φ : Rn ⊇ A −→ R is Schur-convex (resp. Schur-concave) if, whenever amajorizes
b, a  b, then φ(a) ≥ φ(b) (resp. φ(a) ≤ φ(b)).
If a sub b then φ(a) ≥ φ(b) for every Schur-convex and increasing function φ.
To proof our results we repeatedly use the following important results from statistics.37
Theorem 2.6 (Cal and Carcamo 2006). Let X and Y be integrable random variables with equal
means and F (0) = G(0) = 0. Then if X ≤MPS Y , the vector of mean order statistics of Y ,
(E [Y1:n] , . . . , E [Yn:n]) majorizes the vector of mean order statistics of X for all n ≥ 1. That is,
(E [Y1:n] , . . . , E [Yn:n])  (E [X1:n] , . . . , E [Xn:n]).
Theorem 2.7 (Barlow and Proschan (1966)). Let X and Y be integrable random variables with
equal means and F (0) = G(0) = 0. Then if X ≤∗ Y this implies X ≤MPS Y , and moreover
37In their paper Cal and Carcamo (2006) establish this result for random variables ordered in terms of the
convex-order. In our informational setting we always compare random variables with finite and equal means. In
this case the convex order is equivalent to a mean-preserving spread.
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(i) For 1 ≤ r ≤ n:
n∑
i=r
i · (E [Xi:n]− E [Xi+1:n]) ≥
n∑
i=r
i · (E [Yi:n]− E [Yi+1:n]) .
(ii) For a1 ≤ · · · ≤ an:
n∑
i=1
ai · i · (E [Xi:n]− E [Xi+1:n]) ≥
n∑
i=1
ai · i · (E [Yi:n]− E [Yi+1:n]) .
Lemma 2.2. Let F be a distribution function with F (0) = 0 and an increasing hazard rate
(IHR). Then, for fixed n, the normalized spacings of order statistics i · (Xi:n −Xi+1:n) are
stochastically increasing in i = 1, . . . , n. That is:
(X1:n −X2:n) ≤FOSD 2 · (X2:n −X3:n) ≤FOSD · · · ≤FOSD n · (Xn:n −Xn+1:n) .
If F has a decreasing hazard rate (DHR), then the normalized spacings are stochastically de-
creasing in i.
We will also need the following result
Lemma 2.3. Let X, Y be nonnegative random variables with distribution functions F and G,
respectively, such that F (0) = G(0) = 0. If X ≤∗ Y then
(i) E[Yi:n]
E[Xi:n]
is decreasing in i, and
(ii) E[Yi:n]
E[Xi:n]
is increasing in n.
B Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.1. is a direct corollary of theorem 3.6 in Barlow and Proschan (1966).
Proof of Proposition 2.1. If S2 % S1 then E [X|S2] ≥MPS E [X|S1] and, by Theorem 2.6,
(µS21:n, . . . , µ
S2
n:n)  (µS11:n, . . . , µS1n:n).
For k ≥ n, O = ∑ni=1 ηi:kµi:n is Schur-convex in the vector of mean order statistics of
workers’ characteristics and consequently if S2 % S1 then O(S2) ≥ O(S1).
For k < n, O =
∑k
i=1 ηi:kµi:n is Schur-convex in the truncated vector of mean-order statistics
of workers’ posterior types, µ|≤k = (µ1:n, . . . , µk:n). A higher information level of workers only
results in (weak) submajorization of the truncated vectors of mean-order statistics, i.e.
S2 % S1 ⇒ µS2
∣∣
≤k sub µS1
∣∣
≤k .
Since O is increasing and Schur-convex it follows that O(S2) ≥ O(S1).
In order to prove Theorem 2.2 we first establish a technical Lemma. To state and prove it
we need the following fact.
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Fact 2.2 (Theorem 3.A.5 in Shaked and Shanthikumar 2007). The following conditions are
each sufficient and necessary for X ≤MPS Y∫ p
0
(
G−1(u)− F−1(u)) du ≤ 0 ∀ p ∈ [0, 1] , and (2.3)∫ 1
p
(
G−1(u)− F−1(u)) du ≥ 0 ∀ p ∈ [0, 1] . (2.4)
Lemma 2.4. Let X, Y be random variables with continuous differentiable distributions F and
G and equal means, such that X ≤MPS Y . Then, for every k ∈ N there exists some nˆk such
that
E [Xk:n] ≤ E [Yk:n] ∀n ≥ nˆk.
Proof. The methods in this proof are similar to the ideas used to prove theorem 1 in Ganuza
and Penalva (2010).
We can apply the probability integral transformation38 to obtain the following simple formula
for the kth order statistics of X:
E [Xk:n] =
n!
(k − 1)!(n− k)!
∫ 1
0
F−1(u)un−k(1− u)k−1 du
Set φ(u) := G−1(u) − F−1(u). Since G and F are continuously differentiable, by the inverse
function theorem F−1 and G−1 are continuous and so is φ.
Suppose that φ(u) 6= 0 on a subset of [0, 1] with nonempty interior.39 Define
L := {u ∈ X [0, 1] : φ(u) < 0} and u := sup{L}. (2.3) and (2.4), continuity of φ and the
assumption that φ(u) 6= 0 on a subset of [0, 1] of positive measure imply that u ∈ (0, 1).
We obtain that there exist p1, p2 ∈ (u, 1] such that φ(u) > 0 for all u ∈ [p1, p2]. Set
c1 := minu∈[0,p1]{φ(u)(1− u)k−1} and c2 := minu∈[p2,1]{φ(u)(1− u)k−1}. By construction c1 < 0
and c2 > 0. This yields:
E [Yk:n]− E [Xk:n] =k
(
n
k
)∫ 1
0
(
G−1(u)− F−1(u))un−k(1− u)k−1 du
≥ n!
(k − 1)!(n− k + 1)!p
n−k+1
2
[(
p1
p2
)n−k+1
(c1 − c2) + c2
]
Set nˆ := dk − 1 + ln
(
c2
c2−c1
)
ln
(
p1
p2
) e where dxe denotes the smallest natural number greater or equal
than x. It follows that:
n!
(k − 1)!(n− k + 1)!p
n−k+1
2
[(
p1
p2
)n−k+1
(c1 − c2) + c2
]
≥ 0 ∀ n ≥ nˆ
38For every random variable X with continuous c.d.f. F and density f , the transformed random variable
F (X) has a standard uniform distribution, F (X) ∼ U [0, 1]
39The case φ(u) = 0 a.e. is trivial.
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Proof of Theorem 2.2.
(i) Total expected investments:
a) By Lemma 2.4 there exists some nˆ > k + 1 such that for every n ≥ nˆ, µS2k+1:n − µS1k+1:n ≥ 0.
Since µS1k+1:n ≥ 0, it follows that
µS2k+1:n
µS1k+1:n
≥ 1 ∀n ≥ nˆ.
By Lemma 2.3, µ
S2
i:n
µ
S1
i:n
is decreasing in i for every n and it follows that µS2i:n − µS1i:n ≥ 0 for all
i ≤ k + 1. We obtain that for all n ≥ nˆ > k:
Tw(S2)− Tw(S1) =
min{n,k}∑
i=1
(ηi:k − ηi+1:k) ·
(
µS2i+1:n − µS1i+1:n
)
=
k∑
i=1
(ηi:k − ηi+1:k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
· (µS2i+1:n − µS1i+1:n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
≥ 0.
b) If FY has an increasing hazard rate, then the normalized spacings i(ηi:k−ηi+1:k) are stochas-
tically increasing in i (Lemma 2.2). Set T˜w :=
∑n
i=0 i(ηi:k − ηi+1:k)µi+1:n. Then, for n ≤ k,
Tw = T˜w and T˜w is Schur-concave in the vector of mean order statistics of workers’ character-
istics. It follows that Tw is decreasing (non-increasing) in the level of information of workers.
(ii) Workers’ expected welfare:
Set ai := −ηi:k. Then, applying Theorem 2.7 (ii) yields
S2%∗ S1 ⇒ Ww(S2) ≥ Ww(S1).
Proof of Theorem 2.3.
(i) Total expected investments:
Analogous to the proof of Theorem 2.2 (ii) whereas the case-by-case analysis is now for k ≤ n
and k > n.
(ii) Firms’ expected welfare:
If FY has a decreasing hazard rate, by Lemma 2.2 the normalized spacings i(ηi:k − ηi+1:k) are
stochastically decreasing in i. Consequently, Wf is Schur-convex in the vector of conditional
mean order statistics of workers. By Theorem 2.6 it follows that Wf (S2) ≥ Wf (S1), if S2 is
more precise than S1. The results for the case when FY has an increasing hazard rate, follow
from arguments analogous to those used to prove Theorem 2.2 (i).
77
Proof of Theorem 2.4. W = Ww +Wf . Rearranging terms yields:
W (S) =
min{n,k}∑
i=1
i · (µSi:n − µSi+1:n) (ηi:k − ηi+1:k)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
(Wf−Tw)(S)
+
min{n,k}∑
i=1
µSi:nηi:k︸ ︷︷ ︸
0.5O
By Proposition 2.1 we know that total match output is increasing in precision. Whether aggre-
gate welfare is increasing or decreasing in the level of workers’ information depends on the effect
on Wf − Tw, and, for the case that Wf − Tw is decreasing, on which of these effects dominates.
Throughout the proof, let S2 be more single-crossing precise than S1.
(i) If FY has a decreasing hazard rate, both Ww and Wf are increasing in precision (cf. Theo-
rem 2.2 and Theorem 2.3) and so is W = Ww +Wf .
(ii) Suppose n < k and fY is monotone decreasing. In this case
W =
n∑
i=1
µSi:nηi:k +
[
n∑
i=1
i · (µSi:n − µSi+1:n) (ηi:k − ηi+1:k)
]
.
We use the following result which establishes that the spacings of order statistics from random
variables with monotone density functions can be ordered in terms of stochastic dominance.40
Lemma 2.5. Let Y1, . . . , Yn be independently, identically distributed random variables with
finite support and density function fY . Then,
(i) if fY is monotone increasing (non-decreasing)
Yi:n − Yi+1:n ≤FOSD Yi+1:n − Yi+2:n ∀ i = 1, . . . , n− 2
(ii) if fY is monotone decreasing (non-increasing)
Yi:n − Yi+1:n ≥FOSD Yi+1:n − Yi+2:n ∀ i = 1, . . . , n− 2
It follows directly that if fY is monotone decreasing, the expected spacings of mean order
statistics (ηi:k − ηi+1:k) , i = 1, . . . , k − 1 are decreasing in i. Setting ai := − (ηi:k − ηi+1:k),
by Theorem 2.7 (ii) we obtain (Wf − Tw)(S2) ≥ (Wf − Tw)(S1), for S2%∗ S1. It follows that
aggregate welfare is increasing in workers’ information level.
Lemma 2.6. For linear information technologies, under Assumption 2.2, for all α ∈ (0, 1), Hα
and hα are continuously differentiable in the precision level α. Moreover, O, Tw, Tf , Ww, Wf
are continuously differentiable in α ∈ (0, 1).
40This result can be found in Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007).
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Proof. For α 6= 0, set φ(α,w) := w−(1−α)E(X)
α
. Then, for linear information technologies and
α 6= 0, Hα(w) = G (φ(α,w)), and hα(w) = 1
α
g(φ(α,w)), for α = 0, H = G. By Assumption 2.2
and since φ(w, α) is continuously differentiable in α ∈ (0, 1), Hα(w) and hα(w) are continuously
differentiable in α. Moreover, if Hα and hα are continuously differentiable in α then so are the
distributions of order statistics Hαi:n. The densities hαi:n are continuous in α for all i = 1, . . . , n.
This implies that the conditional mean order statistics E
[
X̂αi:n
]
are continuously differentiable
in α. It follows that W , Ww, Tf , Tw, O are continuously differentiable in α.
Proof of Theorem 2.5. The marginal value of information for workers is ∂Ww
∂α
and the socially
marginal value is ∂W
∂α
= ∂Ww
∂α
+
∂Wf
∂α
. By Theorem 2.3, if FY is DHR or if n ≥ nˆ > k then ∂Wf∂α > 0
and it follows that, at any information level α ∈ (0, 1), ∂W
∂α
> ∂Ww
∂α
. However, if FY is IHR and
n ≤ k, then social marginal gains from higher precision are lower than the marginal gains for
workers, ∂W
∂α
< ∂Ww
∂α
.
In the precision and matching game with costly precision, the optimization problem for
workers is:
max
α∈[0,1]
{Uc(α) = Ww(Sα)− n · c(α)}
and for the social planner:
max
α∈[0,1]
{USP (α) = W (Sα)− n · c(α)}
Given our assumptions on the cost function and Assumption 2.2, Uc and USP are continuously
differentiable in α. By the extreme value theorem this guarantees the existence of a solution
to the optimization problem of workers, respectively the social planner. The single-crossing
conditions, (SC) and (SCC), establish uniqueness.
If Uc is increasing on [0, 1], then the optimal level of precision for workers is αwo = 1,
otherwise it is characterized by:
∂Ww
∂α
∣∣∣∣
α=αwo
= n
∂c
∂α
∣∣∣∣
α=αwo
(I)
Analogous reasoning shows that the unique socially optimal level of precision is either
αso ∈ {0, 1} or an interior solution exists which is characterized by:
∂W
∂α
∣∣∣∣
α=αso
= n · ∂c
∂α
∣∣∣∣
α=αso
(II)
Suppose that FY is DHR or that n ≥ nˆ > k. In this case, at any information level α˜,
the marginal gains for workers from higher precision are lower than the social marginal gains,
∂Ww
∂α
∣∣
α=α˜
< ∂W
∂α
∣∣
α=α˜
. Given uniqueness of the worker-optimal and the socially optimal level of
precision we obtain αwo ≤ αso.
The result for FY being IHR and n < k follows by analogous reasoning.
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Proof of Proposition 2.2. This result is a direct corollary of Theorem 7.6 in Chapter 4, Barlow
and Proschan (1981).
C Discussion and relation to other informativeness criteria
Given our assumption that signals are monotone the natural informativeness criterion to use
is the concept of effectiveness introduced by Lehmann (1988).41 The basic idea behind this
concept is that for a given state space X, information technology S2 is more informative about
X than S1, if the conditional distribution of S2 is more dependent on X than that of S1.
Formally,
Definition 2.3 (Effectiveness, Lehmann (1988)): Given X, let S1 and S2 be two signals which
satisfy the Assumption 2.1. Then S2 is said to be more effective than S1 if for all s
G−1S2 (GS1(s|x)|x) is nondecreasing in x.
Mizuno (2006) shows that for a more effective signal about X the resulting distribution of
conditional expectations is more dispersed.
Theorem 2.8 (Mizuno 2006). If signals are monotone, then if S2 is more effective than S1, it
follows that S2 is more integral precise than S1 for all priors.
Our definition of precision is similar to the notion of integral and supermodular precision
in Ganuza and Penalva (2010) but the stochastic orders used to define these concepts differ.
Our precision criterion in Definition 2.1 is based on the star order whereas integral precision
is based on the convex order and supermodular precision is based on the dispersive order.42
We briefly discuss the relation of these criteria which amounts to analyzing the relation of the
stochastic orders.43
Let X and Y be two random variables with interval support and distribution functions
F and G, respectively. We write X ≤∗ Y for X being smaller than Y in the star order, and
X ≤cx Y and X ≤disp Y for X and Y ordered in terms of the convex, respectively dispersive
order.
For a random variable X and signals S1 and S2, by the law of iterated expectations
E [E [X|S1]] = E [E [X|S1]] = µ. Consequently, in our informational setting we always compare
random variables with finite and equal means. In this case the convex order is equivalent to
41Persico (2000) refers to this concept as accuracy. Effectiveness applies to monotone decision problems
and requires less restrictive conditions than sufficiency (Blackwell, 1951) to compare signals in terms of their
informativeness.
42For a formal definition of these concepts, see Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007) or Ganuza and Penalva
(2010).
43For further insights on the relation to other informativeness criteria, like sufficiency (Blackwell, 1951) or
accuracy, respectively effectiveness (Lehmann, 1988; Persico, 2000) we refer the reader to the discussion in
Ganuza and Penalva (2010).
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the concept of second order stochastic dominance. Moreover, the dispersive order and the star
order are both stronger than the convex order, that is
X ≤disp Y ⇒ X ≤cx Y and
X ≤∗ Y ⇒ X ≤cx Y.
For the star order and the dispersive order the following relation holds:
X ≤∗ Y ⇔ logX ≤disp log Y. (2.5)
Thus, the star order and the dispersive order are in general not nested. However, under some
conditions they are.
Lemma 2.7. For nonnegative random variables, X and Y with distribution functions F and
G, respectively,
(i) if X ≤FOSD Y , then X ≤∗ Y implies X ≤disp Y .
(ii) if F and G are absolutely continuous with F (0) = G(0) = 0 and f(0) ≥ g(0) > 0, then
X ≤∗ Y implies X ≤disp Y .
Figure 2.4 summarizes the relation of the three precision criteria and the sets of signals that
are ordered in terms of any of these criteria.
Signals ordered in
terms of single-
crossing precision
Signals ordered in
terms of supermod-
ular precision
Signals ordered in terms of
integral precision
Truth-or-Noise Technologies
(Example 1)
Normal Experiments
(Example 2)
Figure 2.4: Illustration of the relation between the concepts of single-crossing precision, super-
modular precision and integral precision.
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Chapter 3
Mechanism Design with Endogenous Information
In mechanism design problems with endogenous information, regularity properties
of the distribution of posterior estimates (types) are essential for tractability. Impor-
tant properties are a monotone hazard rate, increasing virtual valuations or costs.
Difficulties arise since these properties are not preserved under mixtures, and reg-
ularity of the prior distribution may not translate to the distribution of posterior
types. We identify sufficient conditions on the primitives of an information struc-
ture, which guarantee that the distribution of posterior types has a monotone hazard
rate, increasing virtual valuations or costs. These characterization results make it
possible to study mechanism design problems with endogenous information, without
imposing regularity conditions on the interim stage or restricting attention to spe-
cific information structures. Applications to information acquisition and disclosure
in optimal auctions, and to allocation problems without money are discussed.
1 Introduction
Consider a setting with endogenous information, in which the distribution of posterior types
of agents emerges from the information acquisition or disclosure choices of the agents. In the
process of Bayesian updating, mixtures over distributions are formed, an operation under which
the increasing hazard rate property is not generally preserved. That is, for a prior distribution
F with support X ⊆ R and a family of distributions {G(·|x)}x∈X with support S ⊆ R, even if
all of these distributions have an increasing hazard rate this is not generally the case for the
mixture distribution
G(s) =
∫
X
G(s|x) dF (x).
Consequently, even if the prior distribution of types has an increasing hazard rate, the dis-
tribution of posterior types induced by the endogenous choices of agents may not have this
property.
In mechanism design settings, in which agents’ information is endogenous, conditions that
guarantee regularity of the distribution of posterior types are essential for tractability.1 Without
1By contrast, in settings with exogenous information the role of regularity conditions is to simplify the
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this assumption a circular effect could arise: small changes in the information level of agents
could result in significant changes of the structure of the optimal mechanism, which would
change the incentives to acquire or disclose information. This effect would render the model
fragile, complicate the analysis tremendously, and make the model untractable. Under what
conditions can we guarantee that all feasible choices of agents lead to regularity of the distri-
bution of posterior types?
The main objective of this essay is to identify sufficient conditions on the primitives of an
information structure that guarantee that the distribution of posterior estimates has an increas-
ing hazard rate, increasing virtual valuations or costs.2 This characterization result is important
for the emerging literature on mechanism design with endogenous information of agents. This
literature dispenses with the common assumption that the distribution of types, and the pri-
vate information held by agents, is exogenously given. It includes an information stage into the
analysis, in which information is either acquired by market participants or disclosed to them.3
In our analysis, we focus on the standard setting for mechanism design problems, in which
agents are risk-neutral and have quasi-linear preferences. In such a framework, all payoff-relevant
information of agents that is necessary to characterize the optimal mechanism in the second
stage is captured in the posterior estimates (types) of the agents. It is therefore not necessary
to know the full posterior distribution, but it suffices to know its mean.
Our first result is an “impossibility result”. We identify a class of signal structures for which
the resulting distribution of posterior types will always have a decreasing hazard rate, irrespec-
tive of the prior distribution of types.4 If a signal structure from this class is contained in the
set of feasible signal structures that agents can choose from, it is impossible to guarantee that
the induced distribution of posterior types has an increasing hazard rate for all feasible choices
of agents.
Our second result is a “possibility result”. We identify sufficient conditions on the signal
structure that guarantee that certain regularity properties of the prior distribution – an in-
creasing hazard rate, increasing virtual valuations or costs – translate to the distribution of
posterior estimates.5
analysis and avoid technicalities, specifically ironing-out procedures.
2 It is a well-known problem in the economic literature that certain properties are not generally preserved
under aggregation or mixtures. A prominent example is the single-crossing property introduced by Milgrom
and Shannon (1994), which is not preserved under aggregation. Quah and Strulovici (2012) provide sufficient
conditions that guarantee that the single crossing condition is preserved under aggregation. We provide a similar
result: sufficient conditions for the increasing hazard rate property to be preserved under mixtures.
3Examples include Bergemann and Välimäki (2002) and Shi (2012) who study information acquisition,
whereas the focus in Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007), Esö and Szentes (2007), Ganuza and Penalva (2010),
Li and Shi (2015) and Ganuza and Penalva (2014) is on information disclosure. Bergemann and Välimäki (2007)
provide a good survey of the topic.
4This is the case for signal structures that are characterized by a family of conditional distributions that all
have a decreasing hazard rate.
5Formally, signals must be characterized by a family of survival functions that is log-concave. This property
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Straightforward applications of our results are the auction design problems analyzed in Shi
(2012) and Ganuza and Penalva (2014). Shi (2012) studies optimal auctions with information
acquisition by the bidders, whereas the focus of Ganuza and Penalva (2014) is on information
disclosure in optimal auctions. The authors of these papers choose different approaches to cir-
cumvent the tractability problems that arise in their models. Shi (2012) imposes the regularity
assumption directly on the distribution of posterior estimates, assuming that it has increas-
ing virtual valuations. Ganuza and Penalva (2014) restrict attention to a specific information
structure to make their model tractable. The results presented in this essay make it possible
to identify classes of information structures to which the results in Shi (2012) and Ganuza and
Penalva (2014) apply. These applications are discussed in Section 4.
To further illustrate how our results can be applied, we discuss information disclosure in
allocation problems without monetary transfers.6 We find that, by choosing an appropriate in-
formation technology, the designer can guarantee that the optimal mechanism is a full screening
mechanism. This result is robust in the sense that the designer does not need to know the prior
distribution of agents’ types.
The rest of the essay is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the formal model of
the informational environment. Section 3 contains our theoretical results, with the main results
presented in Section 3.3. Applications are discussed in Section 4. We conclude with some further
discussion and remarks in Section 5. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 The Informational Setting
Consider the following model. There exists an unknown state, represented by a real-valued
random variable X. The common, initial beliefs about the state are captured by an absolutely
continuous prior distribution F with interval support X ⊆ R. We assume that X has finite
expectation, µ := E(X) <∞, under F .
A signal is characterized by a real-valued random variable S with typical realizations
s ∈ [s, s] ⊆ R, and a family of conditional distributions {G(·|x)}x∈X , where
G(s|x) := Pr(S ≤ s|X = x)
is the probability to observe a signal s′ ≤ s if the state is x.7 We assume that for every x ∈ X ,
G(·|x), is absolutely continuous in s, that is, it admits a density function, and g(s|x) > 0 almost
everywhere.8 Together with the prior distribution F , a signal induces a joint distribution on
is a generalization of the increasing hazard rate property to multivariate distributions.
6For the case of exogenous private information of agents this problem has been studied for example in
Condorelli (2012) and Chakravarty and Kaplan (2013).
7We allow for the supports of X and S to be the real line.
8This assumption implies that there is some noise in the signal. That is, upon observing a signal realization,
agents cannot exclude any states. The set of states to which an agent attaches a positive probability is the same
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(X,S), a so-called information structure. We denote the marginal distribution of S by G.
Agents update their beliefs according to Bayes’ rule. The posterior distribution of X condi-
tional on observing s is G(·|s), and the resulting conditional expectation is
X̂(s) = E [X|S = s] =
∫
X
x dG(x|s). (3.1)
We call X̂(s) the posterior estimate. Without loss of generality we can assume that X̂ is
increasing in s, which implies that an inverse function X̂−1 exists.9 For a given prior distribution
F , every signal S results in a distribution of posterior estimates, represented by a random
variable X̂ = E [X|S] with distribution function
H(xˆ) := G
(
X̂−1(xˆ)
)
=
∫
X
G(X̂−1(xˆ)|x) dF (x),
and quantile function H−1(p) = inf{xˆ|H(xˆ) ≥ p} for p ∈ [0, 1].
We assume that signals are monotone, that is, that high signal realizations aremore favorable
than low signal realizations in the sense of Milgrom (1981). This condition implies that it is
more likely to observe a high signal realization s if the underlying state x is high, than if it is
low.
Assumption 3.1 (Monotone Signals): For all signal realizations s, s′ ∈ S with s′ > s, signal
realization s′ is more favorable than s. That is, for every non-degenerate prior distribution F
on X, if s′ > s, then the posterior distribution G(·|s′) dominates G(·|s) in terms of first-order
stochastic dominance, G(·|s′) ≥FOSD G(·|s).
If signal S is characterized by conditional densities {g(·|x)}x∈X , then Assumption 3.1 is
equivalent to the monotone likelihood ratio property.10
Examples
The model captures many information technologies, among them the following examples that
are frequently used in the literature.
Example 3.1 (Normal Experiments): Suppose that the states are normally distributed
X ∼ N (µX , σ2X), and signal S is given by S = X + ε, where ε is a normally distributed noise
term, ε ∼ N (0, σ2ε). In this case, signals are also normally distributed, S ∼ N (µX , σ2X + σ2ε),
and the posterior estimate after observing signal realization s is
X̂(s) =
σ2ε
σ2X + σ
2
ε
µ+
σ2X
σ2X + σ
2
ε
s.
for all signal realizations. This assumption is sometimes called the “non-shifting support” assumption in the
literature.
9For a formal justification see Shaked et al. (2012).
10Signal S has the (strict) monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP), if for every x > x′, g(s|x)g(s|x′) is strictly
increasing in s.
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The posterior estimates are linear in S and normally distributed. 4
Example 3.2 (Truth-or-noise technology): For a given state space X, let the prior belief
be represented by F , a continuously differentiable distribution with finite mean µ. A truth-
or-noise technology provides with some probability α ∈ [0, 1] a perfectly informative signal
s = x, and with probability (1−α) pure noise, independently drawn from prior distribution F .
The receiver cannot distinguish which kind of signal he observes. For signal realization s, the
posterior estimate is X̂(s) = αs+ (1− α)µ. 4
Example 3.3: Suppose X ∼ U [0, 1]. If the state is x, the resulting signal realizations s are
normally distributed with mean x and variance 1, that is, G(·|x) ∼ N (x, 1). The joint density
which characterizes this information structure is
f(x, s) = g(s|x)f(x) =
 1√2pie−
(s−x)2
2 if 0 ≤ x ≤ 1,
0 otherwise.
Upon observing signal realization s, the resulting posterior estimate is:
X̂(s) =s+ φ(0) · (1− 2s) = s · (1− 2φ(0)) + φ(0),
where φ(s) :=
√
2
pi
·
[
e−
s2
s −e−
(s−1)2
2
]
erf
(
s√
2
)
− erf
(
s−1√
2
) , and erf is the error function.11 Note that, as in the
previous examples, the posterior estimate is linear in the signal realizations. 4
3 Sufficient Conditions
In this section, we first discuss the implications of properties of information structures for the
distribution of posterior estimates. Then, sufficient conditions on the primitives of information
structures for the distribution of posterior estimates to have a monotone hazard rate, increasing
virtual valuations or costs are identified.
Definition 3.1: The random variable X with distribution F and density f has an increasing
hazard rate, if the hazard rate function
λ(x) =
f(x)
1− F (x)
is increasing in x.
The random variable X has a decreasing hazard rate, if λ(x) is decreasing in x.
An equivalent condition to X having an increasing (decreasing) hazard rate is that the
survival function F (x) = 1− F (x) is log-concave (log-convex).12
11 erf (s) = 2√
pi
∫ s
0
e−t
2
dt
12The natural definition of an increasing hazard rate for random variables without densities is, to say that X
has an increasing hazard rate if the survival function is log-concave.
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Remark 3.1. Interpreting the state x as time, the hazard rate λ(x) = f(x)
1−F (x) has a natural in-
terpretation as the failure rate of a component: It represents the probability of an instantaneous
failure of a component conditional on the component still being intact at time x.
To establish our results we proceed in two steps. First, we identify sufficient conditions on
the prior and signal distribution for the marginal distribution of signals to have an increasing
hazard rate, respectively log-concave density (Lemma 3.1). We then show that these properties
transfer to the distribution of posterior estimates (Proposition 3.1 and Proposition 3.2).
3.1 Induced Properties of the Marginal Distribution of Signals
The marginal distribution of signals is the mixture distribution over the conditional distribu-
tions characterizing the signal, with the prior being the mixing distribution
G(s) =
∫
X
G(s|x) dF (x).
It is a well-known result in statistics that the decreasing hazard rate property is preserved
under mixtures.13 For the increasing hazard rate property – the more important property for
economics – the result is less clear-cut since the class of increasing hazard rate distribution is
not closed under mixtures.
To develop some intuition about why the increasing hazard rate property is not necessarily
preserved under mixtures, think about the hazard rate function as representing the failure rate
of a component (cf. Remark 3.1). A basic insight is that for mixtures of distributions early
failures are likely to arise from distributions with high hazard rates. As Finkelstein and Cha
(2013) put it “the weakest items are dying out first”. More precisely, for a given prior distribution,
consider the hazard rate of a mixture of a family of increasing (respectively decreasing) hazard
rate distributions. For the mixture, early failures are more likely to arise from distributions with
high hazard rates (at that time) whereas late failures are more likely to originate from low hazard
rate distributions. This effect amplifies the features of decreasing hazard rate distributions but
may offset the increasing hazard rate properties of the distributions when they are mixed.
Consequently the increasing hazard rate property is not necessarily preserved under mixtures.
Figure 3.1 illustrates an example of two distributions with increasing hazard rate, whose mixture
does not have this property.14
The following lemma identifies a set of sufficient conditions for the primitives of an informa-
tion structure that guarantee that the marginal distribution of signals has an increasing hazard
rate.15
13See Barlow and Proschan (1981). This result is also formally stated in the appendix (Lemma 3.2).
14For further examples, see Finkelstein and Cha (2013) and Gurland and Sethuraman (1994).
15This set is the least restrictive set of sufficient conditions we are aware of. The lemma is based on a theorem
by Lynch (1999). For sufficient conditions for the case of a discrete state space see Block et al. (2003).
87
Λ1 HtL
ΛmHtL
Λ2 HtL
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
t
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
ΛHtL
Figure 3.1: Hazard rate functions λ1, λ2 of Weibull distributions W(1.2, 1) and W(100, 1), with
scale parameter 1 and shape parameters k1 = 1.2 and k2 = 100; and mixture hazard rate λm
of their equal-weight mixture.
Lemma 3.1. Suppose the information structure (X,S) satisfies Assumption 3.1.
If the family of survival functions {G(·|x)}x∈X is log-concave in (s, x), then if the prior distri-
bution F has an increasing hazard rate, so has the marginal distribution of signals G.
Moreover, if the family of densities {g(·|x)}x∈X is log-concave in (s, x), then if the prior density
f is log-concave, so is the marginal density of the signal g.
3.2 Link to the Distribution of Posterior Estimates
In order to obtain a general characterization result we still need to establish a relation between
the marginal distribution of signals and the distribution of posterior estimates. This is possi-
ble for information structures that satisfy one of the following two assumptions, linearity or
smoothness.
Assumption 3.2 (Linearity): Posterior estimates are a positive linear transformation of the
signal:
X̂ = aS + b, a, b ∈ R, a > 0.
Many information structures that are commonly used in the literature satisfy Assump-
tion 3.2, among them those of Example 1 – 3.
For posterior estimates that do not satisfy this linearity condition, we impose the following
smoothness condition.
Assumption 3.3 (Smoothness): The distributions F and {G(·|x)}x∈X are twice continuously
differentiable with strictly positive and bounded densities, 0 < f < f and 0 < g(·|x) < g
∀x ∈ X .
This assumption has the flavor of the smoothness assumptions in Mechanism Design that
are typically imposed on the prior distribution. Assumption 3.3 requires a certain smoothness
on the distributions defining the information structures. Often, information structures satisfy
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both Assumption 3.2 and Assumption 3.3.
We can now state our result, that for information structures satisfying at least one of these
assumptions, the regularity properties of the marginal distribution of signals translate to the
distribution of posterior estimates.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose that the information structure (X,S) satisfies Assumption 3.1, and
either Assumption 3.2 or Assumption 3.3, and that the posterior estimate is a concave (con-
vex) function of the signal. Then, if the marginal distribution of signals G has an increasing
(decreasing) hazard rate, so has the distribution of posterior estimates H.
Proposition 3.2. For information structures satisfying Assumption 3.1 and Assumption 3.2,
if the marginal density of signals g is log-concave, so is the density of posterior estimates, h.
Remark. To avoid introducing new concepts and notation, the result of Proposition 3.2 is
stated for log-concave densities. It should be noted, however, that the result extends to ρ-concave
densities with ρ-concavity defined as in Caplin and Nalebuff (1991a,b) and Ewerhart (2013).
3.3 Main Results
Combining the results from Section 3.1 and Section 3.2, we can finally present our main result.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose that the information structure (X,S) satisfies Assumption 3.1, and
either Assumption 3.2 or Assumption 3.3.
(i) If {G(·|x)}x∈X is a family of decreasing hazard rate distributions and the posterior estimate
is a convex function of the signal, then for any prior F , the distribution of posterior
estimates H has a decreasing hazard rate.
(ii) If the family of survival functions {G(·|x)}x∈X is log-concave in (s, x) and the posterior
estimate is a concave function of the signal, then if the prior distribution F has an in-
creasing hazard rate, so does the distribution of posterior estimates H.
Remark. It should be noted that the conditions required to obtain the result in (ii) are signif-
icantly stronger than those in (i). Under the assumptions in the theorem, to guarantee that the
distribution of posterior estimates has a decreasing hazard rate it suffices that for every x ∈ X ,
the conditional distribution G(·|x) has a decreasing hazard rate. In particular, the result holds
for any prior distribution. One can also think of this result as an “impossibility result”: If signals
are characterized by conditional distributions with a decreasing hazard rate, it is impossible
that the increasing hazard rate property of the prior distribution translates to the distribution
of posterior estimates.
By contrast, the possibility result for the increasing hazard rate in (ii), requires that the
prior distribution has an increasing hazard rate and that the family of conditional survival
distributions {G(·|x)}x∈X is log-concave in (s, x).16
16 A function ψ : R2 → R is log-concave, if its domain dom ψ is convex and
ψ(αx+ (1− α)y) ≥ ψ(x)αψ(y)1−α ∀x, y ∈ dom ψ, α ∈ (0, 1) .
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We can also establish sufficient conditions for the virtual valuations and costs of the posterior
estimates to be increasing.
Definition 3.2: A random variable X with distribution F and density f has increasing virtual
valuations if
Jv(x) = x− 1− F (x)
f(x)
,
is increasing in x.
It has increasing virtual costs if
Jc(x) = x+
F (x)
f(x)
,
is increasing in x.
The following result is a direct corollary to Theorem 3.1.
Corollary 3.1. Let (X,S) be an information structure that satisfies Assumption 3.1, and either
Assumption 3.2 or Assumption 3.3.
If the family of survival functions {G(·|x)}x∈X is log-concave in (s, x) and the posterior estimate
is a concave function of the signal, then if the prior distribution F has an increasing hazard
rate, the distribution of posterior estimates has increasing virtual valuations.
In order to guarantee that the distribution of posterior estimates has increasing virtual
costs, slightly stronger conditions are required.
Theorem 3.2. Let (X,S) be an information structure that satisfies Assumption 3.1 and
Assumption 3.2.
If the family of densities {g(·|x)}x∈X is log-concave in (s, x), then if the prior density f is
log-concave, the distribution of posterior estimates has increasing virtual costs.17
4 Applications
4.1 Auctions
A straightforward starting point for the discussion of applications of our results, is to connect
them to the existing research on auction design with endogenous information. The results are
useful in settings in which regularity of the posterior estimates does not arise from equilibrium
considerations. This is for example the case in Shi (2012), who studies information acquisition in
optimal auctions, as well as in Ganuza and Penalva (2014) who analyze information disclosure
in optimal auctions.18 In both settings, the implemented mechanism affects agents’ incentives
17The statement of the theorem can be strengthened. The conditions stated in the theorem imply that the
generalized virtual valuation and cost functions Jv(x) = x − γ 1−F (x)f(x) and Jc(x) = x + γ F (x)f(x) are increasing in
x for every γ > 0.
18 Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007) study a setting in which the designer can choose what information
to provide to bidders as well as the selling mechanism. In this setting the non-decreasing virtual valuations
property follows from equilibrium considerations: If providing information would result in non-increasing virtual
valuations, the seller would rather not differentiate between buyers, but move the “ironing out” procedure to
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to acquire or disclose costly information and these informational effects have to be taken into
account when designing the optimal mechanism. In both papers, the set of information tech-
nologies from which agents can choose is restricted, such that all information technologies in
the feasible set can be compared in terms of their informational content.
Information Acquisition in Optimal Auctions
Shi (2012) characterizes an optimal, that is revenue maximizing, selling mechanism in a setting
in which buyers do not know their private valuations ex-ante, but can acquire costly information
prior to participating in the mechanism. The timing is as follows:
1. The seller announces a mechanism (and suggests an information acquisition profile).
2. Bidders acquire costly information: they choose the precision level of the signal that they
will obtain about their valuation of the object.
3. Based on their chosen precision levels of information, bidders obtain a (noisy) signal about
their valuation and update their beliefs accordingly.
4. Bidders submit their bids, and the object is sold according to the mechanism previously
announced by the seller.
In this environment, when choosing the optimal mechanism, the seller has to take into ac-
count that his choice of a mechanism will affect the incentives of bidders’ to acquire information.
For the symmetric case, in which all bidders acquire the same level of information, Shi (2012)
shows that, if the distribution of posterior estimates is regular and the number of bidders is suf-
ficiently large, the optimal mechanism is a standard auction with a reserve price. The optimal
reserve price in the case with endogenous information acquisition is closer to the prior mean
than the standard reserve price if the equilibrium information level were exogenously given.
The results of Section 3 allow us to identify a class of information structures to which the
results of Shi (2012) apply. It is hence not necessary anymore to impose the regularity conditions
on the interim stage. Instead it is possible to identify sufficient conditions on the primitives of the
information structures such that the results of Shi apply.19 This class includes all information
structures satisfying the conditions in Theorem 3.1 (ii) or Corollary 3.1. Examples include
truth-or-noise technologies with increasing hazard rate prior distributions; and information
structures with S = X + , an increasing hazard rate prior distribution and noise with log-
concave density.20
the information stage by not providing information to the agents. The result relies on the richness of the set
of feasible information technologies that the designer may choose from. The information technologies in this
set are not ordered in terms of informativeness and no statement about the optimal precision-level of disclosed
information can be made.
19The result in Shi (2012) is based on further assumptions on the distribution of posterior estimates. A
sufficient condition for these assumptions to hold is that, when switching from one signal to a more precise (and
thus more costly) signal, the resulting distributions of posterior estimates are ordered in terms of the dispersive
order. This is the case for information structures satisfying Assumption 3.2 (cf. Proposition 4 in Ganuza and
Penalva, 2010).
20For classes of functions which have an increasing hazard rate or log-concave densities see Bagnoli and
Bergstrom (2005).
91
Information Disclosure in Optimal Auctions
Ganuza and Penalva (2014) study information disclosure in optimal auctions. In their set-
ting, the seller chooses the selling mechanism, as well as the precision level of the information
disclosed to bidders before the auction. Prior to the auction, each bidder observes a private,
partially informative signal about his valuation for the object and update his beliefs accord-
ingly. The informational content of the signal is determined by the precision level chosen by
the seller, which is known to all bidders. More precise information allows bidders to better as-
sess their preferences or tastes for the object, which leads to more heterogeneity among bidders.
In their analysis, Ganuza and Penalva (2014) assume that signals have the structure of a
truth-or-noise technology (cf. Example 3.2). The authors state in their conclusion that “the
model is standard (and general) in all dimensions but the choice of the set of available signals”.
This simplifying assumption that signals have the structure of a truth-or-noise-technology has
the following convenient implications:
1. For truth-or-noise technologies, the regularity properties, like increasing virtual valuations
of the prior distribution translate to the distribution of posterior estimates.21
2. Linearity of the information structure keeps the model tractable.
3. Information technologies are naturally ordered in terms of their informational content
(precision) and it is straightforward to define a cost-function which captures the idea that
information disclosure is costly.
If we allow for a larger set of information structures that satisfy Assumption 3.1 and As-
sumption 3.2 (linearity), the last two of the aspects mentioned above (2. and 3.) are preserved.22
However, for these more general information structures the marginal distribution of signals is
usually not the same as the prior distribution. Consequently, the increasing virtual valuation
property will in general not translate from the prior distribution to the distribution of posterior
estimates. In this case, our results of Section 3 can be applied to characterize sufficient condi-
tions on the primitives of information structures for the distributions of posterior estimates to
satisfy the increasing virtual valuations property.
The results in Ganuza and Penalva (2014) generalize to the class of information structures
satisfying Assumption 3.1, Assumption 3.2 and the conditions in Theorem 3.1 (ii) or Corol-
lary 3.1.23 The main insights are:
1. In an optimal auction, the auctioneer discloses more information than in a standard
auction in which the object is always sold. Here, an optimal auctions is a standard auction
21For truth-or-noise technologies, the marginal distribution of signals is the same as the prior distribution.
Moreover, due to the linearity of the posterior estimates in signals, the regularity properties translate from the
marginal distribution of signals to the distribution of posterior estimates.
22The class of information structures that satisfy Assumption 3.2, are naturally ordered in terms of super-
modular precision (cf. Ganuza and Penalva, 2010, Proposition 4).
23It is straightforward to replicate the proofs in Ganuza and Penalva (2014) for these more general information
structures, using our results in Section 3 and the linearity of posterior estimates (Assumption 3.2). We refer the
reader to the discussion in Ganuza and Penalva (2014).
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with a reserve price that is optimal given the precision level of the information disclosed
to bidders.
2. The level of information disclosed to bidders in an optimal auction is weakly increasing
in the number of bidders.
The intuition behind these results is the following. In a standard auction (without reserve
price), if a seller discloses information, he has to leave informational rents to the bidders. If
information is costly, the auctioneer will therefore not reveal all information. An optimal reserve
price reduces the informational rents of bidders and thus increases the seller’s incentives to
disclose information.
4.2 Optimal Mechanisms without Money
Another interesting application of our results are allocation problems without monetary trans-
fers as studied for example in Condorelli (2012) and Chakravarty and Kaplan (2013). These
model consider the allocation of k indivisible heterogeneous objects to n agents when mon-
etary transfers or charging personalized prices is infeasible or undesirable, but a benevolent
designer can screen the agents.24 Screening yields non-monetary costs which are wasted, that
is, screening generates a deadweigh loss. More specifically, if the seller chooses to screen agents,
he implements a mechanism that requires the agents to invest in some costly non-productive
action (e.g. exerting effort, spend time in waiting lines, etc.) in order to signal their private
types. Incentive compatibility requires that the non-monetary costs incurred by the agents cor-
respond to Vickrey-payments. That is, the expected (wasteful) costs of an agent capture the
externalities that he imposes on the other agents.
In this setting, Condorelli (2012) characterizes the optimal mechanism within the class of
incentive compatible direct allocation mechanisms, that is, the mechanisms that maximizes
ex-ante welfare. Condorelli shows that, if buyers’ valuations have a decreasing hazard rate, a
full screening mechanism is optimal whereas in any other case, due to the trade-off between a
more efficient allocation and screening costs, only partial or no screening is optimal.
The results of Section 3 can be applied to extend the model studied in Condorelli (2012)
to a setting in which agents do not know their private valuations or tastes ex-ante and the
seller can provide information through a noisy channel, for example by advertising a concert
or sport event. We assume that the designer has to provide some information to make market
participants aware of the availability of his products, but cannot provide perfectly informative
private signals. For example, an event manager has to advertise a concert to attract interested
customers but cannot perfectly control how interested parties perceive the information provided
to them through the advertisement. Formally, this means that we exclude perfectly informative
signals and pure noise from the set of feasible information technologies available to the designer.
24Typical examples mentioned in the literature are the allocation of donor organs, or ticket sales for concerts
or sport events. Waiting lines can serve as costly screening instruments.
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The setting studied in Condorelli (2012) is linear, hence the distribution of posterior estimates
captures all relevant information to determine the optimal mechanism. Applying our insights
from Section 3 yields the following result.
Proposition 3.3. Consider information disclosure in an allocation problem without monetary
transfers. Suppose that the signal is characterized by conditional distributions with decreasing
hazard rate. Then for any prior distribution of agents’ types, it is optimal for the seller to
implement a full screening mechanism.
We want to emphasize the following remarkable robustness feature of this result: As long
as the designer can implement a signal characterized by decreasing hazard rate distributions,
he knows that a full screening mechanism is optimal, irrespective of the prior type distribution
of agents. To implement the optimal mechanism the designer therefore does not need to know
the prior distribution.25
5 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
In this note we discussed properties of information structures and their implications for the
distribution of posterior estimates. We specifically focused on identifying conditions such that
the induced distribution of posterior estimates satisfies certain regularity properties that are
commonly used in the mechanism design literature.
An important insight of the discussion is, that the increasing hazard rate property may not
be preserved under mixtures of distribution functions, an operation which occurs during the
updating process. For certain signal structures it is impossible that the distribution of posterior
estimates has an increasing hazard rate. However, we identified sufficient conditions on the
signal structure that guarantee that the increasing hazard rate property translates from the
prior distribution to the distribution of posterior estimates.26
The theoretical results were used to identify classes of information environments to which the
results on information acquisitions and disclosure in optimal auctions of Shi (2012) and Ganuza
and Penalva (2014) apply. Moreover, we discussed information disclosure in allocation problems
without money as for example studied in Condorelli (2012) or Chakravarty and Kaplan (2013).
It was shown that whenever signals are characterized by a family of decreasing hazard rate
distributions, a full screening mechanisms is optimal.
25The result of Proposition 3.3 extends to models of two-sided matching markets as analyzed in Hoppe et al.
(2009) and Roesler (2014), respectively Chapter 2 of this thesis. In these settings, if the designer implements an
information technology characterized by decreasing hazard rate distributions, the welfare optimal mechanism is
to screen agents, and to implement the positive assortative matching.
26As a corollary we obtain sufficient conditions for the distribution of posterior estimates to have increasing
virtual valuations. However, these conditions are not tight and could probably be relaxed, using the insight from
Ewerhart (2013) that
(− 12)-concavity is a tight sufficient condition for increasing virtual valuations, which is a
weaker condition than an increasing hazard rate. The mathematical methods that we use to obtain our results
do not extend to the case that would be needed to pursue this question systematically. We therefore second
the statement of Hardy et al. (1952) that “the complications introduced by zero or negative values [are] hardly
worth pursuing systematically”.
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We think that our results will be valuable beyond the applications discussed in this note,
specifically for research on mechanism design problems with endogenous information. For such
problems, the insights of Section 3 can be used to restrict attention to a set of feasible infor-
mation structures for which the optimal mechanism is of a particular form. This allows to keep
mechanism design problems with endogenous information tractable, an important first step to
address new questions and develop new insights on this topic.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Suppose the information structure (X,S) satisfies the slightly stronger
condition that f is log-concave. In this case, G(x, s) := G(s|x)f(x) is log-concave, since the
product of two log-concave functions is log-concave. The survival function of the marginal
distribution G is given by:
G(s) =
∫
X
G(s|x)f(x) dx.
By Prékopa’s Theorem (1973), log-concavity is preserved by integration and it follows that G
is log-concave. Consequently, G has an increasing hazard rate (cf. Definition 3.1).
The same line of reasoning can be used to prove that log-concavity of f and g(·|x) implies
log-concavity of g.
For the proof of the general case, which only requires that F has an increasing hazard
rate, observe that by Assumption 3.1, for every s > s′, G(·|s) ≥FOSD G(·|s′). This implies,
G(·|x) ≥FOSD G(·|x′) for all x > x′, which is equivalent to G(s|x) = 1−G(s|x) being increasing
in x for every s ∈ S. The result then follows by Theorem 2.1 in Lynch (1999).
Proof of Proposition 3.1.
Case 1: Suppose the information structure (X,S) satisfies Assumption 3.1 and Assumption 3.2.
That is, suppose X̂ = aS + b with a > 0. This is equivalent to S = X̂−b
a
. Given monotonicity of
signals, for every xˆ ∈ X̂ , X̂(s) ≤ xˆ ⇔ s ≤ xˆ−b
a
. This implies H(xˆ) = G
(
xˆ−b
a
)
.
Let η(xˆ) := xˆ−b
a
. For a > 0, η(xˆ) is increasing in xˆ. Moreover,
h(xˆ) =
dG
dη
dη
dxˆ
=
1
a
· g (η(xˆ)) . (3.2)
It follows that
λH(xˆ) =
1
a
· g (η(xˆ))
1−G (η(xˆ)) .
Given that a > 0 and η(xˆ) is increasing in xˆ, it follows that, if G has an increasing (decreasing)
hazard rate then λH(xˆ) is increasing (decreasing) in xˆ which implies that H (resp. X̂) has an
increasing (decreasing) hazard rate.
Case 2: Suppose the information structures (X,S) satisfies Assumption 3.1 and Assump-
tion 3.3. These conditions imply that X̂(s) is continuously differentiable and strictly increasing
in s. By the inverse function theorem, Xˆ is invertible. That is, there exists a twice continuously
differentiable function η := X̂−1, and the first and second derivative of η are given by
η′(xˆ) =
1
X̂ ′ (η(xˆ))
and η′′(xˆ) = − X̂
′′(η(xˆ))(
X̂ ′(η(xˆ))
)3 .
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By Assumption 1, η(xˆ) is strictly increasing in xˆ. This implies that η′(xˆ) > 0 for every xˆ.
Moreover, if X̂ is concave, then η′′(xˆ) > 0, that is, η is convex. Similarly, if X̂ is convex, then
η′′(xˆ) < 0 and η is concave.
For every xˆ, η(xˆ) determines the signal realization s that results in the conditional expec-
tation xˆ. With these specifications, S = η(X̂) and H(xˆ) = G(η(xˆ)). Since G and η are both
continuously differentiable so is H, and it follows that
h(xˆ) =
dG
dη
dη
dxˆ
= g(η(xˆ)) · η′(xˆ).
It follows that the hazard rate function of X̂ is given by
λH(xˆ) = η
′(xˆ)
g(η(xˆ))
1−G(η(xˆ)) .
Its derivative is
λ′H(xˆ) = η
′′(xˆ)ψ(xˆ) + η′(xˆ) · ψ′(xˆ),
with ψ(xˆ) := g(η(xˆ))
1−G(η(xˆ)) .
If G has an increasing (decreasing) hazard rate, then ψ(xˆ) = g(η(xˆ))
1−G(η(xˆ)) is increasing (de-
creasing). Given that η′(xˆ) > 0 for every xˆ, it follows that the second summand of λ′H(xˆ) is
increasing (decreasing) in xˆ. Moreover, if X̂ is concave (convex) then η′′(xˆ) > 0 (η′′(xˆ) < 0),
which implies that the first summand is increasing (decreasing).
It follows that the distribution of posterior estimates H has an increasing hazard rate, if
the posterior estimate is a concave function of the signal and the distribution of signals has an
increasing hazard rate. Similarly, the distribution of posterior estimates has a decreasing hazard
rate, if the distribution of signals has a decreasing hazard rate and the posterior estimate is a
convex function of the signal.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. The proof follows along the same lines as Case 1 of the proof of
Proposition 3.1. The result for log-concavity is a direct consequence of (3.2) and the fact that
log-concavity is preserved under affine transformations.
Proof of Theorem 3.1.
(i) As mentioned in Section 3.1, it is a well-known results that the decreasing hazard rate
property is preserved under mixtures. Formally
Lemma 3.2 (Barlow and Proschan 1981). Consider a family of distributions {G (·|x)}x∈X with
support S that all have a decreasing hazard rate. Then, for any mixing distribution F , the
mixture distribution
G(s) =
∫
X
G (s|x) dF (x)
has a decreasing hazard rate.
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It is straightforward to apply this result to information structures: If for every x ∈ X , the
distribution G(·|x) has a decreasing hazard rate, then by Lemma 3.2 the marginal distribution
of signals G has a decreasing hazard rate. By Proposition 3.1 it follows that the distribution of
posterior estimates, H, has a decreasing hazard rate.
(ii) The result follows directly by combining Lemma 3.1 and Proposition 3.1. Given the assump-
tions, Lemma 3.1 implies that the marginal distribution of signals G has an increasing hazard
rate. By Proposition 3.1 the distribution of posterior estimates H has the same property.
Proof of Corollary 3.1. The result follows directly from Theorem 3.1 and the fact, that an
increasing hazard rate implies increasing virtual valuations.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Under the assumptions of the theorem, Lemma 3.1 implies that the
marginal density function of signals g is log-concave. Applying Proposition 3.1 yields that the
distribution of posterior estimates h is log-concave. It is shown in Ewerhart (2013) that log-
concavity is equivalent to ρ−concavity for ρ = −1
2
, and that this is a sufficient condition for
the virtual cost function Jc(xˆ) to be increasing in xˆ.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. Suppose the seller implements a signal that is characterized by con-
ditional distributions with decreasing hazard rate. That is, suppose that for every x ∈ X , the
distribution G(·|x) has a decreasing hazard rate. Then, by Theorem 3.1 (i), the distribution of
posterior estimates H has a decreasing hazard rate. By Theorem 1 and Corollary 3 in Condorelli
(2012) it follows that the optimal mechanism is a full screening mechanism.
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Chapter 4
Preference Uncertainty and Conflict of Interest in
Committees
We propose and analyze a committee model, in which agents with interdependent
values vote on whether to accept an alternative or to stick to the status quo. Agents
hold two-dimensional private information: About a dimension of the payoff state,
and about their individual preference type, which reflects an agent’s level of parti-
sanship.
In equilibrium, committee members adopt cutoff-strategies, and an agent’s prefer-
ence type is reflected in his acceptance standard. We identify how the composition of
a committee affects its decisions: As the population of committee members becomes
more partisan, agents’ adjust their acceptance standards more, and equilibrium cut-
offs move away from the sincere voting threshold. By contrast, an agent who finds
himself in a committee with more heterogeneity of preference types, is more un-
certain about the preferences of others, and hence bases his vote more on his own,
privately observed signal.
1 Introduction
In most organizations, it is the prevailing practice that complex decisions are made by commit-
tees, not by individuals. Corporate boards decide how to invest, whom to hire and whether or
not to adopt a new technology. Further examples include the allocation of research grants, the
approval of new drugs by the FDA, and academic hiring. Typically, decisions are reached by a
voting procedure.
By the complexity of matters that are put to vote, committee members often cannot assess
all information about the alternatives. Rather, they pay attention to the aspect of the matter
that is most important for them, but are aware that the signals held by the other committee
members also contain relevant information. The aforementioned examples are such situations, in
which committee members typically have interdependent, but not purely common preferences.1
Agents differ in how they aggregate available information about the state into preferences.
1This is in contrast to the common assumption in the voting literature that agents share a common interest.
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Two dimensions about which committee members usually have private information are the
following: First, they possess private information about the state, which is payoff relevant to all
agents. Second, agents also have private information about their preference type, which deter-
mines how they aggregate available information about the state into preferences. The private
preference type of an agent reflects his level of partisanship, that is, the extent to which he favors
his own private signal over the average signal held by other agents. This means that, even if all
private signals about the state were publicly revealed, it would still remain private information
to the agents how they aggregate these signals into preferences – there is preference uncertainty.
In this essay, we introduce a committee model that captures the idea that agents have
interdependent preferences and individual private preference types. Our goal is to understand
how private preference types, preference uncertainty, and the composition of the committee
affect the equilibrium acceptance standards and acceptance sets of committee decisions. We
focus on two questions: How does the level of partisanship of the population affect acceptance
standards? And what are the effects of more or less heterogeneous distribution of preference
types for committee decisions?
The analysis is motivated by the observation that committees differ significantly in their
composition. One dimension is the level of partisanship of committee members. The distribu-
tion of partisanship levels depends on aspects such as the cultural background of committee
members, and the culture within an organization. Agents from individualistic cultures are more
likely to show a high level of partisanship compared to their colleagues with a more collectivist,
socially-minded (cultural) background.2 Hence, partisanship levels of members naturally vary
across committees.
A second dimension of the composition of committees is the heterogeneity of preference types
of its members. Irrespective of whether committee members display a high or a low average
level of partisanship, the partisanship levels of committee members may be similar, or show a
high level of variation.3 For example, if committee members stem from a group with diverse
cultural backgrounds, one would expect this population to display a high level of preference
heterogeneity. Committees or parliaments from small states like Belgium or the Netherlands,
are less likely to display strong preference heterogeneity than parliaments of larger states like
the US or Canada, or multinational assemblies such as the EU, or the UN general assembly.
However, even in committees whose members stem from a population with a high level
of preference heterogeneity, committee members may learn about the other agents’ preference
types, for example in standing committees. The uncertainty about the preference types of
fellow committee members decreases, which corresponds to a decrease in the level of preference
heterogeneity in the population. Hence, such committees resemble those with members from a
2Hofstede (1991) identifies individualism vs. collectivism as one dimension along which cultural differences
can be analyzed; Triandis (2001) links this cultural dimension to differences in personality and behavior.
3The special case, in which all committee members have the same level of partisanship is studied in Yildirim
(2012) and Moldovanu and Shi (2013).
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relatively homogeneous population.
Our results provide insights how the composition of committees regarding the distribution
and the heterogeneity of preference types of its members affects the acceptance standards in
collective decisions.
We study a model, in which a group of agents faces a binary decision: whether to accept a
proposal or to stay with the status quo. The decision is made by generalized majority voting.
Each agent indicates whether he wants to accept the proposal. The majority rule determines
the minimal number of affirmative votes that are required to adopt the proposal.
Prior to voting, each agent obtains a private signal about the state (quality of the proposal).
The payoff of the status quo is assumed to be zero for all agents. For each agent, the payoff
from adopting the alternative is determined by an additively separable function of the private
signals of all agents, which satisfies a single-crossing condition. Hence, committee members have
interdependent values and each agent puts the most weight on his own signal. The extent to
which an agent favors his own signal – his partisanship level – is represented by his preference
type. It is assumed to be private information, capturing the idea that the partisanship level of
an individual is intrinsic in nature, and can be regarded as part of his personality. Consequently,
there is conflict of interest among committee members but uncertainty about the extent of the
conflict. Moreover, agents hold two-dimensional private information.
We begin our analysis by establishing the existence of a Nash equilibrium in undominated
strategies, and by characterizing some fundamental properties. In equilibrium, agents adopt
cutoff strategies,4 that is, an agent accepts an alternative whenever his private signal is above
a certain threshold.
We find that an agent’s private preference type is reflected in the cutoff that he adopts:
Strongly partisan agents base their votes mostly on their own observed signal. More socially-
oriented types take into account the information about the other agents’ signals that they can
derive from the event of being pivotal. They adjust their acceptance thresholds accordingly. For
example, under unanimity voting, partisan agents adopt higher acceptance standards than the
ones adopted by their more socially-oriented colleagues.
Next, we address the questions how private preference types and the composition of a
committee affects its decisions. For the comparative statics analysis, we consider the iid case. We
establish the existence of a unique symmetric voting equilibrium, on which we focus throughout
the analysis.
As a first step, we provide a result that simplifies the analysis: In the present model, iden-
tifying the symmetric equilibrium corresponds to finding a fixed point of a mapping between
function spaces. We show that it is possible to re-express this problem as a one-dimensional
one: There exists a one-dimensional mapping and a one-to-one correspondence between fixed
4This is typical for voting models with continuous signals, see e.g. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997), Duggan
and Martinelli (2001), and Li and Suen (2009).
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points of this mapping and symmetric equilibria of the original problem. This reformulation of
the problem simplifies the comparative statics analysis. The problem reduces to identifying the
direction in which the fixed-point of the one-dimensional mapping moves.
We show that agents, who find themselves among more partisan committee members, adjust
their acceptance standards more than if they were in a committee from a more socially-oriented
population. For the unanimity rule, this means that acceptance standards decrease in the
partisanship level of the population of the committee members. The driving effect for this
result is the following: For a fixed profile of strategies, shifting to a more partisan population
implies that acceptance standards are on average higher, and hence the event of being pivotal
is more informative about the signals of others. Consequently, agents adjust their acceptance
standards more, which counteracts the initial effect.
Furthermore, we find that in committees with much heterogeneity of preference types, agents
adjust their acceptance standards less than in committees with more homogeneous preference
types. Here, more heterogeneity of preference types leads to more uncertainty about why an
agent votes affirmatively. He may have observed a high signal, or simply have a socially-oriented
preference type. It follows, that the event of being pivotal is less informative about the other
agents’ signals, and agents adjust their acceptance standards less. For the unanimity rule, one
may suspect that more preference uncertainty would lead an agent to adopt a more lenient
acceptance standard. It may be somewhat surprising that the opposite occurs: more preference
uncertainty causes an agent to focus more on his own private signal, and increase his acceptance
standard.
The rest of the essay is structured as follows. The model is introduced in Section 2. In
Section 3, we discuss related literature and special features of the present model. An illustrative
example is presented in Section 4. Section 5 and Section 6 contain the main results. In Section 5,
equilibrium existence is established and fundamental properties of equilibrium strategies are
discussed. The comparative static results regarding the partisanship level and the heterogeneity
of preference types in the population of committee members are presented in Section 6. Section 7
concludes. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 The Model
Consider a committee of n agents, I = {1, . . . , n}, who take a binary decision: whether to
accept a proposal (P) or to stay with the status quo (Q). A proposal is characterized by an
n-dimensional vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn. We refer to x1, . . . , xn as the attribute values of x.
Each agent has an individual, private preference type, θi ∈ Θi ⊆ [0, 1], which determines how
the agent aggregates the n-dimensional payoff state x into preferences.
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Payoffs.
For agent i with preference type θi, the payoff of proposal x is:5
vi(θi, x) = θixi + (1− θi) 1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
xj. (4.1)
The payoff of the status quo is 0 for all members.
The parametric form (4.1) captures that agents have interdependent preferences. If θi = 1,
agent i has private values, whereas the pure common values case corresponds to θi = 1n for
all i = 1, . . . , n. We take the private and the pure common values case as the two boundary
benchmarks, and hence focus on Θi ⊆
[
1
n
, 1
]
.
Information Environment. Attribute values xi are determined by independent random
draws with distributions Fi from interval Xi = [x, x] ⊂ R. The set of proposals, X = ×ni=1Xi,
is a closed convex set in Rn. Let X−i := ×j 6=iXj and x−i := (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn). The
distribution functions Fi are are twice continuously differentiable. The joint distribution of
proposals is F =
∏n
i=1 Fi. The realization xi is private information to agent i; the distributions
Fi of the respective random variables Xi are common knowledge.
Agents’ preference types are independently distributed on Θi with distributions Gi and
densities gi > 0. Preference type θi is private information to agent i, the distribution of types
is common knowledge. Given these model specifications, agents hold two-dimensional private
information: (xi, θi) is private information to agent i.
It is common knowledge that the payoff structure has the form of (4.1). We assume that
E(Xi) = 0 for every i ∈ I. This implies that, before agents observe their private signal xi about
the proposal, they neither favor the status quo nor the proposal.
Decision Rule. The committee decision is made by generalized majority voting. The ma-
jority rule, which is characterized by an integer k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, is publicly announced. Agents
indicate whether they want to accept or reject the proposal. The proposal is adopted if and
only if there are at least k affirmative votes.
Strategies. A pure strategy for agent i is a measurable function:
σi : Θi ×Xi → {0, 1}
(θi, xi) 7→ σi (θi, xi) ,
where σi(θi, xi) = 1 represents the case in which agent i votes affirmatively (i.e. in favor of the
5The specific parametric form of (4.1) is not crucial for the results. The equilibrium characterization results
of Section 5 extend to additively separable utility functions that are continuously increasing in xi for all i ∈ I,
and that satisfy the following single-crossing property with respect to agents’ private signals xi:
Assumption 4.1 (SC): For all i, j ∈ I, j 6= i:
∂vi
∂xi
(θi, x) ≥ ∂vj
∂xi
(θj , x) ∀x ∈ X .
For the parametric form of (4.1) this is equivalent to θi ≥ 1n−1 (1 − θj), for all (θi, θj) ∈ Θi × Θj , j 6= i. It
follows that Θi ⊆
[
1
n , 1
]
for every i ∈ I.
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proposal) if his type is θi and his private signal is xi. It is sometimes convenient to consider the
strategy of a given type, θi, of agent i. With a slight abuse of notation we denote the strategy
of type θi by σθi , where σθi(xi) := σi(θi, xi).
Remark 4.1. One could allow for mixed strategies here. However, it is easy to show that agents
adopt pure strategies in equilibrium. Hence, we directly restrict attention to pure strategies, in
order to avoid unnecessary technicalities.
In the binary decision problem that we consider, a pure strategy for an agent characterizes
for each of his preference types θi a corresponding acceptance set A+i (θi) := σ
−1
θi
(1) ⊆ Xi. This
is the set of private signals xi ∈ Xi that will induce the agent to vote affirmatively. A strategy
of agent i thus corresponds to a set of acceptance sets {A+i (θi)}θi∈Θi .
Let X i = Xi ∪ {x˜} be the space that is obtained by adjoining a point x˜ to Xi at the upper
boundary of Xi.6 A strategy σi of agent i is a cutoff-strategy, if for every θi there exists some
χi(θi) ∈ X i such that type θi votes affirmatively, if and only if he observes a signal xi ≥ χi(θi).
Here χi(θi) = x˜ represents the case in which agent i always rejects the proposal, irrespective of
his private signal. If agents adopt cutoff strategies, the acceptance sets A+i (θi) are intervals of
the form [χi(θi), x].7
Equilibrium Concept. We employ the concept of undominated Nash equilibrium, that is,
we restrict attention to Nash equilibria in which no agent plays a weakly dominated strategy.8
This is standard in the voting literature and, as in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997), we refer
to it as a voting equilibrium.
3 Related Literature and Discussion of the Model
Related Literature To the best of our knowledge, the pool of literature addressing the
question how the composition of a committee (i.e. the distribution of preference types of its
members) affects collective decisions is very small. Two recent, related papers are Yildirim
(2012) and Moldovanu and Shi (2013). They analyze voting models in which committee mem-
bers have interdependent, additively separable utilities. The preference structure adopted in
both papers is hence similar to the one in this essay. However, in their models all committee
members possess the same preference type, which can be interpreted as a parameter that de-
termines the conflict of interest among committee members. Our model departs in two aspects:
First, agents have individual preference types. Second, these individual preference types are
private information to the agents, that is, there is preference uncertainty. The new model, that
we introduce – in which agents hold two-dimensional private information – makes it possible
6Formally, consider x˜ as a duplicate of x and X i = Xi ∪ {x˜} as the space equipped with the following
topology: Let the set of open sets O consist of all subsets O ⊆ X i such that for each x ∈ O there is an interval
Ix ∈ {(a, b) , (a, x]}, with x ∈ Ix ⊆ O. And let int [a, x˜] := (a, x], where int denotes the interior.
7with [x˜, x] := ∅.
8This eliminates trivial equilibria where all agents play extreme strategies, i.e., always accept respectively,
always reject the project.
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to study new question, such as: How do individual preference types and the composition of a
committee affect collective decisions?
Given the differences of the models, the analyses in Yildirim (2012) and Moldovanu and
Shi (2013) focus on different questions. Moldovanu and Shi (2013) consider a search model, in
which the decision to stop is made by a committee by unanimity voting. They characterize a
stationary equilibrium in cutoff-strategies. In this equilibrium, acceptance standards increase,
and welfare decreases in the level of conflict among committee members.9 In a static model,
Yildirim (2012) identifies time-consistent majority rules, that is, majority rules that a designer
can implement, if he cannot commit to a rule prior to observing the votes.
Further interdependent values models that study collective decision making are Grüner and
Kiel (2004) and Rosar (2015). They consider a different (quadratic-losses) functional form of
utilities, and continuous collective decisions, whereas we focus on a binary decision problem.
Grüner and Kiel (2004) show that, with an unrestricted report space, from a utilitarian perspec-
tive, the average mechanism performs better in the common values case, whereas for private
values the median mechanism is preferable. By contrast, Rosar (2015) finds that with an op-
timally designed report space, for uniformly distributed information or large electorates, the
average mechanism performs better for any degree of interdependence.
More broadly, this essay contributes to the voting literature. This strand of literature goes
back to an early observation made by Condorcet (1785) that, by pooling the information of
their members, groups may take better decisions than individuals. This statement, known
as the Condorcet Jury Theorem, was initially formulated for non-strategic voters and thus a
purely statistical result. Starting from this insight, there is an extensive literature on collective
decision making, now typically focusing on strategic voters who update their beliefs about the
information held by other agents conditional on the event of being pivotal. Li and Suen (2009)
provide a good survey.
Most of the theoretical voting models study settings in which individuals share a common
interest. That is, committee members would agree on the best outcome if they knew the state.
Often an even stronger assumption is made, namely, that agents have perfectly aligned prefer-
ences. This assumption implies that there is an underlying consensus: agents would agree on
the best action if there were no asymmetric information, that is, if all private information were
publicly available.
There are different ways to introduce heterogeneity among agents’ preferences in the voting
model. One option is to introduce a private values component in agents’ preferences. The model
in this essay, and those of Moldovanu and Shi (2013), Yildirim (2012), Grüner and Kiel (2004),
and Rosar (2015) fall into this category. The analyzed interdependent values environments
incorporate both the private values case, as well as the common values case.
Li et al. (2001) choose a different approach to introduce heterogeneity among voters. They
relax the assumption that agents’ preferences are perfectly aligned, but still assume that agents
9Meyer and Strulovici (2015) extend some of the results of Moldovanu and Shi (2013) to more general
preference structures.
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(a) Present model, (θA, θB) =
(
1
2 ,
1
3
)
.
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vT=0
vM=0
(b) Model in Li et al. (2001).
Figure 4.1: Agreement and disagreement sets in the present model, and in Li et al. (2001), if x
is common knownledge.
Agreement sets: A1 – agents prefer the proposal; A2 – agents prefer the status quo.
Disagreement sets: Di – agent i prefers the proposal, agent j 6= i favors status quo; i ∈ {T, M}.
share a common objective. If there is uncertainty about the state there may be conflict of
interest, but disagreement vanishes if all uncertainty is resolved. The authors discuss how the
level of conflict among committee members affects their incentives to strategically misrepresent
their information and thus may hinder information aggregation.
In the model by Li et al. (2001) and related papers,10 agents are heterogeneous in the sense
that they have different preferences for type-I and type-II errors, and hence require different
levels of evidence to prefer the alternative over the status quo. This specification of heterogeneity
implies that between any pair of agents there is only one direction of disagreement: If a pair of
agents disagrees, it is always the same agent who supports the proposal whilst the other favors
staying with the status quo.
By contrast, in the present model, the conflict of interest arises from different preferences
of committee members. Even if the payoff state were known, agents may not agree on the
best outcome. Moreover, the heterogeneity among agents is such that the direction of conflict
depends on the payoff state: If agents disagree, then it is not always the same agent who favors
the proposal. For any two agents, T and M , with different preference types,11 there are payoff
states in which agent T wants to accept the proposal, while agent M prefers the status quo,
and vice versa. The differences in modeling conflict of interest and heterogeneity among agents
are illustrated in Figure 4.1.
10e.g. Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2006) and Li and Suen (2009).
11In the example discussed in Section 4, they represent a technology and a marketing expert.
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4 Illustrative Example
In order to fix ideas, let us discuss an illustrative, stylized example. Consider a technology
company that has to decide whether to accept a proposal for a product update or to keep pro-
ducing the current version. For simplicity, assume that this decision is taken by a two-member
committee, constituted of a technology expert (T), and a marketing expert (M). Acceptance of
the proposal requires unanimity.
The attribute values of the proposal represent the quality of its technical features xT and
its design features xM , where the technology expert can asses the former, and the marketing
expert can assess the latter. Both experts think that for the success of the product update, the
quality of the proposal in their own dimension is more important, but they acknowledge that
both aspects are relevant. For agent i ∈ {T, M} with preference type θi ∈
[
1
2
, 1
]
, the payoff of
implementing alternative x is
ui(x, θi) = θixi + (1− θi)xj.
Formally, attribute values are uniformly distributed, Xi
iid∼ U [−1, 1], and preference types
are independently distributed on
[
1
2
, 1
]
with distributions Gi, i ∈ {T, M}.
Suppose the marketing expert adopts the cutoff-function χM ∈ XMΘM , that is, if his type
is θM , then he votes affirmatively if and only if the design quality of the proposal is at least
χM(θM). The vote of the technology expert only matters, if he is pivotal, that is, if the marketing
expert votes affirmatively. Taking this into account, conditional on being pivotal, the expected
payoff of the proposal for the technology expert with private information (θT , xT ) is:
VT (xT , θT ) =θTxT + (1− θT )EΘM [EXM [xM |xM ≥ χM(θM)]]
=θTxT + (1− θT )
∫ 1
1/2
χM(θM) + 1
2
dGM(θM).
For the technology expert it is optimal to vote for the proposal if and only if his expected payoff
from the proposal is higher than that of the status quo, VT (xT , θT ) ≥ 0. It is easy to see, that
the expert’s best response is to adopt a cutoff-strategy. Analogous arguments can be used to
determine the best-response function of the marketing expert. Equilibrium cutoff-functions are
determined by the equations:
χ∗i (θi) =−
1− θi
θi
EΘj
[
EXj
[
xj|xj ≥ χ∗j(θj)
]]
i 6= j ∈ {T, M}. (4.2)
Notice, that the case in which agents’ preference types are common knowledge corresponds
to Gi being degenerate distributions. In this case, the equilibrium would be described by the
cutoffs x∗T , x∗M that satisfy (4.2) for the realizations of θT , θM .
Under unanimity voting, being pivotal is good news. It means that the other committee
member has received a sufficiently high signal to vote affirmatively. A private value type θi = 1,
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does not attach any value to the signal of the other expert and adopts the sincere voting thresh-
old 0. The lower an agent’s preference type, the more weight he attaches to the signal of the
other agent. Consequently, equilibrium cutoff-functions χ∗(·) are non-positive, and increasing
in θi. More partisan agents adopt higher acceptance standards.12
5 Equilibrium Characterization
In this section, we establish equilibrium existence and characterize fundamental properties of
the equilibrium strategies.
In a voting game, a rational agent conditions his decision on the event of being pivotal.
Hence, when choosing the optimal action, each committee members takes into account the infor-
mation that he can extract from the event of being pivotal. For any majority rule k ∈ {1, . . . , n},
this is the event in which exactly k − 1 of the other agents vote affirmatively, and hence the
agent’s vote determines the outcome.
Every strategy profile σ−i, corresponds to a set of acceptance sets,
{
A+−i(θ−i)
}
. For any
majority rule k and type profile θ−i, the pivotal set,
Apivi (θ−i) := {x−i : |{j ∈ I\{i} : pij(x−i) ∈ A+(θj)}| = k − 1},
is the set of signal profiles x−i for which agent i is pivotal. Here, pij denotes the jth projection
map, which maps vector x−i to coordinate xj.
Conditional on being pivotal, the expectation of agent i about the signals of the other agents
is:
Eσ−i [x−i | piv] =EΘ−i,X−i
[
x−i | x−i ∈ Apivi (θ−i)
]
(4.3)
=
1
P(σ−i)
∫
Θ−i
∫
X−i
x−i · 1Apivi (θ−i) dF−i(x−i) dG−i(θ−i),
where
P(σ−i) :=
∫
Θ−i
∫
X−i
1Apivi (θ−i)
dF−i(x−i) dG−i(θ−i), (4.4)
is the probability that agent i is pivotal, and
x−i :=
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
xj, (4.5)
12Equilibrium cutoffs are:
χ∗i (θi) = −
1− θi
θi
· 1
1 + ln 4
for i ∈ {T, M},
if preference types are private information; and
x∗i = −
(3θj − 1)(1− θi)
3θiθj + θi + θj − 1 for i ∈ {T, M},
if preference types θT , θM are common knowledge.
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is the average signal of the other agents.
It follows that, given strategy profile σ−i, for agent i with private information (θi, xi), the
expected payoff from implementing the alternative, conditional on being pivotal is:
Vi ((θi, xi);σ−i) = θixi + (1− θi) · Eσ−i [x−i | piv] . (4.6)
We establish equilibrium existence by using the Tychonoff-Schauder fixed-point theorem.
In equilibrium, agents adopt cutoff-strategies.
Theorem 4.1 (Equilibrium Existence).
In a committee of n members with interdependent values and private preference types, for any
generalized majority rule, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there exists a voting equilibrium.
In every voting equilibrium agents adopt cutoff strategies, given by:
χ∗i (θi) =

x if Vi
(
(θi, xi);σ
∗
−i
) ≥ 0 ∀xi ∈ [x, x]
x˜ if Vi
(
(θi, xi);σ
∗
−i
)
< 0 ∀xi ∈ [x, x]
−1−θi
θi
Eσ∗−i [x−i | piv] otherwise.
∀ i ∈ I. (4.7)
If attribute values and preference types are identically distributed, it makes sense to focus
on symmetric equilibria, in which all committee members adopt the same strategies. In the iid
case, there exists a unique symmetric voting equilibrium.
Proposition 4.1 (Symmetric Equilibrium – Uniqueness).
If attributes values and preference types are iid (Fi = Fj, and Gi = Gj for all i, j ∈ I), then
there exists a unique symmetric voting equilibrium.
The rest of the section is devoted to characterizing and understanding some fundamental
properties of equilibrium strategies.
Lemma 4.1. In any voting equilibrium, for all i ∈ I,
(i) agents with private value type θi = 1 vote sincerely, χ∗i (1) = 0.
All preference types of an agent adjust their cutoffs in the same direction; that is, agent
i’s cutoffs χ∗i (θi) have the same sign for all types θi ∈ Θi\{1}.
(ii) the cutoff functions χ∗i are continuous in the agent’s preference type θi, and twice contin-
uously differentiable a.e..
(iii) the more partisan an agent is, the less he adjusts his acceptance standard:
|χ∗i (θi)| is non-increasing in θi.
If an agent has private values (θi = 1), the signals of the other agents do not influence his
preferences, and the information that he derives from the event of being pivotal does not affect
his decision. Hence, a private values type will vote sincerely, that is, solely based on his own
private signal. He adopts the cutoff 0.
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Every other agent with interdependent values, takes into account the expected value that
he attaches to the information held by other committee members. In his decision of choosing an
optimal cutoff, each agent updates his beliefs conditional on the event of being pivotal. In par-
ticular, being pivotal is either good news (if Eσ−i [x−i|piv] > 0) or bad news (Eσ−i [x−i|piv] < 0).
In the first case, agent i attaches a positive expectation to the information held by other agents.
He will therefore require weaker evidence himself to accept an alternative, adjust his own ac-
ceptance standard and adopt a negative cutoff. The expected information derived from the
event of being pivotal is the same for all types of agent i. Consequently, all types θi 6= 1 will
adjust their acceptance standards in the same direction. In particular, under unanimity voting,
all cutoffs are non-positive.
Corollary 4.1 (Unanimity Voting). For the unanimity rule k = n, equilibrium cutoffs are
non-positive:
χ∗i (θi) ∈ [x, 0] ∀θi ∈ Θi, i ∈ I,
and χ∗i (θi) is increasing in θi.
Are agents’ equilibrium strategies responsive, that is, do agents condition their voting deci-
sion on the private signal that they observe?
Definition 4.1: Type θi of agent i ∈ I is responsive, if he conditions his decision whether
or not to vote affirmatively on his observed signal. For cutoff-strategies this is equivalent to
adopting an (interior) cutoff, χi(θi) ∈ (x, x].
Agent i’s strategy is responsive if there exists a set of types ΘRi ⊆ Θi with non-empty interior,
such that all types θi ∈ ΘRi are responsive.
Responsiveness of agents’ equilibrium strategies is a necessary condition for information
aggregation. The next result shows that there is always a set of responsive preference types
with non-empty interior. In any voting equilibrium a positive measure of preference types (and
profiles) condition their decision on the signal that they observe – some information aggregation
occurs.
Lemma 4.2. In any voting equilibrium, agents’ cutoff strategies are responsive. There exists
some type θˆi such that all types θi ≥ θˆi are responsive, whereas χ∗i is constant on
[
0, θˆi
)
. All of
these types adopt the same extreme cutoff, either x or x˜. That is,
χ∗i (θi) ∈ (x, x] , ∀ θi ∈
[
θˆi, 1
]
, and
χ∗i (θi) ≡ constant ∈ {x, x˜}, ∀ θi ∈
[
0, θˆi
)
.
The following lemma characterizes the shape of the equilibrium cutoff-functions. If equilib-
rium cutoffs are non-positive (non-negative), then the corresponding cutoff-function is concave
(convex) on the set of responsive types.
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Lemma 4.3. In any voting equilibrium, every equilibrium cutoff function with non-positive
cutoffs χ∗(θi) ≤ 0 (non-negative, χ∗(θi) ≥ 0), is concave (convex) on the set of responsive types[
θˆi, 1
]
. Equilibrium cutoff functions satisfy:
(χ∗i )
′ · (χ∗i )′′ ≤ 0 ∀ i ∈ I. (4.8)
The identified properties determine the shape of equilibrium strategies. Some properties
depend on the quorum rule. There are four possible shapes of equilibrium cutoff-functions,
which are illustrated in Figure 4.2. An explicit example for a two-member committee was
discussed in Section 4.
θi
   1
χi*(θi)
   
-1
^
1
θi
Figure 4.2: Possible shapes of equilibrium cutoff-functions.
6 Comparative Static Effects of Preference Uncertainty
One goal of this essay is to understand how the distribution of preference types, and preference
uncertainty affect the outcomes of committee decisions. Should we expect the composition
of committees to matter for the outcome of collective decisions – and if so how? The model
establishes a framework that allows us to study these questions.
Specifically, we answer the following questions: Should we expect committee members who
originate from more partisan populations to adopt more or less stringent acceptance standards?
And how does this affect the set of alternatives that are accepted by such committees? The
same questions are analyzed regarding the effects of more or less heterogeneity of the population
of committee members.
For the comparative statics analysis, we consider the symmetric case with iid attribute
values and preference types. We focus on symmetric equilibria, which are unique in this case
(Theorem 4.1 and Proposition 4.1). For simplicity, we consider decisions that require unanimity.
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Hence, equilibrium cutoffs are non-positive (Corollary 4.1). A brief discussion of the case of
generalized majority rules is provided at the end of this section.
6.1 Extent of Partisanship in the Population
How are committee decisions affected by the extent of partisanship of its members? As the
following result shows, agents adopt lower acceptance standards if they find themselves among
fellow committee members from a more partisan population.
Proposition 4.2 (More Partisan Populations).
In any symmetric voting equilibrium,13 in a committee whose members stem from a more par-
tisan population, each preference type will adopt less stringent acceptance standards than in a
committee with less conflict among members’ preferences:
If H ≥FOSD G then χ∗H(θi) ≤ χ∗G(θi) ∀ θi ∈ Θi, ∀ i ∈ I.
A first-order shift in the distribution of preference types of the committee members pop-
ulation represents a shift in the population towards more extreme or partisan types. From
Lemma 4.1 we know that those types adjust their thresholds less, and vote more based on their
own signal. Hence, for any individual agent who faces fellow committee members from such a
more partisan population, being pivotal is more informative about other members’ signals than
if his fellow committee members are more socially oriented. It follows that any given preference
type will adjust his acceptance standard more, and equilibrium cutoffs move away from 0, the
sincere voting threshold. In the case of unanimity voting, this means that the event of being
pivotal is better news, and equilibrium cutoffs-functions shift downwards.
Let me sketch the idea of the proof of Proposition 4.2, the formal details are relegated
to the appendix. A difficulty in the analysis of the current model is that agents hold two-
dimensional private information. The multi-dimensionality of the model hence requires working
with function spaces and to identify fixed points therein (cf Theorem 4.1). The trick that we
adopt is to re-formulate the characterizing fixed-point property for symmetric equilibria. The
original problem is mapped to a related problem, which only requires to identify fixed-points
of a one-dimensional mapping, and hence is more tractable. Moreover, it is shown that there is
a one-to-one correspondence (bijection) between fixed points of this one-dimensional mapping,
and symmetric equilibria of the original problem. This trick to re-formulate the problem is
illustrated in Figure 4.3.
In the alternative problem, we determine the effects of distributional shifts on the mapping
Φ in order to then derive the induced effects for the equilibrium cutoff-functions of the original
problem. In the proof it is shown that the function Φ is decreasing. Moreover, a shift in the
distribution of preferences types only affects the mapping Λ whereas the mapping β remains
13for decisions requiring unanimity
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Ψ : XΘ Λ //
Ψ
,,R β // XΘ
χ(θ)  // c(χ) := EΘ [EX [χ(θ)|piv]]  // χc(θ) := χBR(c, θ)
(a) Best-response correspondence – symmetric case.
Φ : R+0
β //
Φ
++XΘii Λ // R
c  // max
{
x, −1−θi
θi
· c
}
 // EΘi [EX [Xi|Xi ≥ χi(θi)]] .
(b) Related, one-dimensional mapping.
Figure 4.3: Re-formulation of the problem. There is a one-to-one correspondence between fixed
points of the mappings Ψ and Φ.
unchanged. Specifically, it is shown that a first-order shift of the distribution of preference types
results in a upward shift of the function Φ. It is then easy to see that the fixed-point of the
new mapping is to the right of the fixed point of the original mapping Φ. This is illustrated
in Figure 4.4, where the fixed points are determined by the intersection points of the graph
of Φ with the 45◦-line. This fixed-point captures the information that an agent derives in
equilibrium from the event of being pivotal – for the unanimity rule it is positive, and higher
for more partisan populations. Finally, it follows that agents adjust their acceptance standards
more, resulting in a downward shift of the equilibrium cutoff-function.
45°-line,
 y = c
cH
cG LHHΒHcLL
LGHΒHcLL
1
c
0.5
FHcL
Figure 4.4: Effects of a FOSD-shift of the distribution of preference types on the function Φ
and its fixed points.
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6.2 Level of Preference Heterogeneity of the Populations
How should we expect acceptance standards and sets to change depending on whether the
committee consists of members from a population with more or less preference heterogeneity? In
the latter case, there is less uncertainty about other agents’ preferences. As the following result
shows, if agents find themselves among committee members from a more partisan population,
they adjust their acceptance standards less and vote more based on their own signal.
Proposition 4.3 (More Heterogeneous Populations).
For the unanimity rule, in any symmetric voting equilibrium, in a committee that is consti-
tuted of members from a more heterogeneous population, each preference type will adopt more
stringent acceptance standards than in a committee with members from a more homogeneous
population:
If H ≥MPS G then χ∗H(θi) ≥ χ∗G(θi) ∀ θi ∈ Θi, ∀ i ∈ I.
The proof of the result again uses the re-formulation of the problem discussed in Section 6.1
and is relegated to the appendix.
Let us provide some intuition for the result. An agent, who finds himself among committee
members from a population with a high level of preference heterogeneity, faces a lot of uncer-
tainty about the preference type of his fellow committee members. It is hence hard for him to
predict whether a fellow committee member voted affirmatively because of a high signal, or
because he has a low preference type. In the latter case, an agent may vote affirmatively even
though he observes a relatively low signal (cf. Lemma 4.1). Hence, the event of being pivotal
is not very informative for an agent, he only weakly adjusts his acceptance standard and votes
based more on his own private signal than an agent who finds himself in a committee of mem-
bers from a more homogeneous population. For the unanimity rule, this implies that members
of committees constituted of individuals from a more heterogeneous population adopt higher
acceptance standards than committees with members from a more homogeneous population.
The results allow to make predictions, regarding the acceptance standards and acceptance
sets of the examples of committees that we mentioned in the introduction. One should expect
that committees from large states or assemblies of international organizations, only accept al-
ternatives that are of sufficiently high quality in every dimension. By contrast, the minimum
requirements in each dimension for an alternative to pass, may be lower for a committee whose
members stem from a more homogeneous population. It should be noticed that this observa-
tion does not imply that one or the other committee performs better in term of maximizing
utilitarian welfare.
Generalized Majority Rules
The comparative static results in this section were established for the unanimity rule. However,
the results do not seem to depend on this assumption and should extend to generalized majority
rules. Let us provide some intuition about which results one could expect.
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For any generalized majority rule, the number of affirmative votes required to adopt the
alternative determines whether in the symmetric equilibrium, cutoff-functions are non-positive
(as for the unanimity rule), or non-negative. The latter is the case if only a small number of
affirmative votes are necessary in order to adopt the alternative.
As discussed in Section 6.1, a first-order shift in the distribution of preference types of the
population of committee members, results in the event of being pivotal being more informative
about the other agents’ signals than before. Hence, each individual preference type will adjust
his acceptance standard more and equilibrium cutoffs move away from 0: The equilibrium
cutoff-function moves upwards if it is non-negative, and downwards if it is non-positive.
For the case of a second-order shift – meaning that committee members stem from a pop-
ulation with more heterogeneous preference types – the event of being pivotal becomes less
informative about the other agents’ preferences. As a result, each agent adjusts his acceptance
threshold less, and votes more based on his private signal. For each individual preference type,
equilibrium cutoffs move closer to 0: The equilibrium cutoff-function moves downwards if it is
non-negative, and upwards if it is non-positive.
7 Conclusion
In this essay, we have proposed and analyzed a committee voting model in which agents have in-
terdependent preferences and individual, private preference types. It was shown that, in equilib-
rium, agents choose optimal acceptance standards conditional on being pivotal, and an agent’s
preference type is reflected in his acceptance standard. We identified how acceptance standards
react to changes in the distribution of preferences-types of committee members:
1. Agents adjust their acceptance standards more (compared to the sincere voting threshold), if
they believe to find themselves among committee members from a more partisan population.
2. More heterogeneity of preference types – and hence more uncertainty about the preference
types of the other committee members – leads an agent to act cautious, adjust his acceptance
standard less, and base his decision more on his own, privately observed signal.
The prediction of the model could be tested, either in the lab, or in the field by compar-
ing decisions across committees. Here, cultural dimensions, e.g. on the scale of individualism-
collectivism, could be taken as predictors of preference types of committee members.
The analysis can be extended in several dimensions and there are various open questions
and directions for future research. It is of interest to (1) allow for sequential voting procedures,
(2) study more general mechanisms than generalized majority rules, (3) allow for pre-voting
communication; either about the observed signal, or the preference types, or a combination
of both, (4) study a dynamic situation in which a standing committee votes on a sequence of
alternatives, and may accept multiple of them.
We briefly want to comment on two of these topics, on which we have some basic insights.
First, it would be interesting to consider the collective decision problem for a group of agents
with interdependent preferences from a mechanism design perspective (not allowing for mone-
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tary transfers).
For the case with one-dimensional private information, in which preference types are com-
mon knowledge, it is straightforward to show that a necessary condition for implementability of
a social choice function is that it is a step function. Such social choice functions can be imple-
mented by some kind of generalized voting procedure, where agents may use finer reports than
simple yes/no votes (e.g. yes, maybe, rather not, no). It follows that, in this setting, the socially
efficient (utilitarian) policy hence cannot be implemented. The question remains, which social
choice functions can be implemented, and how well the utilitarian policy can be approximated.
For the model with two-dimensional private information studied in this essay, an interesting
observation is that it falls into the class of “non-generic settings” for which the impossibility
result of Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) does not apply. This raises the question what can be
done beyond implementing constant social choice functions.
Second, a straightforward question is whether information sharing through pre-vote com-
munication is possible. Much of the voting literature consider straw polls as communication
devices.14 In the model studied in this essay, information sharing is not possible through straw
polls. This is most easily seen for unanimity voting. Suppose agents observe their private signal
about an attribute of the proposal. In the straw poll, agents may reveal some of their private
information by indicating support for the proposal or not. However, the only interest of an
agent under unanimity is to get other agents to vote for the alternative in case that his own
private signal is high enough. Hence, an agent will always exaggerate his private signal in the
straw poll. This still leaves him with the option to vote against the proposal in the actual vote.
It would be of interest to allow for more general communication devices/procedures, or to give
agents the option to communicate about their private preference types.
14See e.g. Coughlan (2000) and subsequent papers
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Consider some agent i ∈ I. Suppose σ−i denotes the strategies adopted
by all agents but i, and let {A+−i(θ−i)}θ−i∈Θ−i be the corresponding set of acceptance sets. For
agent i with type θi, the expected payoff of the alternative, conditional on being pivotal, and
observing signal xi is:15
Vi ((θi, xi);σ−i) = θixi + (1− θi) · Eσ−i [x−i | piv] with (4.9)
Eσ−i [x−i|piv] :=
1
P(σ−i)
∫
Θ−i
∫
X−i
x−i · 1Apiv−i (θ−i) dF−i(x−i) dG−i(θ−i).
It is agent i’s best response to vote in favor of the alternative if and only if the expected payoff
of the alternative, conditional on him being pivotal, is greater than the payoff of the status
quo, which is 0. Consequently, it is agent i’s best response to vote affirmatively if and only if
Vi ((θi, xi);σ−i) ≥ 0.
It is easy to see from (4.9) that Vi ((θi, xi);σ−i) is continuous and strictly increasing in xi.
This readily establishes that agent i’s best response is to follow a cutoff-strategy. That is, for
every preference type θi, there exists some χi(θi) ∈ X i such that type θi votes affirmatively
if and only if he observes a signal xi ≥ χi(θi).16 In particular, suppose all other agents adopt
strategy profile σ−i, then agent i’s best response is to adopt cutoff-function φBRi characterized
by:
φBRi (θi) =

x if Vi ((θi, xi);σ−i) ≥ 0 ∀xi ∈ [x, x]
x˜ if Vi ((θi, xi);σ−i) < 0 ∀xi ∈ [x, x]
−1−θi
θi
Eσ−i [x−i|piv] otherwise.
(4.10)
From now on we assume that agents adopt cutoff-strategies. By a slight abuse of notation,
we denote agent i’s cutoff strategy by a function χi : Θi → X i, where χi(θi) is the cutoff that
agent i adopts if his type is θi.
Let X iΘi be the space of functions f : Θi → X i endowed with the product topology
(here: the topology of pointwise convergence). We denote agent i’s best response function by
15Suppose agent i updates his beliefs, assuming that he is pivotal and all other agents play according to σ−i.
Then his expected payoff if he votes affirmatively is:
V˜i ((θi, xi);σ−i) =
∫
Θ−i
∫
X−i
θixi + 1− θi
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
xj
 · 1Apiv−i (θ−i) dF−i(x−i) dG−i(θ−i)
=P(σ−i)θixi +
1− θi
n− 1
∫
Θ−i
∫
X−i
∑
j 6=i
xj
 · 1Apiv−i (θ−i) dF−i(x−i) dG−i(θ−i),
where P(σ−i) =
∫
Θ−i
∫
X−i 1Apiv−i (θ−i) dF−i(x−i)dG−i(θ−i) is the probability that agent i is pivotal. Using that
xi :=
1
n−1
∑
j 6=i xj and conditioning on the event of being pivotal yields (4.9).
16Reminder: X i := Xi ∪ {x˜}, and cutoff x˜ represents the case in which the agent rejects all proposals.
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φBRi : XΘ → X iΘi .17 This is well-defined since we have shown that for any strategy profile σ−i
agent i’s best response is a cutoff function.
The discussion shows that, for every strategy profile σ−i a unique best response for agent
i exists, and that best responses take the form of cutoff functions. It follows that the best
response correspondence is a function, characterized by:
Φ : X 1Θ1 × · · · × X nΘn −→ X 1Θ1 × · · · × X nΘn
χ = (χ1, . . . , χn) 7−→
(
φBRi (χ) , . . . , φ
BR
n (χ)
)
.
We use the Schauder-Tychonoff fixed-point theorem18 to establish equilibrium existence.
First, notice that for every i ∈ I, Θi is compact. Moreover, X i is compact for the given
topology that we have chosen. It is possible to interpret X iΘi as an infinite product of X i, and
hence by Tychonoff’s theorem X iΘi is compact. Applying Tychonoff’s theorem again, yields
that K := X 1Θ1 × · · · ×X nΘn is compact. It is easily verified that K is non-empty and convex.
We also have to verify that the best response function Φ is continuous for which it suffices
to show continuity for each of the coordinate functions. Consider the coordinate function
Φi : X iΘi ×X−iΘ−i → X iΘi
χ = (χi, χ−i) 7→ φBR(χ)
It is easily seen that Φi is constant in χi. Moreover, since the expectation operator is linear,
and in the given setting bounded, it follows that Φi is continuous in χ−i (cf. (4.10)). This shows
that every coordinate function Φi is continuous, and so is Φ.
Finally, the existence of a fixed point of φ follows by the Schauder-Tychonoff fixed-point
theorem, which completes the proof of equilibrium existence.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Consider the symmetric case, in which attributes values and prefer-
ence types are iid: Fi = Fj, and Gi = Gj for all i, j ∈ I.
Given the cutoff-function profile χ = (χ1, . . . , χn), agent i’s expected payoff of the proposal,
conditional on being pivotal, is
Vi(θi, xi) =θixi + (1− θi)EΘ−i
[
EX
[
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
Xj|Xj ≥ χj(θj)
]]
=θixi + (1− θi) 1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
EΘj [EX [Xj|Xj ≥ χj(θj)]]
17φBR identifies for every σ−i a corresponding cutoff-function φBR(σi, σ−i) = χi ∈ X iΘi . Notice that φBR is
constant in σi.
18cf. Aliprantis and Border (2006) p. 583
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On an individual basis, we thus have
Λj : X iΘi −→ R (4.11)
χi 7−→ EΘi [EX [Xi|Xi ≥ χi(θi)]]
Define the function
β˜ : R+0
n−1 −→ X iΘi
(c1, c2, . . . , ĉi, ci+1, . . . cn) 7−→ χi(θi) = max
{
x, −1− θi
θi
· 1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
cj
}
.
We focus on symmetric equilibria, in which all agents adopt the same strategy. In a sym-
metric equilibrium χ∗i ≡ χ∗j , and hence c∗j = c∗i := EΘi [EX [Xi|Xi ≥ χ∗i (θi)]] for all i, j ∈ I.
Consequently, it suffices to consider the following reduced version of the function β˜:
β : R+0 −→ X iΘi
c 7−→ χi(θi) = max
{
x, −1− θi
θi
· c
}
.
The discussion shows that, for the unanimity rule, there exists a constant, c ∈ R+0 that deter-
mines the equilibrium cutoff-functions.
Consider the following composite function
Φ : R+0
β−→ X iΘi Λ−→ R
c 7−→max
{
x, −1− θi
θi
· c
}
7−→ EΘi [EX [Xi|Xi ≥ χi(θi)]] .
The problem to find a symmetric equilibrium is equivalent to finding a fixed-point, c∗, of this
mapping Φ. Every fixed-point c∗ uniquely determines the equilibrium cutoff-functions and vice
versa.
For c ≥ 0, β is decreasing in c (in a “set-value” sense), meaning that if c′ ≥ c, then
χc′(θi) ≤ χc(θi) for every θi ∈ Θi.
The left-truncated expectation operator is non-decreasing in the cutoff; that is, E [X|X ≥ xˆ]
is non-decreasing in xˆ. Consequently, if χ˜(θi) ≤ χ(θi) for all θi ∈ Θi, then EΘi [EX [Xi|Xi ≥ χ˜i(θi)]] ≤
EΘi [EX [Xi|Xi ≥ χi(θi)]]. It follows that (Λ ◦ β) (c) is decreasing in c (for c ∈ R+0 ).
We wish to determine a fixed point of Φ, that is, some c∗ ∈ R+0 such that
c∗ = (Λ ◦ β) (c∗) (4.12)
We know that for (4.12):
(i) For c = 0: lhs < rhs.
Indeed, (Λ ◦ β) (0) = E [X|X ≥ 0] > E [X] = 0.
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(ii) For c = x: lhs ≥ rhs.
Indeed, E [X|X ≥ xˆ] ≤ x, with strict inequality for xˆ < x. Moreover, for every c ∈ R+0 ,
χi(θi) is continuous in θi, with χi(θi) ≤ 0 for all θi ∈ Θi, and χi(1) = 0. It follows that
(Λ ◦ β) (c) = EΘi [EX [Xi|Xi ≥ χc(θi)]] < x.
The lhs of (4.12) is strictly increasing in c, whereas the rhs of (4.12) is strictly decreasing in
c. The functions on both sides of (4.12) are continuous. It follows that there exists a fixed
point c∗ of Φ = Λ ◦ β. Moreover, given that the functions on both sides are strictly decreasing,
respectively increasing, there exists a unique fixed point of Φ.
Proof of Lemma 4.1.
(i): An agent with preference type θi = 1 has private values, and hence Vi
(
(1, xi);σ
∗
−i
)
= xi,
∀xi ∈ Xi. Given that the payoff of the status quo is 0 it follows that χ∗i (1) = 0, that is, in
equilibrium, preference type θi = 1 always votes sincerely.
Consider any equilibrium strategy profile σ∗ with corresponding acceptance sets
{A∗i (θi)}i∈I, θi∈Θi . Notice that, for every agent i, Eσ−i [x−i|piv] is constant in θi. Moreover,
−1−θi
θi
< 0 for all θi ∈ (0, 1). It follows that equilibrium cutoffs χ∗i (θi) have the same sign
for all types θi ∈ Θi\{0}:
sign [χ∗i (θi)] = −signEσ−i [x−i|piv] .
(ii): Continuity of equilibrium cutoff-functions.
Consider a committee member with type θi who adopts and interior equilibrium cutoff, that is,
χ∗i (θi) ∈ (x, x]. Given the equilibrium characterizing conditions in Theorem 4.1, it must hold
that Vi
(
(θi, xi);σ
∗
−i
)
>
(<)
0 for xi >
(<)
χ∗i (θi). Since Vi
(
(θi, xi);σ
∗
−i
)
is continuous in θi and xi,
this implies that there exist an  > 0 s.t. Vi
(
(θ′i, x);σ
∗
−i
)
> 0 and Vi
(
(θ′i, x);σ
∗
−i
)
< 0 for all
θ′i ∈ B(θi), where B(θi) is the open −ball about θi. It then follows from the equilibrium
characterizing conditions of Theorem 4.1, that all preference types θ′i ∈ B adopt interior
cutoffs. In this case equilibrium cutoffs are characterized by χ∗i (θi) = −1−θiθi Eσ−i [x−i|piv]. Since
Eσ−i [x−i|piv] is constant and −1−θiθi is twice continuously differentiable in θi, it follows that
χ∗i (θi) is continuously differentiable in θi.
Now, consider a preference type θi ∈ Θi who adopts a boundary cutoff, χ∗i (θi) ∈ {x, x˜},
that is for type θi either Vi
(
(θi, xi);σ
∗
−i
) ≥ 0 for all xi ∈ Xi, or Vi ((θi, xi);σ∗−i) < 0 for all
xi ∈ Xi. Consider the first case, that is, χ∗i (θi) = x and Vi
(
(θi, xi);σ
∗
−i
) ≥ 0, ∀xi ∈ Xi.19
Given that Vi
(
(θi, xi);σ
∗
−i
)
is monotone increasing in xi, a necessary and sufficient condition
for V
(
(θi, xi);σ
∗
−i
) ≥ 0 is V ((θi, xi);σ∗−i) ≥ 0. Since Vi ((θi, xi);σ∗−i) is continuous in θi, the
set {θi ∈ Θi|Vi
(
(θi, xi), σ
∗
−i
) ≥ 0} is closed. Since ∂Vi
∂θi
∣∣
xi=xi
≥ 0, it follows that there exists
some θˆ ∈ Θi such that {θi ∈ Θi|Vi
(
(θi, xi), σ
∗
−i
) ≥ 0} = [θ, θˆ]. By Theorem 4.1, χ∗(θi) = x for
θi ∈
[
0, θˆ
]
. The equilibrium cutoff function is constant on this set and thus twice continuously
19The second case can be easily verified using analogous arguments.
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differentiable in θi. It is easy to check that lim
θi↓θˆ
χ∗(θi) = x, which establishes continuity of the
equilibrium cutoff function. However, χ∗(θi) is not differentiable at θˆ, hence equilibrium cutoff-
functions are only differentiable almost everywhere and the same holds true for higher order
differentiability.
(iii): To prove the last statement we use again that Eσ−i [x−i|piv] is constant in θi. For all θi
such that χ∗i (θ) ∈ (x, x], we have shown that the cutoff-function is continuously differentiable.
We obtain: ∣∣∣∣ ∂∂θiχ∗i
∣∣∣∣ = − 1θ2i · ∣∣Eσ−i [x−i|piv]∣∣ ,
from which it follows that |χ∗i (θi)| is non-increasing in θi whenever cutoffs are interior. Moreover,
all types θi ∈
[
0, θˆi
]
of agent i adopt extreme cutoffs in {x, x˜}. Since cutoff-functions are
continuous, it follows that |χ∗i (θi)| is non-increasing in θi for all types θi ∈ Θi.
Proof of Corollary 4.1. For unanimity voting, agent i is pivotal if and only if all other committee
members vote affirmatively. This implies
Eσ−i [x−i|piv] =
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
EΘj
[
EXj
[
Xj | Xj ≥ χ∗j(θj)
]]
>
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
EΘj
[
EXj [Xj | Xj ≥ x]
]
= 0
We obtain the last equality because E [Xj] = 0 for every j ∈ I. The inequality is strict because
χ∗j(1) = 0 and χ∗j(θj) is continuous in θj, which implies that in a neighborhood of θ−i = 1,
χ∗j(θj) 6= x for all j ∈ I\{i}.
It follows that
χ∗i (θi) = −
1− θi
θi
EΘ−i,X−i
[
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
Xj | Xj ≥ χ∗j(θj)
]
≤ 0,
and hence by Lemma 4.1 (iii), χ∗i (θi) is increasing in θi for every i ∈ I.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. In Lemma 4.1 it was shown that χ∗i is continuous in θi, χ∗i (1) = 0 and
|χ∗i (θi)| is non-increasing in θi. Moreover, if χ∗i (θi) ∈ {x, x˜}, then χ∗i (θ′i) = χ∗i (θi) ∈ {x, x˜} for
all θ′i ≤ θi. Continuity of χ∗i for interior cutoffs and χ∗i (1) = 0 yield that if there are types which
adopt extreme cutoffs in {x, x˜}, then there exists some type θˆi such that all types
[
0, θˆi
]
adopt
extreme cutoffs in {x, x˜} whereas all types
(
θˆi, 1
]
adopt interior cutoffs.
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Proof of Lemma 4.3. By Lemma 4.1 χ∗i (θi) is constant on the set of non-responsive types. That
is, (χ∗i )
′ (θi) = 0 for all θi ∈
[
0, θˆi
)
and (4.8) is trivially satisfied.
Now consider any responsive type θi ∈
(
θˆ, 1
]
. By Lemma 4.1 we know that χ∗i is twice
continuously differentiable at θi. It is easily verified that for θi ∈
(
θˆ, 1
]
we obtain
(χ∗i )
′ · (χ∗i )′′ (θi) = −
2
θ5i
Eσ∗−i [x−i|piv]2 ≤ 0.
The result about concavity/convexity of equilibrium cutoff functions follows by combining this
with the result of Lemma 4.1 (iii).
Proof of Proposition 4.2. As shown in the proof of Proposition 4.1, there is a one-to-one corre-
spondence between symmetric equilibria, and fixed-points of the composite function:
Φ : R+0
β−→ XΘii Λ−→ R
c 7−→max
{
x, −1− θi
θi
· c
}
7−→ EΘi [EX [Xi|Xi ≥ χi(θi)]] .
with
β(c) := max
{
x, −1− θi
θi
· c
}
, and (4.13)
Λ(χi) := EΘi [EX [Xi|Xi ≥ χi(θi)]] .
Based on this observation, we will first study the effects of changes in the distribution of
preference types on the fixed-point(s) of the one-dimensional mapping Φ. We then derive the
induced effects on the equilibrium cutoff-functions of the original problem.
Every distribution function on Θ defines an operator Λ as in (4.13), with the expectation
taken with respect to the distribution of preferences types. The operators corresponding to the
distributions H and G are denoted ΛH and ΛG.
Notice that a change in the distribution function of agents’ preference types only affects the
operator Λ, whereas the mapping β remains unchanged.
We know from Corollary 4.1 that, under unanimity voting, any equilibrium cutoff-function
is non-positive and increasing in θi. Moreover, if H ≥FOSD G, then for every increasing function
χ ∈ XiΘi , it holds that
ΛH (χ) ≥ ΛG (χ) .
Since β remains unchanged, and β(c) is increasing in θi whenever c ≥ 0, it follows that:
ΦH(c) = ΛH (β(c)) ≥ ΛG (β(c)) = ΦG(c) ∀ c ≥ 0. (4.14)
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Now, notice that ΦG and ΦH are functions from the unit interval to R. Consequently, it is easy
to graphically determine a fixed point of these mappings. It is simply an intersection point of the
graph ΦG(c), respectively ΦH(c) with the 45◦-line. We denote these points by cG, respectively
cH . Figure 4.4 (page 113) illustrates the graphs and fixed points.
From Theorem 4.1, we know that fixed points of the mappings ΦH and ΦG exist. Moreover,
by (4.14), ΦH(c) ≥ ΦG(c) for all c ≥ 0, and hence the graph of ΦH always lies above the graph
of ΦG. As shown in the proof of Theorem 4.1, ΦH and ΦG are decreasing in c. Hence, for the
intersection points of the graphs with the 45◦-line it follows that ΦH(c∗H) lies above ΦG(c∗G),
that is, ΦH(c∗H) ≥ ΦG(c∗G). This implies c∗H ≥ c∗G.
For the equilibrium cutoff-functions it follows that
χ∗H(θi) = χc∗H (θi) ≤ χc∗G(θi) = χ∗G(θi). (4.15)
In the symmetric equilibrium, on an individual basis, acceptance standards are lower for more
partisan populations than for more socially-oriented populations.
Proof of Proposition 4.3. We again use the trick that it is possible to decompose the map Ψ
into Ψ = β ◦ Λ, and that there is a one-to-one correspondence between fixed-points of the
composition map Φ = Λ ◦ β and symmetric voting equilibria. For two distribution functions
H ≥MPS G, we determine and compare the fixed points of ΦH and ΦG, in order to then derive
the implied relation of the equilibrium cutoff-functions for populations distributed according to
H and G, respectively.
As pointed out in the proof of Proposition 4.2, a shift in the distribution function of pref-
erence types only affects the second component, the function Λ, of the decomposition of Φ.
By Lemma 4.3 and Corollary 4.1, under unanimity, equilibrium cutoff functions are increas-
ing and concave, and c∗ = EΘi [EX [Xi|Xi ≥ χ∗i (θi)]] ≥ 0. Moreover, if H ≥MPS G, then for
every increasing and concave function χ ∈ XΘii , it holds that
ΛH (χ) ≤ ΛG (χ) .
Since β remains unchanged, it follows that for every c ≥ 0:
ΦH(c) =ΛH (β(c)) ≤ ΛG (β(c)) = ΦG(c). (4.16)
As in the proof of Proposition 4.2, it is easy to determine and compare the fixed points of the
functions ΦG and ΦH graphically. They are simply the intersection points of the graph ΦG(c),
respectively ΦH(c), with the 45◦-line. Figure 4.5 illustrates the graphs and fixed points.
If H ≥MPS G, by (4.16), the graph of ΦH lies below ΦG for all c ≥ 0. Since ΦG and ΦH
are decreasing in c, it follows that the intersection point of ΦH with the 45◦-line lies below
the intersection point of ΦG with that line. Consequently, c∗H ≤ c∗G, and for the equilibrium
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Figure 4.5: Illustration of the effect of a mean-preserving spread of the distribution of the
populations’ preference types on the expected value of the information of the other agent
conditional on the event of being pivotal.
cutoff-functions it follows that:
χ∗H(θi) = χc∗H (θi) ≥ χc∗G(θi) = χ∗G(θi) ∀ θi ∈ Θi,
which proves the result.
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